

OFFICIAL HISTORY
OF
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

PART II.

FROM THE BATTLE OF THE YA-LU TO LIAO-YANG,
EXCLUSIVE.

PREPARED BY
THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE COMMITTEE
OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

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PART II.

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PREFACE.

PART II of the Official History of the Russo-Japanese War has been prepared by the Committee of Imperial Defence in continuation of Part I, which was published by the General Staff in 1906.

This part forms an advanced portion of the combined naval and military history which is in course of preparation by the Committee of Imperial Defence. It deals with the military operations between the battles of the Ya-lu and Liao-yang; naval operations have only been touched upon in so far as they affect the movements of troops on land. In accordance with the wishes of the General Staff all comments are withheld until the production of the combined history.

The principal works which have been consulted in addition to reports by British attachés are the Austrian, German and American official accounts, Major von Tettau's *Eighteen Months with the Russian Army in Manchuria*, and Colonel Gertsch's *The Russo-Japanese War*. Much information has also been derived from various lectures delivered in Japan and at the Nicolas Academy of the General Staff, St. Petersburg.

The maps are taken from the Russian two verst map and from other sources.

Committee of Imperial Defence.

2, Whitehall Gardens.

7th August, 1908.

DIARY OF EVENTS.

5th February to 1st May, 1904.

5th February.—Diplomatic relations broken off by the Japanese Minister in St. Petersburg.

8th February.—Japanese squadron arrived at Chemulpo, escorting three transports with four infantry battalions.
Japanese squadron under Admiral Togo attacked Port Arthur. Two Russian battleships and one cruiser torpedoed.

9th February.—Naval attack on Port Arthur renewed. One Russian battleship and three cruisers injured.
Russian cruiser *Variag* and gunboat *Koriets* destroyed at Chemulpo.

14th February.—Naval attack on Port Arthur. Russian cruiser torpedoed.

16th February.—Japanese 12th Division began to disembark at Chemulpo.

24th February.—First attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur.

27th February.—Japanese 12th Division completed disembarkation at Chemulpo.

6th March.—Admiral Kamimura bombarded Vladivostok.

13th March.—Japanese Guard and 2nd Divisions began to disembark at Chinampo.

21st-22nd March.—Naval bombardment of Port Arthur.

27th March.—Second attempt to block Port Arthur.

28th March.—Japanese Guard and 2nd Divisions completed disembarkation at Chemulpo.

21st April.—Japanese First Army concentrated at Wiju.

27th April.—Reconnaissance for third attempt to block Port Arthur.

30th April-1st May.—Battle of the Ya-lu.

CHAPTER VII.

THE LANDING OF THE SECOND JAPANESE ARMY IN MANCHURIA
AND THE BATTLE OF NAN SHAN.

THE victory of the Ya-lu had cleared the air, and had relieved the Japanese Imperial Head-Quarters of much anxiety. East and West had met for the first time under equal conditions of armament and organization, and all the moral effect of success in the first encounter was with the army of Japan. General Kuroki was able to hold his own; the occupation of Korea, the first objective of the campaign, was assured; and the Imperial Head-Quarters could now turn their attention towards Port Arthur.

The early successes of her fleet had given Japan temporary command of the sea, and had enabled her to land her troops in Korea unmolested, but as long as the Russian naval base of Port Arthur, and the fleet which had taken refuge there, remained effective, there was no permanent security for the Japanese over-sea communications; for the dockyard afforded the necessary means for repairing many of the damaged Russian ships, and the announcement of the intended despatch of the Baltic Fleet to eastern waters was evidently more than a mere threat. To blockade Port Arthur and at the same time hold off the Baltic Fleet was a task beyond even Admiral Togo's power to perform, and the Russian fleet in the Far East must be dealt with before Admiral Rojestvenski could arrive from Europe. Apart, moreover, from its naval importance, the moral and political value attached to the possession of the Kuan-tung Peninsula must not be underrated. Port Arthur was a point of supreme strategical importance. Its capture and the destruction of the fleet would assure to Japan the command of the sea, the permanent safety of her maritime communications with the theatre of war, the wiping out of the insult put upon her by the coalition of European nations in 1895, as well as the power to ensure the correctness of China's attitude of neutrality. The capture of the fortress would, also, deal a blow to Russian prestige in the East from which it could scarcely hope to recover.

The Japanese victory on the Ya-lu was, therefore, the signal for a great movement of troops by sea to the shores of the Liao-tung Peninsula.

While General Kuroki had been deploying his troops of the First Army upon the frontier of Korea, the Second Army under General Baron Oku, consisting of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions and the 1st Artillery Brigade, had been quietly shipped from

Japan to Chinampo, where it now lay on board some eighty transports, whose moorings along the Taitong River occupied about eighteen miles of water. Orders for the mobilization of the Second Army had been issued on the 6th March, and by the end of that month the units had assembled at the appointed ports of embarkation, whence, as transports became available, they sailed to the rendezvous at Chinampo in groups of four or five ships. Though not actually under convoy, each transport carried a naval officer and a complement of signalmen, who communicated at fixed points with the cruisers protecting the route.

The destination of this force, which was ultimately to form the left wing of the converging movement on Liao-yang, was a point on the coast line at no great distance from Port Arthur, the isolation of which fortress was the immediate task assigned to General Oku. In determining the exact locality of the landing place, questions of the nature and configuration of the coast and of facilities for safeguarding the disembarkation were the main factors involved. The coast line between the Bay of Ta-lien and Ta-ku-shan, within which zone in accordance with the strategic plan the landing must be effected, is ill-suited for the purpose, the water being very shoal, and the coast possessing no sheltered anchorage at a convenient distance from the shore. Other considerations favoured a disembarkation in the western rather than in the eastern section of the coast line chosen, since the foreshore towards Ta-lien-wan is better, the currents weaker, and the rise and fall of the tide less than in the neighbourhood of Ta-ku-shan. Moreover, towards Port Arthur there are several groups of islands suitable as points of assembly for transports, and the future movements of the Second Army would be considerably facilitated by a close approach to the fortress, although the danger of attack by sea would be proportionately greater.

Everything pointed to a landing near Pi-tzu-wo, where the Japanese 1st Division had landed in 1894; but that place suffers from the usual disadvantage of the southern coast of Manchuria, for the foreshore shelves very gradually and extensive mud flats, nearly two miles wide, are exposed at low water. For these reasons Pi-tzu-wo itself was rejected, and Hou-tu-shih, near the mouth of the Ta-sha Ho, where the water is deeper, was selected.

This spot, chosen from the chart, had not been reconnoitred in peace time, and to have done so after the opening of hostilities would have attracted the attention of the Russians, who had a force only some eighteen miles distant at Pu-lan-tien, and another at Chin-chou about twenty-five miles from Yen-tai Bay. The Japanese general staff, however, was no doubt aware from Admiral Togo's reports that the Chin-chou force was engaged in fortifying the isthmus at Nan Shan, from which fact it was reasonable to infer that any offensive movement, or active defence, from that direction was not contemplated by the Russians. In fact the nearest Russian force, from which serious opposition might have been forthcoming, was 100 miles distant, at Ta-shih-chiao.

But although the situation on land was favourable for the disembarkation at Hou-tu-shih, there appeared to be more than a possibility of interference by sea; and when selecting a landing place within sixty miles of the enemy's fleet, the Japanese fully recognized the risk they ran.

To minimize this risk, the Japanese fleet transferred its temporary base from the Korean coast to the Elliot Islands, in the neighbourhood of the place of landing, and a third attempt to block the exit from Port Arthur was made on the night of the 2nd-3rd May, after which Admiral Togo was able to report that "the harbour entrance appears to have been completely blocked to the passage of cruisers and larger vessels." Since, however, destroyers could still pass out, and as the probability of a torpedo attack on the transports was acknowledged, further precautions were necessary to reduce the danger. All available Japanese destroyers and torpedo boats, to the number of about sixty, were stationed off Port Arthur, or between that fortress and the intended anchorage, which was further protected by booms, nets, dummy mines, patrol boats, and guard ships at anchor, thus blocking the fair way between the mainland and the Elliot Islands, a distance of nearly eight miles.

On the 3rd May, the first group of sixteen transports sailed from the Taitong River, timed to arrive off Hou-tu-shih* at daylight on the 4th May. Two cruisers led the line, others held position on the exposed flank, and one brought up the rear. The fleet was delayed by boisterous weather, and obliged to shelter under the lee of the Elliot Islands from 3 p.m. on the 4th to 6 a.m. on the 5th, when it sailed for Hou-tu-shih, where a few Cossacks of the 1st Verkhne-Udiusk Regiment were observed; but the Russians offered no resistance either by sea or by land. As the transports approached the coast they were drawn up in three lines and were taken to their anchorage close inshore where, even if the ships were sunk, their upper works would remain above water.

At 7.20 a.m. on the 5th May, a naval landing party, consisting of six officers and about 1,000 men, who had come from Chinampo in two improvised cruisers, reached the shore and took up a covering position. On their signal, a battalion of the 3rd Division, already in the boats, pushed off from the ships, closely followed by the military landing staff. As soon as the covering position had been occupied by the naval party a flag was hoisted, and the boats at once proceeded to the shore, the infantry replacing the sailors who were then withdrawn.† As more troops of the 3rd Division reached the beach, infantry and cavalry were added to the covering force, which now comprised portions of two divisions. The fighting units of the 3rd Division were disembarked

* Hou-tu-shih soon proved to be a most unsuitable landing place, and on the 9th the transports were moved to San-chia-tzu, about four miles further west.

† The Second Army was clothed in blue at the time of its landing. *Khaki* was taken into wear about the beginning of June.

by the evening of the 11th, and those of the 1st Division by the 13th.

On the 8th May, General Oku and the Head-Quarters of the Second Army landed and, on the 10th, the 4th Division began to disembark, its point of assembly being the village of Ma-chia-tun. Although a strong south-east wind was blowing, and the sea ran high, the work of disembarkation was carried on day and night, the transports sailing independently for Japan as soon as they were cleared.* By the 13th, the three divisions with their artillery and cavalry were all on shore. The 1st Division held a position from Ma-chia-chang on the Li-lan Ho to Chih-chia-fang. The 3rd Division continued the line to the Ta-sha Ho. The 4th Division was still about Ting-chia-tun. As the Second Army had taken the field without either field hospitals or supply and ammunition columns, which were to follow on the next voyage of the transports, no distant operations were possible. With the last group of transports from the Taitong River came the cable ship which completed the extension of the cable from An-tung, thus establishing direct telegraphic communication with Imperial Head-Quarters at Tokio.

While the Japanese were thus engaged in landing, the general situation of the Russian forces was as follows:—

Situation of the Russian forces.	Lieutenant-General Zasulich, after his defeat upon the Ya-lu, was falling back from Feng-huang-cheng to Lien-shan-kuan, whither reinforcements were on their way from Liao-yang to his support. To secure General Zasulich's left flank, Major-General Rennenkampf, with portions of his Trans-Baikal Cossack Division, in all three battalions, seventeen squadrons, and fourteen guns, was to operate in the neighbourhood of Sai-ma-chi†; while on his right flank Major-General Mishchenko, with eleven squadrons and a horse battery, watched the area between Feng-huang-cheng and Hsiu-yen as well as the coast line between An-tung and Pi-tzu-wo, where he came in touch with a mixed force under Major-General Zikov covering the 1st Siberian Army Corps, which stood about Kai-ping and Ta-shih-chiao.
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It will be remembered that at the end of April, the bulk of Major-General Mishchenko's force stood between An-tung and Ta-tung-kou, with two and a half squadrons of the Verkhue-Udinsk Cossack Regiment watching the coast line between the latter place and Pi-tzu-wo. On the 1st May, after the defeat of the Russian force on the Ya-lu, General Mishchenko fell back towards Feng-huang-cheng, in accordance with previous instructions

* The landing began under the following conditions:—

About 3,000 yards of shore were available. The transports had to be about three miles off the shore. There was no shelter from the prevailing wind, while close inshore there were many rocks.

At high water the troops landed at wharves, constructed in the first instance by the engineer battalion and subsequently by civilian carpenters from Japan. At low water the lighters were grounded and the troops waded ashore, the guns and wagons being run along planks over the sterns or sides of the lighters and hauled ashore. The ammunition was carried.

† See Chapter XI.

from Lieutenant-General Zasulich, and appears to have lost touch with the coast line for some days. Meanwhile, General Kuropatkin decided that General Mishchenko should not retire beyond Sha-li-chai, where he would be in a position to watch the coast, and also to close the road running from Ta-ku-shan to Hai-cheng through Hsiu-yen. General Mishchenko's brigade returned to the last-named place towards the middle of May, but his original retirement had left the coast unwatched at a critical time, with the result that undue credit was given to exaggerated native rumours which were received in Liao-yang concerning Japanese landings near Ta-ku-shan.

In advance of the 1st Siberian Army Corps between Te-li-ssu and Wa-fang-tien the detached force under Major-General Zikov (commander of the 2nd Brigade, 9th East Siberian Rifle Division), consisted of five battalions of East Siberian Rifles, of which one was at Pu-lan-tien, five squadrons of the Primorsk Dragoon Regiment, the 2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Battery, and a company of Mounted Scouts. In Port Arthur, Lieutenant-General Stessel commanded a force computed at 30,000 combatants. Holding posts on the railway line from Kai-ping to Chin-chou were four companies and four squadrons of the 4th Brigade Trans-Amur Frontier Guards with a mountain battery; and at Chin-chou, guarding the works on the isthmus south of the town, was the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment detached from the garrison of Port Arthur.

On the afternoon of the 4th May, Cossacks reported the appearance of General Oku's transports in the offing, and next morning Major-General Zikov directed Lieutenant-Colonel Rantsov, commanding the rifle battalion at Pu-lan-tien, to furnish information of the Japanese disembarkation. Sending one company and a scout detachment towards Pi-tzu-wo, Colonel Rantsov went himself with two companies in the direction of Yen-tai Bay, and that evening was able to report his estimate that 10,000 Japanese troops had landed. Returning on the 6th May he fell in with Japanese infantry already established at San-chia-tun. What version of this affair reached the Russian Army Headquarters at Liao-yang is not known, but a telegram was despatched the same day by General Kuropatkin's Chief of the Staff directing Major-General Zikov to withdraw his force northward, together with the Frontier Guards, making a night march covered by his cavalry. Hsiung-yao, sixty miles north of Pu-lan-tien, was to be reached in two marches, the railway being used as far as accommodation permitted; the troops entrained were to proceed as far as Liao-yang. The evacuation of that place was actually begun, and large quantities of stores were loaded on to trains. There seems little doubt that at this period Russian counsels were to some extent divided; General Kuropatkin had from the first been in favour of concentrating his troops at Harbin, declining to meet the Japanese till his organization was complete; but he had apparently been overruled by superior authority, perhaps upon the recommendation of the Viceroy, Admiral Alexeiev.

With the disaster on the Ya-lu and the disembarkation near Pi-tzu-wo, General Kuropatkin's original inclination had apparently reasserted itself, but Admiral Alexeiev arrived from Port Arthur on the 6th May, and it may have been due to his influence that the orders for the evacuation of Liao-yang were cancelled on the 11th.

The necessity for the hasty abandonment of the railway between Pu-lan-tien and Wa-fang-tien is not obvious, for it considerably assisted the Japanese to interrupt communication between Port Arthur and the north. On the 6th May, one and a half battalions of infantry and a detachment of engineers of the 3rd Japanese Division damaged the railway line and telegraph at Pu-lan-tien, after a skirmish with the Frontier Guards at that station.* As the troops approached the railway, a train was seen steaming north and fire was opened on it; the train stopped, and the flag of the Geneva Convention was hoisted, whereupon the infantry ceased fire to let it pass. The Japanese detachment fell back on the 7th,† as it was deemed inadvisable to remain unsupported across the Russian line of communication. On the same day a battalion and some engineers, also of the 3rd Division, occupied Pi-tzu-wo in co-operation with the navy, driving out some 200 Russian cavalry who fell back on Wa-fang-tien.

Meanwhile, Major-General Zikov, in accordance with his orders, concentrated his detachments and retired north, leaving only two squadrons of the Primorsk Dragoons and two squadrons of the Frontier Guards to observe the enemy. On the 8th May, detachments of the 3rd Japanese Division again cut the line and telegraph at Lung-kou, midway between Pu-lan-tien and Chinchou, and discovered a strong Russian force, consisting of the 2nd Brigade of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division and a battery, under Major-General Nadyein, at Shih-san-li-tai. This officer had been sent out from Port Arthur by General Stessel, as soon as he had heard of Major-General Zikov's retreat, in order to secure the line for the passage of a train of sick, wounded, and civilians. Later information led the Japanese to believe that General Nadyein had been reinforced from Port Arthur and his command increased to a division.

Deeming it necessary to disperse this force before dealing with the enemy further south, General Oku led against it the

* The Japanese did not intend to destroy the railway line, as they contemplated making use of it later in their operations against the Russian field army. They therefore confined themselves to minor damage of rails and telegraph. Another account states that the Japanese failed to cut the telegraph wires, owing to their being made of extra thick steel.

† Communication with Port Arthur was re-opened later, for a train carrying artillery ammunition succeeded in reaching the fortress on the 9th May, the line being repaired sufficiently to permit its passage, and on the following day a train of sick and civilians passed north. Pu-lan-tien was finally occupied on the 14th May by two Japanese infantry battalions and two squadrons of cavalry.

1st Division, the 13th Artillery Regiment, and one regiment from the 4th Division.

At 12.30 p.m. on the 16th, he engaged the Japanese rearguard left by General Nadyein (who had retired on the approach of superior force), and by 3 p.m. Shih-san-li-tai. gained the heights of Shih-san-li-tai, and those east of Chin-chou about Mount Sampson. The Russians fell back under cover of artillery fire, with an estimated loss of one hundred and fifty officers and men killed and wounded, while that of the Japanese was one hundred and sixty-two.

By this action the first phase of General Oku's task had been brought to a successful conclusion; the Kuan-tung Peninsula had been isolated from the north, and communication between Port Arthur and Liao-yang was finally severed.

Now, however, the Second Army was between two bodies of the enemy and General Oku felt that he was not sufficiently strong to attempt any further offensive movement. He therefore decided to await the arrival of the 5th Division from Japan, and in the meanwhile he disposed his forces as follows:—

General
situation of
the Second
Army.

- (1) General Oku, with the 1st Division and the 7th Brigade from the 4th Division (less three battalions attached to the 19th Brigade), faced the Russian lines at Chin-chou and Nan Shan, and detached a battalion of the 2nd Regiment and a troop of cavalry to Sai-tzu-ho to protect his left flank.
- (2) The 3rd Division, and the 19th Brigade, held Pu-lan-tien and the line of the Ta-sha Ho ready to meet possible danger from the north.

With a view to minimizing the latter danger, and holding the 1st Siberian Army Corps to its ground about Ying-kou and Kai-ping, a naval demonstration was made by Rear-Admiral H. Togo along the western coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula, reconnoitring the shore line as though for a landing in the neighbourhood of Kai-ping. Moreover on the 19th May commenced the disembarkation of the 10th Japanese Division at Ta-ku-shan.* These troops were to fill the gap between the First and Second Armies, and to protect the former's flank and the latter's rear. It was also hoped that their arrival would still further mystify and mislead the Russian Army Head-Quarters as to the real intentions of the Japanese.

The second group of transports, carrying the 5th Division and the 1st Cavalry Brigade, began to arrive from Japan on the 15th May, and by the 23rd the last ship had come up. The difficulties of the troops, inseparable from landing on an open beach, were aggravated by the fact that at low tide all stores had to be carried on men's shoulders across a muddy foreshore from a quarter of a mile to two miles wide. On the other hand recent successes

Landing of
5th Japanese
Division and
1st Cavalry
Brigade.

* See Chapter X.

had so far strengthened the Japanese position that haste was no longer the first necessity, and something could be sacrificed to other considerations. For these reasons night work, which would have entailed the burning of lights and so have invited attack, was abandoned, and the transport flotilla retired to the base in the Elliot Islands at the end of each day's work.

With the reinforcements which were now on shore, General Oku felt himself strong enough to take his next step in advance, which was to gain possession of Ta-lien-wan and the harbour of Dalny, and so to secure a convenient landing place as a base for future operations. At 10 a.m. on the 21st May, he issued the following orders from his Head-Quarters at Tsu-chia-tun:—

1. The 3rd Division will move on the 22nd from Chih-chia-fang so as to arrive on the 23rd at Sai-tzu-ho, proceeding thither through Erh-la-ping-tun. It will replace the detachment of the 1st Division at Sai-tzu-ho. One regiment of infantry,* one regiment of cavalry (less one squadron), and a battalion of artillery will remain under the command of the general officer commanding the 5th Division.
2. The 4th Division will move on the 22nd by the Fu-chou—Chin-chou road so as to arrive at Shih-san-li-tai on the 23rd. On reaching that place it will find the 7th Brigade and the 13th Artillery Regiment, and will hold the heights to the west of the village. One battalion of infantry,† and one regiment of cavalry (less one squadron) will be left at Pu-lan-tien under the command of the general officer commanding the 5th Division.
3. The 1st Division will occupy, by the 23rd, a line from Chin-chou to Lao-hu Shan (Mount Sampson), and will maintain connexion with the 3rd and 4th Divisions.
4. The 1st Artillery Brigade, less the 13th Regiment, will advance on the 22nd from Tsu-chia-tun through Lung-ko-tien to Tung-tao-chia-kao. (See Map II.)

At the same time General Ueda, commanding the 5th Division, received the following order:—

“The general officer commanding the 5th Division, with the detachments of the 3rd and 4th Divisions allotted to him, the force now landing, and the 1st Cavalry Brigade, will occupy a line from Pu-lan-tien along the Ta-sha Ho so as to protect the Second Army in its southerly movement.”

In accordance with these orders, the several groups named occupied their assigned positions on the 23rd, the 3rd Division arriving after a march of thirty-five miles over bad roads. Army Head-Quarters moved to Liu-chia-kao (12 miles N.E. of Chin-chou) on the 22nd.

* 34th Regiment.

† The 2nd Battalion, 38th Regiment.

About this time the knowledge of the Russian forces which had been gained by the Second Army was as follows. While the disembarkation was in progress, some 1,500 troops were known to be in the neighbourhood of Ta-shih-chiao, holding all important points on the railway to the south. Wa-fang-tien was apparently the centre at which the greater number of these railway guards was concentrated; reconnoitring parties were occasionally pushed towards Pu-lan-tien, but no indications of a movement in force were observed. At Shih-san-li-tai part of the 14th and 16th Regiments of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division, the whole of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and eight guns had been encountered, as already mentioned, and forced to retire, part on Chin-chou and part on the position at Nan Shan, where field works were being constructed with great energy. From Chin-chou, which was held by a small Russian garrison, reconnaissances were sent out from time to time, but there was reason to hope that the care exercised by General Oku to conceal his strength and dispositions would prevent them from gaining any useful information.

The positions which the Second Japanese Army now held were within a few miles of the spot where the Liao-tung and Kuan-tung Peninsulas are connected by an isthmus, which at the same time separates an arm of the bay of Ta-lien on the east from that of Chin-chou on the west.

This isthmus, which lies some thirty-five miles north-east of Port Arthur, is an important strategical point covering the roads to that place and to Dalny, as well as the junctions of the Ta-lien-wan* and Dalny branches with the main southern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Measured from high-water mark east to west, its extreme breadth is 4,400 yards, but on both sides there is a muddy foreshore the extent of which varies, according to the condition of the tide, from 1,500 to 2,000 yards.

On this isthmus is a block of hills stretching almost from sea to sea, and rising to over three hundred feet. Here the Russians had resolved to bar the Japanese advance, and to delay, if not to prevent, the investment of Port Arthur.

The ground which they decided to hold for this purpose, known as the Nan Shan position, may be described as a group of hills forming a rough circle rather over a mile in diameter, and presenting to the north three marked salients, each of which is separated from its neighbour by deep ravines. The central and eastern spurs are, however, connected at several points by cols. Viewed from the north, these three features appear to form a single salient, due partly to the inclination of the outer ones towards that in the centre and partly to their lying, with regard to one another, somewhat in echelon.

Nature and art had made this side of the position wellnigh impregnable, for the slopes are bare and glaxis-like, the field of fire is extensive, and, on the day of battle, a network of barbed wire confronted the assailant as he advanced to the attack.

* Ta-lien-wan is also called Liu-shu-tun.

The eastern side, with a double border of wire* and mines, was even more formidable, for while its slopes were favourable for rifle fire, its defenders were well protected from hostile guns, and were to be aided by an improvised Russian gunboat in the bay. This vessel was safe from molestation by the Japanese, for on the 9th February, the day following the torpedo attack upon the fleet outside Port Arthur, the Russians had taken steps to render Ta-lien Bay unapproachable from the sea. Mines had been thickly sown, especially near the entrance, and a battery of heavy guns had been erected on the promontory near the town of Ta-lien-wan.

On the other hand, although the defence of the western flank of the position had been somewhat neglected, barbed wire had been stretched across the mouths of the ravines which, here as elsewhere, are both numerous and deep. The muddy foreshore of Chin-chou Bay is more extensive than that of Hand Bay on the east, and could be subjected to heavy cross fire both from the main position and from batteries on the Nan-kuan hills. It would appear, therefore, that the Russians in making their preparations for defence, not only regarded an attack from this direction as highly improbable but also omitted to take into consideration the effect that might be, and was, produced by enfilade fire from Japanese war vessels.

Since the 11th February considerable labour had been expended in preparing the position. Five years earlier, at the time of the Boxer rising, the Russians had placed a garrison in Chin-chou and had constructed two redoubts, twelve batteries, and some shelter trenches on the Nan Shan heights, for the defence of which a garrison of two battalions and some ninety guns were allotted.

During the summer of 1903 the ground was carefully examined and a further scheme was prepared. Three forts were to be erected on the heights themselves and another was to be placed on the low ground on either flank. All these forts were to be connected by a ditch, the whole forming a minor fortress, but the sudden outbreak of hostilities occurred before the defensive scheme had been carried into effect.

On the 3rd February 1904, the position was inspected by Major-General Kondratenko and some officers of engineers, when it was found that the works which had been made in 1900 had fallen into disrepair and were now of little value. Proposals, drawn up with the view of remedying defects, were at first rejected by the Council of the Kuan-tung Province, who refused to furnish the necessary funds,† but when war broke out a few days later orders were issued for the immediate execution of the work.

The new defences consisted for the most part of repairs to the old redoubts and batteries, all of which stood on more or less commanding points. Some of the batteries were converted into closed works, and a few more, as well as lunettes to hold a

* The barbed wire entanglements averaged from 17 to 21 feet in width.

† The first estimate amounted to 19,000 roubles (£1,900), but the ultimate cost of the defences, hurriedly constructed, was 80,000 roubles (£8,000).

company of infantry, were added. Especial care was devoted to the southern side of the position, as it was feared that the Japanese might effect a landing at some point between Port Arthur and Chin-chou and thence assault the gorge of the defences. Shelter trenches, of which the lowest line was practically continuous, were constructed on the hill sides in two, three, and, in places, even in four lines.

Whether all these lines were utilized for the defence, it is impossible to say, as some bore the appearance of having been constructed as cover for supports or reserves rather than for the firing line. Within the gun batteries, which were connected by telephone, were splinter proofs, blindages, and traverses; a dynamo, in rear of the highest battery, supplied power to the search-lights which swept the front by night. A few roads existed, but these were better suited to facilitate the mounting of the artillery than the passage of reinforcements, which would have been greatly exposed in using them. Water was procurable from a few wells, and the supply was increased by metal tanks filled before the battle.

These defences were constructed in a period of forty working days,* but owing to cold weather and occasional storms, they were not completed until the 1st April. Between that date and the day of the battle of Nan Shan, supplementary casemates were made, and a shelter trench which ran towards the sea on the western flank was dug by order of Major-General Fock, commanding the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division.

In spite of all the labour which had been expended, the position was in some respects defective; the defences lacked concealment, and were in certain places exposed to reverse and enfilade fire; on the western flank sufficient precautions had not been taken against a turning movement; communications were bad, and the ground was unfavourable for counter-attack. On the other hand, every movement of the attack was clearly visible for several miles; the defenders had a magnificent target while they themselves were hidden from view and generally protected from fire. Had the earthworks been less conspicuous, the assailants would have found it more difficult to ascertain the distribution of the Russian troops and guns.

Excluding quick-firing field guns, there were originally on the position itself, four fortress guns, twelve old Chinese guns, and thirty-six field guns (1877 model 3·4-inch). The thirteen heaviest guns, varying in calibre from 4·2-inch to 6-inch, were all on the eastern front.

Besides the artillery actually on the main position, there was one battery of four old 3·4-inch field guns near Ta-fang-shen, and another of two 4·2-inch guns and two 6-inch guns, whose extreme range was 9,300 yards, on the Ta-lien-wan promontory. In addition, two 4·2-inch and four 6-inch light siege guns were

* The two battalions of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment carried out the work, assisted by Chinese coolies, who at one time numbered 5,000 men. The 3rd Battalion of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment did not arrive at Chin-chou from Russia until the beginning of April.

brought from Port Arthur on the 25th May, and placed on the eastern front.*

The guns on the north-west side, of which only sixteen could fire in the direction of Chin-chou Bay, could not be expected to cope successfully with those of the Japanese flotilla which took part in the battle. The former were mostly old field guns, of 3·4-inch calibre, while the armament of the ships consisted of fourteen guns, varying in calibre from 10·2-inch to 4·7-inch, and of four guns of under 15 cwt.

The Russian troops in the neighbourhood of the Nan Shan isthmus on the 26th May, consisted of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division with portions of the 2nd and 7th East Siberian Rifle Divisions. Of these, one and a half companies† of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment with some scouts and four old pattern field guns, were posted in the walled city of Chin-chou. The total strength of this detachment was not more than 400 men.

On the morning of the 24th May, when all the divisions of the Second Japanese Army were in position awaiting the order to

Naval co-operation.	attack, a message was received from Admiral Togo to the effect that if the weather were clear the gun-boats <i>Tsukushi</i> , <i>Heizen</i> , <i>Akagi</i> , and <i>Chokai</i> , with a flotilla of torpedo boats, would co-operate by shelling the Russian position on the 25th and 26th May. General
General Oku's orders.	Oku therefore decided to delay his attack until the 25th, and at 1 p.m. issued the following orders :—

1. The 1st Division (less one regiment of infantry) will move under cover of night and occupy, by 3.30 a.m. on the 25th, a line stretching from a point 500 yards north-east of Chin-chou, through Hsiao-chin Shan, to Tang-wang-tun. It will keep to the east of the Fu-chou—Chin-chou road and maintain touch with the 4th Division by means of a detachment. Part of its artillery will take up such a position, under cover of darkness, as will allow it to fire on Chin-chou without interruption from the enemy's guns. The main body of the division will occupy a covered position and make all preparations for attack.
2. The 4th Division, keeping touch with the right of the 1st Division and making use of the Fu-chou—Chin-chou highway, will move under cover of night and occupy, by 3.30 a.m. on the 25th, a line as far westward as Lung-wang-miao. Part of its artillery will take position so as to fire on Chin-chou without interference from the Russian

* The account from which the details of these guns are taken mentions no howitzers, but there were certainly some on the position. It is said that when Admiral Makarov inspected this position on the 9th March, he was asked whether he considered that enfilade fire could be brought to bear upon it from the ships in Chin-chou Bay. His reply was non-committal, but he advised that some heavy calibre guns should be placed in the western front.

† 10th Company and half of the 9th Company. The half of the 9th Company was sent to reinforce Chin-chou, at 11 p.m., on the 25th May.

- guns. The main body of the division will take up a covered position and make all preparations for attack.
3. The 3rd Division, under cover of darkness, will move to the district south of Lao-hu Shan and occupy Wang-chia-tun by 3.30 a.m. on the 25th. The main body of the division will take up a covered position and prepare for attack. Two companies of infantry will be attached to the 1st Artillery Brigade.
 4. The 1st Artillery Brigade (less the 13th Regiment*) will follow the line of march of the 3rd Division and take position in the neighbourhood of Sai-tzu-ho and prepare for action. Two companies of infantry of the 3rd Division will be attached to the brigade.

As already stated General Oku's design was to attack on the 25th, but two causes, the failure to capture Chin-chou and the non-arrival of the promised war-vessels, combined to prevent that plan from being executed.

Before daylight the troops had moved into the positions ordered, and at 8 a.m. Army Head-Quarters reached the hill near Shih-san-li-tai. At 5.50 a.m. portions of the 1st, 4th, and 13th Artillery Regiments opened fire upon the garrison of Chin-chou, to which the enemy replied from Nan Shan. The artillery in Chin-chou was quickly silenced, and an attempt to storm the gates was made by infantry and engineers of the 4th Division, but there was no concealment, and as the troops showed little of the dash they displayed on the following day, the attack failed. The day was dull and stormy, and since no gunboats had appeared in Chin-chou Bay by 3 p.m. General Oku decided to postpone the attack till the 26th, and then, if need be, to carry it out unassisted by the naval guns. At 3.30 p.m. the following orders were issued :—

1. The 1st Division will keep its present position, and at 4.30 a.m. to-morrow will attack the enemy between lines stretching from the east of Chin-chou to the north-east point of the hill of Nan Shan, and from Pa-li-chuang to Yen-chia-tun (on the railway line).
2. The 4th Division, keeping touch with the 1st Division, will move at 4.30 a.m. to the nameless stream near the south gate of Chin-chou, and will attack Nan Shan on its western side as if to surround it from that direction. Chin-chou will, if possible, be occupied by midnight to-night.
3. The 3rd Division, keeping touch with the 1st Division, will move from its present position at 4.30 a.m. and endeavour to reach a line from Yen-chia-tun to Yao-chia-tun, and attack the eastern face of Nan Shan as if to surround it.
4. The whole of the artillery of the army will be under the command of the chief artillery officer, and, from positions

* Attached to the 4th Division, *vide* para. 2 of Army Orders of the 21st May (p. 14).
(4091)

decided upon by him, will open fire at 4.30 a.m. and assist the infantry advance.

5. The reserve of the army will bivouac at Cheng-chia-tun,* and will time its march so as to reach Hsiao-chin Shan by 4.30 a.m.

At six in the evening the naval flotilla,† which had been forced to take refuge from the stormy weather at a temporary anchorage, approached Chin-chou Bay in readiness for the bombardment of the morrow. All preparations for the struggle upon which the Second Army was about to enter were now complete, a struggle less costly yet, perhaps, more obstinate than any other in which it took part in Manchuria.

The night of the 25th was dark, and as the troops of the 4th Division were forming for the attack on Chin-chou a thunder-storm burst, accompanied by a high wind and heavy rain, which rendered movements over the slippery ground extremely difficult. Shortly before midnight a party of engineers of the 4th Division, closely followed by the 19th Brigade,‡ approached the north gate of the city. The storm was then at its height, and the frequent flashes of lightning showed the coming danger to the Russian sentries on the walls. Nevertheless the engineers succeeded in laying a mine, but before they could spring it they were overwhelmed by heavy rifle fire. Attempts to capture the gate by climbing on some buildings adjoining the walls failed, and in falling back the troops were fired on by their own reserve.

In consequence of this reverse, the artillery of the 4th Division and that of the 13th Regiment could not occupy the intended positions, and remained on the heights north of Chin-chou, while the infantry of the 7th and 19th Brigades retired to the high ground east of Lung-wang-miao.

No combined assault by the troops of the 4th and 1st Divisions had been ordered—a measure scarcely necessary considering the smallness of the garrison—but when Prince Fushimi, who was moving forward in two columns to attack Nan Shan, became aware

* Four miles north-east of Chin-chou, see Strategic map.

† Name.	Draught.	Armament.
Akagi	10 feet	One 8·2-inch, one 5·9-inch, two other guns under 15 cwt., and two machine guns.
Heiyeu	16 "	One 10·2-inch Krupp, two 5·9-inch and six machine guns.
Tsukushi	15 "	Two 10-inch, four 4·7-inch, two guns under 15 cwt., and four machine guns.
Chokai	10 "	Three 4·7-inch and two machine guns.
4 torpedo boats ...	...	Probably one or two 3-pr. Q.F. guns each.

‡ The 19th Brigade had only four battalions present. The II/38th was with the 5th Division near Pu-lan-tien, and the II/9th formed the reserve of its own division.

of the failure of the 4th Division, he sent two battalions of the 1st Regiment against the east gate of the town. Under cover of their fire the engineers laid a mine and blew in the gate, all those employed upon the operation, four in number, being badly wounded; and at 5.20 a.m. the infantry forced its way into the town while the enemy retired to Nan Shan by the southern gate, losing heavily from the fire of the 4th Division and leaving behind four field guns.*

The delay caused by this diversion on the right of the 1st Division, and by the musketry fire from the ramparts of the city, prevented its columns from occupying the allotted position until 6 a.m. Meanwhile the 3rd Division, in two columns, the right consisting of the 5th Brigade (less one battalion), the left of the 18th Regiment (less two companies), had occupied the appointed line, where some entrenchments were thrown up, and the troops were kept concealed awaiting the order to attack.

Under cover of darkness, the 14th and 15th Regiments of the 1st Artillery Brigade, and the artillery of the 1st and 3rd Divisions had taken up positions along the lower slopes of Mount Sampson, while the guns of the 4th and 13th Artillery Regiments were posted on some high ground west of the railway line.

Such were the dispositions of the Japanese for the attack upon the Nan Shan heights. On the other hand, the disposition of the Russian troops was as follows:—

Dispositions
of Russians
at Nan Shan.

(a) In the trenches and redoubts on Nan Shan, under Colonel Tretyakov—

2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 12th Companies of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

Scout detachments of the 13th and 14th East Siberian Rifle Regiments.

In local reserve, half of the 9th Company and the 11th Company of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

In general reserve, two Companies of the 13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

In all, approximately 2,700 bayonets.

(b) On the right flank, near Lower Nan-kuan-ling—
14th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

One field battery on the Ta-lien-wan heights.

(c) On the left flank, south of Mao-yi-tzu—
13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment (less 2 companies).
One field battery of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.

Two field batteries of the 7th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.

(d) In the centre, between (b) and (c)—

15th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

One field battery of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade on the Nan-kuan hills behind Nan Shan.

* The garrison of Chin-chou was ordered to fall back to the trenches on the Nan Shan heights, but only half of the 10th Company, 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, succeeded in doing so, the remainder being cut off by the Japanese.

- (e) At the railway station of Nan-kuan-ling* under Lieutenant-General Fock, commanding the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division—
 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.
 One field battery.

General Nadyein (in command of the 2nd Brigade 4th East Siberian Rifle Division) commanded the whole force on the 26th May until General Fock arrived later in the day, while Colonel Tretyakov (commanding the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment) was in command of the troops occupying the Nan Shan heights.

General Oku had intended to begin the bombardment at 4.30 a.m. on the 26th, but the morning was foggy and the summit of Nan Shan did not become visible till shortly after 5 a.m. Twenty minutes later the 1st Regiment of Artillery opened fire against the centre of the position, speedily followed by the guns of the 3rd and 4th Divisions and of the 1st Artillery Brigade. The Russians replied from more than fifty guns of varying calibre, the shooting of both the heavy and the field guns being remarkably good.

At 6 a.m., the Japanese flotilla entered Chin-chou Bay, and shortly afterwards its guns joined in the cannonade. For a time, in spite of great superiority, no impression was made upon the Russians, but about 7 a.m. their fire showed signs of slackening.

Meanwhile the infantry attack was in progress. The 4th Division, deploying at the hill east of Lung-wang-miao, had pushed forward west of Chin-chou city, the first line of the 19th Brigade on the left reaching the vicinity of Kao-chia-kou at 7.10 a.m. On its right, though considerably in rear, was the 7th Brigade, for the narrow front of the attack forced the greater part of the troops to cross the sandy beach, from which the tide was now receding, under a heavy fire from the defenders. The advance of the infantry allowed the 4th and 13th Artillery Regiments to move forward, and at about 7.30 a.m. they came into action on the western side of Chin-chou and opened fire at closer range.

The Russians, seeing themselves threatened by an attempt to turn their left, withdrew four field guns from Nan Shan to the high ground south of Ssu-chia-tun, whence they opened fire upon the advancing infantry. By 8.30 a.m., the leading troops of the 4th Division, in spite of the heavy fire of guns and rifles, succeeded in reaching the ruined mud walls of an old barrack midway between the enemy's entanglements and the hamlet of Kao-chia-kou; and a few minutes later two more Russian field batteries were withdrawn from Nan Shan in a south-westerly direction, with the view of coming into action with greater effect.

At this juncture, the commander of the Japanese flotilla, either inferring that a general retirement was about to follow, or, perhaps on account of the ebbing tide, moved his vessels out of the bay to a point whence he could command the road and railway leading to Port Arthur. This enabled some of the guns, which he

* This is the junction for Dalny and is not marked on the Nan Shan map.

had kept in check from his former position, to turn their fire against the 4th Japanese Division. About 9 a.m., the artillery of the 4th Division advanced in closer support of its infantry to a position south-west of Hsi-kuan-wei. Most of the guns on the main Russian position had now ceased to trouble the attack, but the two batteries which had fallen back soon opened fire from the direction of Upper Nan-kuan-ling, and their fire, combined with that of the infantry, caused the right of the 4th Division its heaviest loss. The flotilla was therefore recalled by signal from General Oku and ordered to resume the bombardment of the main Russian position, and by 10 a.m. its guns were again in action. For an hour the vessels continued to shell the Russians, until, on account of the ebbing tide, the two largest gunboats again steamed out to sea. In the centre of the attack the 1st Division had reached its appointed position, on the left of the 4th Division, at 6 a.m., but was forced to wait, under heavy fire, until the 3rd and 4th Divisions came up in line. Fortunately the troops were able to throw up some cover with their light entrenching tools, and this, though slight, greatly reduced their losses.

At 8.30 a.m., the progress of the troops on his right, and the gradual weakening of the Russian artillery fire, decided Prince Fushimi to order an assault. Supported by the divisional artillery at Hsiao-chin Shan, and the guns of the 4th Artillery Regiment near Chi-li-chuang, a determined effort was made to close with the enemy. The first line, rising from behind its slender cover, rushed to the front and, in spite of heavy losses from machine gun and rifle fire, reached a point 300 to 400 yards from the trenches. Further progress was impossible, and the position of the 1st Division, which had drawn upon itself the concentrated fire of the defence, grew so serious that, at 10.30 a.m., the 1st and 14th Artillery Regiments were pushed forward to closer range. At the same hour General Oku sent up two battalions of the 3rd Regiment from the general reserve to reinforce the right.

On the Japanese left and facing the eastern front of the position the 3rd Division, which had deployed upon its appointed line before daylight, remained concealed until, at 7.50 a.m., General Oshima ordered the first line to advance. The ground to be passed over was here, as elsewhere, very open, and the nearer the enemy's position was approached, the more the left flank became exposed to enfilade fire from Russian infantry at Chi-chia-tun, and from the guns south of Ta-fang-shen. Nevertheless the Japanese pushed forward little by little, and by 9 a.m. their right and centre had passed the railway and were close to the line of Russian obstacles.

The Russians now reinforced their right, and, half an hour later, brought a field battery into action south of Ta-fang-shen, while the gunboat *Bobr** coming into the bay south of Huang-tu-ai at 10 a.m. harassed the left and rear of the Japanese for about four hours and forced their batteries to change position. General

* The armament of this vessel was one 4.2-inch, one 5.9-inch and one 8.9-inch gun. She arrived at 8 a.m. and returned to Dalny by noon.

Oshima could get no further, and nothing remained but to wait till the fire of the supporting artillery should render an assault practicable.

At 11 a.m., the remaining battalion (less one company) of the 3rd Regiment was sent up from the general reserve by the army commander.*

The attack had thus failed everywhere, but the tenacious assailants, though unable to advance further, clung to the ground which they had won. Many attempts were made by isolated groups to clear a path through the barbed wire against which the high explosive shell had no effect, and officers and men nobly but vainly sacrificed themselves. Frequent telephone messages reached Head-Quarters, telling of the almost desperate situation of the first line, but no reserves remained to give fresh vigour to the attack, and the supply of ammunition for the guns was getting low.

But the defenders were no better off than the assailants. The Russian artillery ammunition had begun to run short as early as 8 a.m.; about 9 a.m., one battery was compelled to cease fire, and after 11 a.m. only two guns were able to take any active part in the defence, all the others having exhausted their allowance of 150 rounds. Meanwhile Colonel Tretyakov, commanding the troops on the heights, had used up the whole of his local reserve, *i.e.*, the 11th and half of the 9th Companies of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, on the right flank. During the early part of the fight this officer, in common with his superiors, seems to have felt convinced that the main Japanese attack would be delivered by the 3rd Division. The consequence was that when the 4th Division, moving along the beach, began to outflank his left, the only reserves available were one company and the band of the 13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

The situation at midday was therefore as follows. The Japanese had failed all along the line in their attempts to carry the Russian position by assault, but were able to hold their own. They were receiving great assistance from the fire of the vessels in Chin-chou Bay, but the supply of ammunition for their field guns was beginning to fail. There were no fresh reserves. Of the whole Russian force available, only a small portion, about eleven companies, had been actually engaged, but it had kept off three divisions for seven hours; the greater part of the 13th, and the whole of the 14th and 15th East Siberian Regiments were still in reserve under General Fock. Artillery ammunition was practically exhausted. The left flank of the defence had, quite unexpectedly, proved to be the point of greatest danger.

It would therefore appear that, in spite of the lack of artillery ammunition, the Russian situation was the more favourable. For three hours longer the Japanese were unable to make any progress

* Some reports say that a force of Russian infantry, carried on five steam launches, attempted to land at Huang-tu-ai about this time but was repulsed; the Russian account which describes the part played by the *Bobr* denies that the attempt was ever made.

and their prospects began to look hopeless, yet General Oku's determination never faltered.

At 3.30 p.m., he ordered a fresh assault to be made, preceded by a heavy artillery fire of half an hour's duration. Engineers were to lead in order to cut the wire entanglements, and a determined effort was to be made to take the position regardless of loss. This renewed attack, however, was no more successful than the earlier one, although three separate attempts were made to push it home; but the 3rd Division, before giving way, managed to cut the wire of the electrically-controlled mines which lay between it and the Russian shelter trenches.

As the Japanese continued to threaten the left flank, General Nadyein sent for two battalions from the reserves, but General Fock, who was at Ta-fang-shen, did not respond, and to this lack of support the ultimate loss of the position must be largely attributed.

At 5 p.m., two batteries of the 1st Japanese Division were moved forward in order to shell a portion of the Russian works and to overwhelm the deadly machine gun fire poured thence upon the infantry. In spite of this assistance, the position of the 3rd Division, whose left was partially enveloped by the enemy's infantry and artillery on the high ground east of Nan-kuan-ling, was growing worse. An hour later the position of the 1st and 3rd Divisions was practically unchanged, but the 4th Division had drawn closer to the Russian left, driving back the 5th and 9th Companies, East Siberian Rifles, who had lost about half their numbers from artillery fire. The commander of the Russian defences there had again sent for reinforcements about 4 p.m., and at last, about 6 p.m., two companies of the 14th East Siberian Rifle Regiment arrived. Of these, half a company was sent to the support of No. 8 Company in the centre. During all this time the 4th Japanese Division was steadily fighting its way closer, and the sun was almost setting when the men of the 7th Brigade, pushed their way breast-high through the waves at a greater distance from the position than in their earlier attempt. Then, changing direction towards the main position, they forced their way into the ravines, captured two redoubts, and drove in the Russian left just as the one and a half companies of the 14th Regiment came to its support. The seizure of this important point, which commanded the line of retreat of the troops in the trenches, opened the way to other successes on this flank, and uncovered the rear of the centre and right. Almost simultaneously the 1st and 3rd Divisions, pushing to the front, succeeded in passing the line of obstacles which had so long been held against them.

The Russians, driven back from point to point, blew up their powder magazine at Ta-fang-shen and retired to San-shih-li-pu in the direction of Port Arthur, and at 7.20 p.m. the flag of the Rising Sun floated upon the summit of the hard-won hill. Some of the guns which still had ammunition came up, and those of the 4th Division, advancing

Turning
movement
of 4th
Division.

Capture of
Nan Shan.

over the level ground before them, opened fire upon the disordered crowds which hurried south, causing them heavy loss. The 1st Cavalry Regiment was ordered to move from its position east of Chin-chou, and, pushing due south, to follow up the enemy; but broken ground and darkness soon stopped the attempt to pursue.

At 8 p.m., General Oku ordered his exhausted infantry to bivouac on the captured hills, holding the ground from Chin-chou Bay on the west to Hand Bay on the east, while the whole of the artillery was directed to remain in the positions which it occupied.

The battle had lasted fifteen hours, and had been won by nothing but hard fighting. The ruthless determination of the Japanese commanders to carry out their task regardless of loss, the tenacity with which the infantry clung to the ground they had won, and the boldness of the artillery support were characteristics of the Japanese fighting. The sacrifice might perhaps have been unavailing had the Russian commander put his whole strength into the fight and employed, in a vigorous counter-stroke, some of the four regiments which he kept at his disposal, and which were never seriously engaged.

On both sides the casualties were heavy in proportion to the numbers; of the 3,000 Russians actually engaged over 700 were buried on the field, and twenty-four officers and men were taken prisoners,* while of the Japanese about fifteen per cent. were killed and wounded. Seventy-four guns fell into the hands of the Japanese.

On the morning of the 27th May, the arrival of two ammunition columns and a supply column enabled a mixed brigade of the 1st Division, under Major-General Nakamura, to push on and occupy Nan-kuan-ling Junction† and Ta-lien-wan, while the remainder of the troops reformed in the vicinity of Nan Shan. The Russians had, meanwhile, hastily evacuate Dalny during the night of the 26th blowing up as they went the bridges on the branch railway connecting that town with Nan-kuan-ling Junction. The bulk of their forces fell back towards Port Arthur, covered by a small rear guard, which ultimately retired as General Nakamura advanced.

Having reformed his troops and replenished his ammunition, General Oku issued orders on the 29th May for the occupation of a line across the Kuan-tung Peninsula, four miles west of the branch railway line to Dalny. The bulk of the 4th Division remained at Chin-chou, while the 1st and 3rd Divisions and the 1st Artillery Brigade, with a portion of the 4th Division (two battalions of infantry, one battalion of artillery, one squadron, and one engineer company) advanced on the 30th, driving back small parties of Russians as they took up the positions assigned to them. Dalny, which had suffered severely at the hands of marauding Chinese since the hasty Russian evacuation, was occupied by troops of the 3rd Division without opposition.

* A Russian account states that the trenches and works were held throughout the day with a loss of only 450 men, but that in the retreat 650 were killed and wounded.

† South-east of the Nan Shan map.

The Bay of Ta-lien was now in Japanese hands, with the port of Dalny equipped with wharves, graving docks, workshops, electric plant, and all the requirements of a first-class commercial harbour, none of which the Russians had injured; but it was many weeks before its waters were sufficiently cleared of mines to permit the safe entry of ships and both troops and stores continued to be landed on the beach near Pi-tzu-wo.

No insuperable difficulty had been experienced in supplying the Second Army from its base; but the task of keeping up divergent lines to the 5th Division, as well as to the main army, had severely taxed the resources of the line of communication, and had emphasized the need of a base connected by rail to the advanced dépôt. The navy was, therefore, urged to clear a channel as soon as possible to Ta-lien-wan which became the chief base of the Second Army during its advance northward to Liao-yang, Dalny being left to the Third Army and to the siege trains required for the bombardment of Port Arthur.

While the events described above were in progress, a serious loss at sea had befallen the Japanese navy. On the 15th May while cruising off Port Arthur, the battleships *Hatsuse* and *Yashima* were sunk through striking mines, and on the same day the second class cruiser *Yoshino* was sunk as the result of a collision in a dense fog. It was impossible to conceal the loss of the *Hatsuse*, which foundered in full view of the Russians, but the *Yashima's* injuries did not prevent her from steaming out of sight before she sank, and the loss of this ship was successfully concealed for many months.*

The risk from floating mines forced the Japanese battleship squadron to take refuge in its temporary naval base in the Elliot Islands, Port Arthur being closely watched by ships of the second line and by torpedo flotillas. It was a portion of these squadrons which had helped to gain the victory of Nan Shan.

* The *Yashima* sank in twenty-five fathoms, after steaming for seven hours. There was no loss of life, and the officers and men were drafted to other ships of the blockading squadron.

NOTE.—Since the actual effect on the battle of Nan Shan of the fire from the Japanese ships has been much discussed, the following information received from the Russian General Staff is of considerable interest: "The position was not evacuated owing to the effect of the fire from the Japanese gunboats, but by an order from General Stessel, which was given owing to General Fock having reported the situation to be extremely critical. The fire from the Japanese war ships was stopped at about 2 p.m. and the position was evacuated at 6.45 pm."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ADVANCE NORTHWARD OF THE SECOND JAPANESE ARMY
AND THE BATTLE OF TE-LI-SSU (WA-FANG-KOU).

DURING the month of May little of importance had occurred in other parts of the theatre of war, as both combatants were still awaiting reinforcements. The Japanese forces in the field had been strengthened by the 10th Division, the nucleus of the Fourth Army, which disembarked near Ta-ku-shan on the 19th May and following days; and by the 11th Division which landed in Yen-tai Bay, ten miles south of Pi-tzu-wo, between the 20th and 31st of that month, thus bringing General Oku's command up to five divisions or about 75,000 men.

Apparently the original intention of the Imperial Headquarters had been that the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions should form the Second Army, and that the 5th, 6th, and 11th Divisions should constitute the Third Army. This arrangement was altered on the 1st June. The 1st and 11th Divisions were placed under Prince Fushimi until the 5th, when General Baron Nogi arrived from Japan to take over the command of this force, which remained in front of Port Arthur.*

It will be remembered that the 5th Division, with certain detachments from the 3rd and 4th Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Brigade, were engaged in watching the line Pu-lan-tien to Pi-tzu-wo. They were now joined by the 3rd and 4th Divisions and by the 1st Artillery Brigade. The 4th Division and the 1st Artillery Brigade reached Pu-lan-tien, the left of the line, on the night of the 2nd June; the 3rd Division arrived on the following day and took post on the right. The whole line was placed temporarily under General Ogawa, commanding the 4th Division, who was ordered to entrench himself securely.

Meanwhile on the Russian side the Xth Army Corps had begun to leave Europe on the 10th May, and on the 15th of that month the 4th Siberian Army Corps, *i.e.*, the 2nd and 3rd Siberian Divisions with their artillery, began to detrain at Liao-yang. The railway was very busy bringing up the troops of this corps until the 24th May, ten trains arriving daily.

* This force was greatly reinforced later and was known as the Third Army. The 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Divisions formed the Second Army under General Oku; only one battalion of the 6th Division arrived in time for the battle of Te-li-ssu.

At the beginning of June the positions of the various troops in the field was, therefore, as follows:—
 Distribution of the opposing forces at the beginning of June, 1904. Opposed to the Second Japanese Army under General Oku was Lieutenant-General Stakelberg with approximately 3,000 cavalry, 30,000 infantry, and 100 guns. His advanced cavalry was at Te-li-ssu and the remainder of his force was distributed between Kai-ping, Ying-kou, and the neighbourhood.

In front of the First Japanese Army under General Kuroki were Lieutenant-General Keller and Major-General Rennenkampf with approximately 3,600 cavalry, 23,000 infantry, and 90 guns.

Between these two groups and opposed to the 10th Japanese Division was Major-General Mishchenko with a Cossack brigade of 3,000 sabres and one horse battery (6 guns). He was supported by two infantry regiments at the Fen-shui Ling and by the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division at Hsi-nu-cheng.

At Liao-yang, in rear of his three advanced detachments, was General Kuropatkin with the reserve of the army, which, including three regiments at Mukden, numbered approximately 6,000 cavalry, 36,000 infantry, and 120 guns. The 31st Division had arrived at Liao-yang from Europe, but the remainder of the Xth Army Corps and the Orenburg and Ural Cossack Divisions were still on the railway.

A small independent detached force of cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Madritov was operating in the extreme east.

In addition there were the Ussuri Army about Vladivostok, and the garrison of Port Arthur which need not be considered at present.

The disposition of these forces, as well as the conduct of the operations which were about to begin, were largely dictated by the topography of the theatre of war. The most important features are the two ranges, the Hsiung-yao Shan and the Fen-shui Ling, which cross Southern Manchuria. Southern Manchuria from south-west to north-east and which barred the advance of the Japanese armies to Liao-yang. Further to the north is the Ta Ling ridge, which lay on the flank of General Kuroki's communications during the later stages of the operations.

The main object of the Japanese strategy was to concentrate every available man against the Russian force at Liao-yang, and to do this it was necessary to use as many lines of advance as possible. Unfortunately for them the roads were few and bad, but the best were:—

- (1) From Port Arthur to Liao-yang;
- (2) From Hsiu-yen to Hai-cheng by the Fen-shui Ling.
- (3) From Feng-huang-cheng to Liao-yang by the Mo-tien Ling.

On these roads were placed the Second, Fourth, and First Japanese Armies, awaiting the order to advance.

The northern spurs of the main ranges separated the Russian forces in the east from those to the south-west: while the southern

spurs interposed between the various Japanese armies, rendering lateral communication extremely difficult. In places the mountains rise to a height of 3,500 feet, with precipitous slopes, narrow valleys, and dense forests presenting serious obstacles even to the movements of infantry. To the west, between the mountains and the sea, there is a strip of less intricate country about 15 miles in width, through which runs the Port Arthur railway, and up which General Oku's army was to advance. Even there the country was ill-suited to the action of cavalry in mass and of artillery, though infantry could manœuvre with little difficulty.

It will be seen, therefore, that the Japanese were restricted by natural features to certain clearly defined lines of advance, and that the First and Fourth Armies had to force their way across lofty mountain ranges, the passes through which were in the hands of the Russians.

The climatic conditions also had an important bearing upon the strategy of the future movements. During the summer months the mountain passes were open and the passage of troops was possible, but at that season the country to the west was often flooded, and the valley of the Liao Ho became little better than a morass. During the winter, on the other hand, the low country west of the railway was frozen hard and could be traversed by both cavalry and artillery.

To resume the narrative of operations, the Russian army, which had much to contend against, was still suffering from divided counsels in high places. General Kuropatkin was anxious to avoid any offensive movement until the arrival of reinforcements should give him numerical superiority, while Admiral Alexeiev insisted that some effort should be made immediately for the relief of Port Arthur.

Determined therefore to assume the offensive, Admiral Alexeiev had, on the 19th May, placed before General Kuropatkin two

alternatives: (a) to contain the Second Japanese Army by sending a portion of his troops to oppose it, while the bulk of his army pushed General Kuroki back across the Ya-lu; (b) to hold General Kuroki at bay and drive the Second Army into the sea. Apart from insufficiency of transport, which alone made an advance through the mountains against General Kuroki impracticable, the former course had other disadvantages and could lead to no decisive result. General Kuropatkin therefore, influenced perhaps by the news of the loss of the Nan Shan position, indicated on the 27th May that he had chosen the latter. Next day he met General Stakelberg at Hai-cheng and personally gave him his orders. A few days later instructions were received by telegraph from St. Petersburg, where a council of war had been assembled, upholding Admiral Alexeiev's contention that the relief of Port Arthur was imperative and directing the despatch of an expedition for that purpose.

The total force available for this movement was the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Siberian Army Corps and two European brigades, or, in all, seven infantry divisions and one Cossack division. Several causes,

however, particularly the fear of offensive Japanese action in the east, operated to reduce these numbers to five infantry divisions and a weak cavalry division of sixteen squadrons. But General Kuropatkin did not think it advisable to employ the whole of these numbers; and General Stakelberg's command, as finally constituted, consisted of his own 1st Siberian Army Corps, the 2nd Brigade of the 35th Infantry Division, the 9th Regiment of Siberian Infantry (from the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Siberian Division) and a composite cavalry brigade, in all about 35,000 men, with 94 guns.

The cavalry brigade, commanded by Major-General Samsonov, was at this time marching south to reoccupy the section of the railway line which had been somewhat hurriedly abandoned by Major-General Zikov at the beginning of the month. The strength of the brigade was 1,600 sabres, 100 rifles, and 6 guns, and consisted of the following troops:—

Primorsk Dragoon Regiment	...	...	5	squadrons.
8th Siberian Cossack Regiment	...	...	5	"
Scout Detachment of 13th E.S.R. Regiment	...	...	$\frac{1}{2}$	"
Frontier Guards*	...	...	$2\frac{1}{2}$	"
				and $\frac{1}{2}$ company.
2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Battery			6	guns.

Rumours of an intended southward movement had already reached General Oku, and on the 30th May he had sent forward Major-General Akiyama with the 1st Cavalry Brigade, supported by some infantry of the 5th Division, to reconnoitre to the north of Wa-fang-tien.

On the previous day Major-General Samsonov's brigade had reached Wan-chia-ling, and on the 30th the advanced cavalry of both sides was approaching Te-li-ssu.†

On reaching Chu-chia-tien, Major-General Akiyama's advanced guard of the 14th Cavalry Regiment reported that Wu-chia-tun, a hamlet lying north of a defile about two and a half miles south of Te-li-ssu, was occupied by the enemy. Orders were at once sent to deploy, dismounted, east of the railway on the heights which command the valley of the Fu-chou River.

The force which had thus checked the Japanese advance was one and a half squadrons and half a company of Frontier Guards, who had formed the garrison of Te-li-ssu until the arrival of Major-General Samsonov's brigade. As soon as it was known that they were engaged, they were reinforced by three squadrons of dragoons. The rest of the Russian force proceeded at a walk until the battery cleared the defile of Pan-la-shan when it trotted forward to Te-li-ssu. There Major-General Samsonov, hearing that the Frontier Guards were still holding Wu-chia-tun, sent his other squadron of Frontier Guards

The first fight
at Te-li-ssu.

* $1\frac{1}{2}$ squadrons and $\frac{1}{2}$ company of Frontier Guards had been left in Te-li-ssu by Zikov and joined General Samsonov's advanced troops on their arrival at that place.

† This place was known as Te-li-ssu by the Chinese and Wa-fang-kou by the Russians. The Japanese name is Tokuriji.

and his scout detachment down the valley of the Fu-chou Ho to take the Japanese in flank, and rode forward in person to join his three advanced squadrons on the heights at Lung-wang-miao.

As the Japanese could be seen holding the southern edge of Wu-chia-tun and the high ground on either flank, General Samsonov ordered his horse battery to take position on the heights held by the dragoons. The steepness of the slopes made this movement appear impossible,* and the battery came into action immediately south of the railway bridge over the Fu-chou River, where it was joined by the rest of the main body.

Meantime the Frontier Guards at Wu-chia-tun, who had been joined by a few troopers of the Primorsk Dragoons, had begun to fall back; the Japanese were at once ordered to pursue, and the 2nd Squadron 13th Cavalry, with drawn swords, crossed the railway embankment at 1 p.m. followed at some distance by the remainder of the regiment. At 1.20 p.m., the 2nd Squadron came up with the enemy south of Lung-wang-miao, when the Russians keeping up their fire until the Japanese were within some fifty yards, charged them in line at open order. During the ensuing mêlée two squadrons of the 8th Siberian Cossacks came up and charged the left of the Japanese squadron.† The main body of the Japanese cavalry was now at hand, and at 1.40 p.m. the Russians drew off towards Te-li-ssu covered by the fire of their dismounted squadron.

As soon as information that the cavalry was engaged reached the commander of the brigade of the 5th Division in front of Pu-lan-tien, he despatched two companies in light marching order to its assistance; two more companies and two battalions were sent up later, but before the latter reached La-tzu-shan, the enemy had been repulsed. From this date Major-General Akiyama had under his command a battalion of infantry and two mountain batteries, while Major-General Samsonov was reinforced at Te-li-ssu on the 31st May by the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, which was sent by rail from Kai-ping.‡

Daily reconnaissances were now carried out by both sides, and on the 3rd June there was another skirmish north of Wu-chia-tun. On that date General Samsonov undertook a reconnaissance on a somewhat larger scale, his force consisting of four and a half squadrons, a battery of horse artillery, and a battalion (the 3rd) of the 36th East Siberian Rifles. The greater part of the cavalry advanced down the right bank of the Fu-chou Ho

* The officer commanding this battery seems to have overestimated the difficulty of his task, as three Russian batteries were engaged on these very heights on the 15th June.

† This is the only instance of cavalry shock action which occurred during the war, and it is said that the Russians used their lances with great effect.

‡ The Japanese official statement of losses from 30th May to 2nd June is:—

	Killed.		Wounded.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
1st Cavalry Brigade and 5th Division		1 26	4 53	

The Russians give their own casualties on 30th May as 2 officers and 35 men killed and wounded,

against the heights west of Wu-chia-tun, while the infantry moved against Lung-wang-miao, pushing back the Japanese patrols and outposts. The battery, with an escort of two squadrons, remained in rear. After one and a half hours' skirmishing the Russian infantry occupied the Lung-wang-miao heights but could get no further, for the village of Wu-chia-tun with the high ground to the east was held by Japanese infantry entrenched, while further west the Russian cavalry sent down the Fu-chou valley found the way barred by three Japanese squadrons. At 4 p.m., the horse battery came up and opened fire from the high ground east of Lu-chia-kou on the Japanese infantry, which withdrew deliberately towards Chu-chia-tien. At 6 p.m. the Russians also retired, followed by the shells from a Japanese mountain battery which came into action south of Wu-chia-tun.

Insignificant as were the operations on the 3rd June, both sides gained information of considerable value. On the one hand General Samsonov concluded, from the presence on the field of mountain artillery, that a stronger body of troops from which reinforcements had come up was not far distant; on the other hand General Akiyama learned that the leading infantry of the 1st Siberian Army Corps had reached Te-li-ssu.

In consequence of this information Lieutenant-General Ogawa, commanding the 4th Division, directed the withdrawal of the cavalry brigade. Sending off the battalion and the batteries in the evening to rejoin their divisions, General Akiyama started from Chu-chia-tien at 2 a.m. on the 4th June for La-tzu-shan, leaving patrols to keep touch with the enemy.

The Russians did not follow up, and on the 5th June General Akiyama fell back to the left bank of the Ta-sha Ho, leaving a chain of outposts to cover Pu-lan-tien and Pi-tzu-wo.

On the Russian side General Samsonov had been further reinforced by the arrival of three squadrons of the 4th Siberian Cossacks and two squadrons of the 5th Siberian Cossacks, which brought the force under his command to nineteen squadrons, one horse battery, one half company of Frontier Guards, and three battalions of infantry.

On the 4th June, General Oku was officially informed of the probable arrival, on the following day, of General Nogi, to take command of the Third Army operating against Port Arthur. He, with the 4th, 5th, and 3rd Divisions, in order as they stood from left to right, the 1st Cavalry Brigade and the 1st Artillery Brigade, was therefore free to devote his whole attention to repelling General Stakelberg's advance; but, pending the complete organization of his line of communication and the landing of his trains, he was unable to assume the offensive and decided to await the Russian attack. In view of the unsuitability of the country along the railway, the cavalry brigade, strengthened by two squadrons of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment from the 3rd Division was moved towards the right flank.

In addition to the Second Army, General Oku at this time had under his command a naval contingent of 1,500 men with six
(4091)

field guns, which held the extreme right of his entrenched position.

The strength of the force which thus barred all access to Port Arthur from the north seems to have been strangely underestimated at the Russian Head-Quarters, for on the 7th June General Kuropatkin issued the following order to Lieutenant-General Stakelberg:—

“Your Excellency’s Army Corps is detailed with the object of drawing upon itself the greatest possible number of the enemy’s forces and thereby weakening his army operating in the Kuan-tung Peninsula.

“Your advance, therefore, against the enemy’s covering troops must be rapid and energetic, in the hope of crushing his advanced detachments should they prove to be weak in numbers.

“In the event of your encountering superior strength decisive action will be avoided, and in no case will you allow the whole of your reserves to become engaged until the conditions are entirely clear.

“The object of our southerly movement is the capture of the Chin-chou (Nan Shan) position, and thereafter an advance on Port Arthur.”

It is, of course, obvious that an expedition despatched under such a complete misapprehension of the difficulties which it was certain to encounter was fore-doomed to failure; and these difficulties were still further increased by the commander-in-chief declining, for the present, to allow his subordinate to concentrate his command. Under such circumstances “rapid and energetic” action was impossible, and General Kuropatkin’s lack of decision can only be explained by the theory that he was still acting under pressure from above and against his own judgment.

In preparation for this advance the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division was trained to Te-li-ssu, arriving there on the 5th June; General Stakelberg arrived on the same day and at once ordered Major-General Samsonov to occupy a fortified position about five miles further south. Between the 5th and 8th General Stakelberg personally reconnoitred a position north of the line Wu-chia-tun—Wa-fang-wo-pu, which was then fortified by impressed Chinese labour.

On the 6th June, General Oku knew that the Russian cavalry screen had been pushed south of Wa-fang-tien, that two squadrons were advancing towards his right flank, and that parties extended westward to the Fu-chou road. It was, therefore, probable that the Russians were advancing to relieve Port Arthur. As soon as it became clear that they were committed to this undertaking, orders were received from the Japanese Imperial Head-Quarters for active operations to be begun by forces in other parts of the theatre of war, with the object of weakening the detachment detailed for the relief of Port Arthur by threatening its communications.

On the 8th June, the 10th Division and a brigade of Guards occupied Hsiu-yen, and, on the 7th and 8th, the 6th Fighting

Operations against the Russian line of communication. Squadron* bombarded the coast between the Kai-ping promontory and the mouth of the Hsiung Ho. A south-bound train was sighted about seven and a-half miles north of Hsiung-yao-cheng, but when the hostile ships were seen it immediately steamed back. Some prisoners captured by the squadron stated that two regiments of infantry and a regiment and a half of cavalry, with eight guns had arrived at Te-li-ssu and Wa-fang-tien between the 28th and 31st May, thus corroborating to some extent the reports, already received from the Chinese, that there were about 5,000 Russians in that district. These movements by land and sea had the desired effect of keeping the bulk of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division in Kai-ping.†

On the 7th June, Lieutenant-General Simonov, formerly commanding the Siberian Cossack Division, arrived at Wa-fang-tien and took over command at that place, but apparently Russian preparations for the advance. Major-General Samsonov still held an independent command of the advanced guard, which consisted of sixteen squadrons and one Cossack battery. This force was now at Wa-fang-tien, with outposts five miles further south on the line Ma-chuan-tzu—Hsiao-chia-chen—Chih-chia-tun; independent posts were also established in Fu-chou and Chu-chia-kou. The extreme length of the front from east to west was nearly thirty miles, and included almost all the roads which led northward from the Japanese position.

On the 9th, two Japanese squadrons drove in an advanced post and penetrated to within three and a half miles of Wa-fang-tien station, and it was not until five Cossack squadrons and two guns were brought up that they were forced to retire. On this day General Oku's intelligence department estimated the Russian force opposing the Second Army at rather more than two divisions, with three or four regiments of cavalry. Similar reconnaissances were carried out on the 10th and 11th against the eastern flank of the Russian line, and General Oku, hoping to find out the effect produced by the occupation of Hsiu-yen and the bombardment of Kai-ping, issued orders for his divisional cavalry to clear up the situation in front of their respective divisions on the morning of the 11th. Each divisional commander was directed to send forward an infantry battalion in support. The result of this reconnaissance showed that the Russian cavalry screen east of the Ta-sha Ho had been somewhat retired, but that the outposts towards Te-li-ssu had been again strengthened by infantry.

In contrast to this accurate information General Kuropatkin seems still to have been ignorant of the strength of General Oku's army, but he had heard from Major-General Mishchenko that the troops advancing from Ta-ku-shan had halted, and were fortifying a position near Hsiu-yen. On the 10th and 11th June, he received news of the withdrawal of the Japanese ships, which

* The squadron which is thus named in the Japanese Official Reports consisted of the gunboats *Akaji* and *Uji* with torpedo boats Nos. 39, 40, 41, and 43.

† See also Chapter XI, p. 96, for General Kuropatkin's movements at this time. (4091)

had menaced General Stakelberg's line of communications from the Gulf of Liao-tung. These two pieces of information seem to have relieved him of a good deal of anxiety; for on the 12th, in the course of a personal interview which took place at Kai-ping, he at last gave General Stakelberg leave to concentrate his command. Two battalions of the 33rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment and two batteries were at once moved to Te-li-ssu, but the remainder of the 9th East Siberian Division was still held back until relieved by units of the 3rd Siberian Infantry Division.

On the 13th June, the 2nd Brigade of the 35th Division, with two of its batteries, came up, and on that date General Stakelberg had under his command nineteen squadrons, twenty-five and a half battalions (including two companies of Frontier Guards with General Simonov) and ten batteries. After his interview with the commander-in-chief he returned to Te-li-ssu at 1 p.m. on the 13th June, but before arriving there he received a report from his cavalry that the Japanese were advancing from Pu-lan-tien with 20,000 men. Although he looked upon the movement as a mere reconnaissance in force, and considered the estimate to be much exaggerated, he nevertheless sent an urgent message to General Kuropatkin requesting that the remainder of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division and other reinforcements might be hurried forward. His wishes were in part complied with, and some of the troops arrived in time for the battle of the 15th June, but others only reached the front when the 1st Siberian Army Corps was in full retreat.

So far from the report being exaggerated the importance of the Japanese advance was by no means fully realized, for it was the commencement of the great converging movement of the First, Second, and Fourth Armies, which was to culminate in the battle of Liao-yang.

General Oku's supply trains had at last reached him on the 12th June, and on the 13th the northward march began. On that date, moving in three columns, the 3rd Division on the right, the 5th in the centre, the 4th on the left, and repulsing small hostile forces, the Second Army occupied a line extending from Tai-ping-chuang through Kuan-chia-tun to Wu-chia-tun (S.) on the Fu-chou road, while Head-Quarters reached Wu-chia-tun* from Chin-chia-tun.* It so happened that on the night of the 12th a reconnoitring party of two Cossack squadrons, some mounted scouts, and a dismounted Cossack squadron had left Wa-fang-tien with the object of breaking through the Japanese outposts in front of Pu-lan-tien. This party had unexpectedly encountered the Second Army on the march and had reported to General Stakelberg as already related.

The fighting on the 13th was unimportant (the Russian loss was said to be one officer and ten men wounded), but the troops suffered greatly from the heat. At 7 p.m. the following orders were issued from the Japanese Head-Quarters (see map II/2):—

* These villages are south of the Te-li-ssu map.

- "(1) The army will advance to-morrow with the object of repulsing the enemy on the line Ssu-chia-chou—Liu-chia-kou (E.).
- "(2) The 3rd Division (less one regiment) leaving the line Tou-chia-tun—Yen-chia-tun at 5 a.m., and keeping to the east of Yen-chia-tun, Chuang-hsiao-fang, Chu-chia-tien, will advance to the line Ssu-chia-chou—Lung-wang-miao.
- "(3) The 1st Artillery Brigade (less one regiment) will be attached to the 3rd Division, and will assemble by 5 a.m. at Kuan-chia-tun.
- "(4) The 5th Division (less two sections of cavalry and one regiment of infantry) will leave the line Hou-chia-tun—San-chia-kou at 5 a.m., and keeping touch with the left of the 3rd Division will advance to Chu-chia-tien and try to occupy a line from Lung-wang-miao to Liu-chia-kou (E.).
- "(5) The 4th Division will move from Wu-chia-tun (S.) at dawn, and, keeping in the district west of the line of villages Wu-chia-tun, Lo-chia-huang, and Liu-chia-kou (W.), march to the Fu-chou Ho. There it will halt and will prepare to operate against the enemy's right flank and rear, keeping a careful look-out to the north.
- "(6) One regiment of the 1st Artillery Brigade will leave Kuei-ma-chiao* and join the 4th Division by the Fu-chou road.
- "(7) The 6th Infantry Regiment (less one battalion), and the 11th Infantry Regiment and two sections of the 5th Cavalry Regiment, will form the army reserve, and will assemble by 5.30 a.m. at Liu-chia-tun.

General
Stakelberg's
position at
Te-li-ssu.

Away to the north a different spirit was manifesting itself, for General Stakelberg had decided to abandon the offensive and to await the Japanese attack in the position he had selected south of Te-li-ssu.

On the morning of the 14th his troops were disposed as follows:—

Western Section (west of the railway), under Major-General Kondratovich—

33rd and 36th Regiments (5 battalions).

3rd and 4th Batteries of the 9th East Siberian Artillery Brigade.

Eastern Section (east of the railway) under Major-General Gerngross—

1st East Siberian Rifle Division (12 battalions).

1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Batteries of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.

At Te-li-ssu station, in reserve, under Major-General Glasko—

2nd Brigade of the 35th Infantry Division (8 battalions)

Two batteries of the 35th Artillery Brigade.

* This village is south of the Te-li-ssu map.

Lieutenant-General Simonov's detached force was withdrawn, from the front, and the cavalry was ordered to take up a position west of Ta-fang-shen to cover the right flank of the corps watching the roads from Ta-fang-shen to Huang-chia-tun and Chun-chia-tun. The baggage train was sent to the north, and the reserve ammunition was brought up to Te-li-szu.

Of these troops, the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, and the 1st Battery of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade arrived early on the morning of the 14th; they were at first kept in reserve on the left, but were brought into action to repel the attack of the 34th Regiment, belonging to the 3rd Japanese Division, which took place soon after mid-day.

It will thus be seen that while the Russians had a whole division and four batteries to the east, and a weak brigade with two batteries and a strong force of cavalry to the west of the railway, the Japanese had one division and a cavalry brigade to the east of it, and two whole divisions to the west.

The 34th and 45th Regiments of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, and the 9th Regiment of the 3rd Siberian Infantry Division, were still coming up by train.

On the 14th, the several Japanese divisions moved as ordered, the 3rd and 5th keeping touch with each other, while the 4th Division struck north-west in the direction of the Fu-chou Ho; The beginning of the battle. at 5 a.m., General Oku left his quarters of the previous night and came to Liu-chia-tun, where the reserve of the army had assembled. Here he received a report from the 6th Division, stating that some troops had disembarked west of the mouth of the Ta-sha Ho, and orders were sent for them to march without delay to La-tzu-shan. Meanwhile the 3rd and 5th Divisions had driven back some small parties of the enemy; and by noon they came in touch with the main body of his advanced guard, in strength about one mixed brigade. This detachment, which was entrenched on rising ground east of the railway overlooking the valley up which the Japanese were advancing, finding itself opposed to superior forces, retired round the eastern slopes of a range of hills, and two hours later the first gun was fired from the centre of the Russian position at Lung-wang-miao. This led to a heavy artillery fire on both sides, during which the Russian position from Ta-fang-shen to Lung-wang-miao was reconnoitred and the strength of the defenders was estimated at under three divisions. At 3 p.m., the cannonade was at its height, the Russian commander disclosing the position of nearly all his guns, while only those of the 3rd Japanese Division were in action. About the same hour a detachment of infantry and artillery from the 5th Division occupied the hill north-west of Lung-chia-tun.

While the artillery duel was in progress, the right of the Japanese line, the 34th Regiment, attacked the 1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment on the heights about Wa-fang-wo-pu. The 2nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment was brought up to assist the 1st, and together they repelled the attack, which cost the latter regiment 14 officers and 150 men killed and wounded. General Stakelberg arrived about 3 p.m., and received a verbal report

from Major-General Gerngross that the attack had been repulsed, and that reinforcements from the general reserve were not required.

A little later the 13th and 15th Artillery Regiments, belonging to the 1st Japanese Artillery Brigade, opened fire against the Russian centre, but neither they nor the infantry produced any definite result before sunset, when the 3rd and 5th Divisions held a line running from Ssu-chia-chou through Lung-chia-tun to Wu-chia-tun (W.). During the day Japanese Headquarters moved to Wa-fang-tien, which was reached at half-past three, and the cavalry brigade, on the extreme right, to which were attached a battalion of infantry and a battery of mountain guns, marched from Wang-chia-tun on the left bank of the Ta-sha Ho through Tsai-men-tien-miao* to Sha-pao-tzu. On the other flank, the 4th Division marched at 4.30 a.m. and by noon assembled on the left bank of the Fu-chou Ho, where, covered by a line of outposts on the high ground across the river, it halted for the night. The divisional cavalry and a detachment of infantry occupied Fu-chou city during the day, expelling a company of Russian infantry which formed the garrison.

Meanwhile General Stakelberg returned to Te-li-ssu about 4.20 p.m., and ordered Major-General Glasko to march at once with the reserve brigade of infantry to Tsui-chia-tun (two and a-half miles S.E. of Te-li-ssu), and there to place himself under the orders of Major-General Gerngross.

Major-General Glasko reached his destination at 6 p.m., and sent out two detachments to reconnoitre the ground in his front and to act as outposts. One detachment, a battalion of the 139th Regiment and four guns, occupied the saddle south-east of Fu-ching-fen at 7.20 p.m. without resistance. The second detachment, under Colonel Petrov, one battalion of the 139th, one battalion of the 140th, and four guns, finding a Japanese battery in position south of Wa-fang-wo-pu, came into action 1,500 yards north of that place. The main body of the brigade bivouacked for the night between Tsui-chia-tun and Fu-ching-fen.

It would appear that General Stakelberg had carried away from the battlefield an entirely erroneous impression of the state

The conclusion of the fighting on the 14th. of affairs. There had been no reports of engagements west of the railway, and the attack of the 3rd Division, which had been checked without very great difficulty, led him to believe that the bulk of

the Japanese army was opposed to his own left. He therefore decided to make a counter-stroke on the 15th, and it was for this purpose that he moved up General Glasko's brigade, thus placing more than three-quarters of his force in the eastern section of his position. His only remaining reserves, available for employment in the western section should the necessity arise, were the troops still coming up by rail. Of these the 34th,† 35th, and two battalions of the 9th Regiment arrived at Te-lis-su during the

* East of Te-li-ssu map.

† The leading battalion of the 34th Regiment was also sent up to join General Glasko's brigade.

night of the 14th; the remaining two battalions of the 9th were detained at a point some three miles north of that station when the retreat had already begun.

On the other hand, at the conclusion of the fighting on the 14th, General Oku's information led him to believe (1) that the force opposed to him consisted of something under three divisions; (2) that it held a defensive position south of Te-li-ssu; (3) that reinforcements were continually arriving at that place by rail. He decided to attack without delay and at 11 p.m. he issued the following orders :—

- (1) The 5th Division will advance to-morrow before dawn from the neighbourhood of Wu-chia-tun (W.) and attack the enemy at Ta-fang-shen, but will delay its further movement up the Fu-chou valley.*
- (2) The 3rd Division, keeping touch with the 5th Division, will advance as soon as the latter has begun its attack.

The following order was despatched to the commander of the 4th Division† :—

“As no danger is to be anticipated from the direction of the valley of the Fu-chou River, you will detach a force of at least one brigade of infantry to-morrow, which will attack the enemy's right flank and help the advance of the other divisions.”

On the morning of the 15th, the 11th Japanese Regiment rejoined the 5th Division so that the only reserve remaining under General Oku's own hand was two battalions of the 6th Regiment. There was, however, good reason to believe that the leading troops of the 6th Division would arrive before very long.

Advancing northward from the bivouac of the Second Army and following the road which skirts the railway and the Hou-tou Ho, a line of hills, or, as it might be termed, a barrier range, from 600 to 1,000 feet in height, blocks the view. Beyond it, and about 2,000 yards north of the crest line, lies the ground selected by the Russian general for a trial of strength with the victorious Second Army. This range of hills stands like a screen before the position, almost entirely hiding movements made behind it. Two peaks rise from it, steep and bare, and between them is a gap through which the railway, road, and river pass; its breadth at both its exits is half a mile, its length the same, and its width in the centre about a quarter of a mile. The hills on either side are inaccessible for field artillery. To the west and at the extremity of the range

* The 5th Division was apparently to await the arrival of the 4th Division.

† The 4th Division was at this time about 13 miles distant from Army Head-Quarters, and the order was sent off at 11 p.m. General Oku was anxious that it should not fail to be delivered, and directed two staff officers to carry it by different roads. The order reached its destination at 5 a.m., 15th June.

is another gap of greater width, through which the Fu-chou Ho takes its course. Directly fronting the former of these gaps—the railway gap—and 2,000 yards from its central point, is a long spur called Lung-wang-miao, which juts out westward towards the river, and in front of it are villages among trees. On this spur—the main Russian gun position—were twenty gun pits, and below them infantry trenches. North-eastward from the hill east of the railway gap, which is itself an outlying feature of the main range, the position followed in a curve a line of more or less commanding points to Fei-chia-tun. Along this front, trenches for infantry and pits for eight more guns were prepared, some of the former facing east and north to guard against a flank attack. After passing through the railway gap and turning to the north-west, it is seen that the valley through which the Fu-chou River flows is flat, open, and heavily cultivated. For about two miles north it continues so, but gradually narrows towards the little village of Te-li-ssu which gave its name to the battle. A short distance north of the point where the river disappears into the western gap is the village of Ta-fang-shen, situated at the southern extremity of a spur thrust out from the range which flanks the valley on the western side. This village and the hill above were held by the Russians, but the main position of their right was one and a half miles further back, across the range, and followed a well-marked feature. Here were placed twenty gun pits, while infantry, separated from them by a deep ravine, held a somewhat similar line in front; and, in the valley, between the right and the artillery on Lung-wang-miao, were pits for twenty guns and more infantry entrenchments. From east to west the position measured about eight and a half miles.*

The plan of the Japanese commander was to assail the Russian left and left centre with the 3rd Division, and, with the 5th Division and part of the 4th, to turn their right, while the cavalry brigade was to operate upon the eastern flank.†

About 2 a.m. on the 15th, shots rang out from the Russian position, creating an alarm and causing the troops of the front line, who were shaken and excited by the events of the previous day, to discharge their rifles in every direction. Some noise, made by the Japanese in strengthening their position under cover of darkness, had apparently led to the belief that they were stealing forward to the attack and had caused the outbreak. After this incident the remainder of the night passed quietly, but when day broke a heavy mist hung over the valleys of the Fu-chou and

* When inspecting the position on the 13th June General Stakelberg drew the attention of the several artillery commanders to the necessity of posting their batteries in covered positions. The opinions of the artillery officers differed on this point, the majority—especially the senior officers—asserting that artillery could only fire from covered positions at stationary objects. Notwithstanding the fact that some battery commanders openly protested against this view, they were overruled by the senior officers, and gun positions were prepared for direct laying. However, one battery at Lung-wang-miao appears to have used indirect fire on the 15th.

† The minor part played by this brigade is a noticeable feature of this battle.

Hou-tou and enabled the Japanese infantry, which had actually begun to move shortly after midnight, to approach unseen close to the Russian position. At 5.25 a.m. the weather cleared, and the 3rd Japanese Artillery Regiment at Wang-chia-tun opened fire, to which the Russian guns replied. The 13th Artillery Regiment took post upon the left of the 3rd, directing its efforts against Lu-chia-kou and Lung-wang-miao, and the 15th Artillery Regiment, in position further to the south, fired on the latter place and on Ta-fang-shen.*

On the Russian side the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division had, during the night, made some changes in its dispositions. On the high ground at Lung-wang-miao was the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment with the 3rd and 4th Batteries of the division. Of the 4th Regiment nine companies were in shelter trenches, while two were kept in reserve and one company remained as baggage escort. The 3rd Battery was in position behind the natural cover of the ridge so placed as to bring an indirect fire on the ground in front; and the 4th Battery, which had suffered heavily owing to its occupying a conspicuous position on the previous day, now took up the emplacements of the 2nd Battery. The latter had been withdrawn and, together with the 1st Battery which was in reserve, had been sent to join Major-General Glasko's brigade. The remainder of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division was posted on the left flank of the position ready to attack, the 2nd and 3rd Regiments holding the front line with the 1st Regiment as a reserve in rear of the centre.

Orders had been issued by Lieutenant-General Stakelberg during the night of the 14th, describing how the counter-stroke against the Japanese right by the troops under Major-Generals Gerngross and Glasko was to be carried out.† According to these orders the operation was to begin between 1 a.m. and 2 a.m. on the 15th, or in any case before daybreak on that date; but the exact hour when the troops were to move was left to the discretion of General Gerngross, who was directed to come to an understanding on the subject with General Glasko. On receiving his instructions General Gerngross intimated to the commander of the 1st Siberian Army Corps that he proposed to move at daybreak, *i.e.*, about 4 a.m. Although the decision as to time was a matter left to his own discretion, he appears to have expected that approval from Head-Quarters would be received. Thus delay occurred, and, when it was at length decided to advance, the co-operating troops of General Glasko's force had not arrived. That officer, too, was in doubt as to the hour at

* The Russians state that the Japanese batteries fired from "covered positions." It seems probable, therefore, that the guns had taken position during the night and that gun pits had been made.

† Lieutenant-General Jilinski, formerly chief of the Viceroy Alexeiev's field staff, states that the operation orders issued by Lieutenant-General Stakelberg for the 15th June were not embodied in one general order, but took the form of separate memoranda indifferently worded. Units were in ignorance of the general situation, in consequence of which there was a lack of cohesion, and confusion resulted.

which the corps commander intended that the movement should begin. During the night he had received an order from Lieutenant-General Stakelberg, dated Te-li-ssu 6 p.m. 14th June, which stated that a battalion of the 34th Regiment was on its way to join him and that, in communication with General Gerngross, he was to attack the right flank of the Japanese. On receiving this order General Glasko sent an orderly officer to the Head-Quarters of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, and received the following reply from General Gerngross, "I am on the road Wu-chia-tun—Wa-fang-wo-pu. If the corps commander should order the attack for daybreak, we may reckon on victory." General Glasko now sent two orderlies to the Head-Quarters of the 1st Siberian Army Corps, requesting further orders for the 15th, and was directed to disturb the enemy by means of scout detachments and to ascertain his positions; both of which duties had already been carried out.*

Thus when day broke the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division and General Glasko's brigade still stood fast, the latter having been joined during the night by a battalion of the 34th Regiment and by the 1st and 2nd Batteries of General Gerngross's command.

When, soon after, the Japanese guns opened fire on the Russian position, General Glasko was forced to come to a decision, and at 6.40 a.m., after a prolonged discussion with his staff, he decided to advance. The detachment on the saddle to the south-east of Fu-ching-fen was reinforced to a strength of two battalions and was ordered to advance by Cheng-chia-tun and Kou-yin to take the Japanese in rear. The other detachment under command of Colonel Petrov, which was reinforced by a third battalion, was to advance at once to Wa-fang-wo-pu, whither the remainder of the brigade would follow. While instructions for these movements were being issued, an order came from General Gerngross directing General Glasko to attack, and stating that he would be supported "from the heights." Scarcely had the march begun, when the following order was received from the corps commander "If the Japanese advance with superior force against our centre or in any other direction, the corps will fall back slowly to Wan-chia-ling. In this case Major-General Glasko will hold the line Kou-chia-tun—Tsui-chia-tun as long as possible, in order to give the troops falling back by Te-li-ssu time to traverse the defile north of Tsui-chia-tun. Should the Japanese retire, the troops will halt, and await further orders."

The situation was thus still further complicated. The corps commander, influenced no doubt by General Kuropatkin's instructions of the 7th June, now gave definite orders that if the Japanese should advance in any direction the Russian troops were to fall back, while should the Japanese retire no pursuit was to be engaged upon. The orders omitted all mention of an intention to attack, and General Glasko was again in doubt as to his proper line of action.

Meanwhile, about 7 a.m., Colonel Petrov's column had become

* See p. 39.

engaged, and, although the Japanese east of the railway had not yet moved from the positions held by them during the previous night, General Glasko seems to have fallen back and occupied the line from Kou-chia-tun to Tsui-chia-tun.

The troops of the 3rd Japanese Division were at this time occupying a line from Ching-chia-hsin-an-tun, through Ssu-chia-chou to Chang-tien Shan, waiting until the bombardment on their left had taken effect, and whilst in this state of inaction they were suddenly attacked. General Gerngross, relying upon the support of General Glasko's brigade, had advanced with his three regiments between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m. The attack progressed but slowly, for the only Russian guns which were at first in a position to support it were those of the Frontier Guard mountain battery, posted south-west of height 1,250'. Nevertheless, the operation was pushed with great determination, and Lieutenant-General Oshima's troops were forced to remain in the rough shelter trenches which had been thrown up on the rocky ground they had held since midnight.

While the 3rd Division was thus engaged, the Japanese troops west of the railway were pushing forward. By 7 a.m. the 5th Division, whose guns had crossed to the right bank of the Fu-chou River, occupied a line from Wang-chia-tun to Yang-chia-tun, driving back the Russian dismounted cavalry, some of which retired north-westward and some directly north. At this time Lieutenant-General Ueda, commanding the 5th Division, was in ignorance of the precise position held by the Russians in front of his men, but from the east, in the direction of the 3rd Division, came the sound of heavy firing and the condition of the troops engaged in that quarter was reported to be dangerous. Placed in such circumstances, General Ueda, without hesitation, resolved to press forward and assail the enemy's right flank. On the right, the 42nd Regiment was directed against the weak Russian detachment occupying the line between the heights north of Ta-fang-shen and the village of Lung-kou. The left was ordered to advance upon the latter place, and about 9 a.m. drove back part of Lieutenant-General Simonov's cavalry division, a movement which threatened the flank and rear of the I/36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and caused it to withdraw towards the right of the Russian batteries north of San-hsi-erh. To support the 1st Battalion, Major-General Kondratovich had meanwhile sent the 2nd Battalion along the ridge between San-hsi-erh and Lung-kou, and these fresh troops engaged the 21st Japanese Regiment as it issued from the latter village.

The danger to the Russian right flank was now becoming serious, for the cavalry division, which had been intended by Lieutenant-General Stakelberg to guard that side, had fallen back, part of it in a north-westerly direction towards Hui-chia-tun, while the main body, contrary to orders, retired to Te-li-ssu. By 9.20 a.m., the hill north of Lu-chia-kou was lost, and the ground to the east was attacked, with the result that, about 10 a.m., the Russian troops

were forced to relinquish the village of Ta-fang-shen and the height commanding it. The guns of the 5th Division, following behind the advancing troops, came into action on the height first taken, and engaged the enemy's artillery at Lung-wang-miao and on the high ground west of Li-chia-tou, which was delaying the forward movement of the infantry. The 13th and 15th Artillery Regiments soon came up in support of the mountain guns and took position east and south-west of Wang-chia-tun, their combined efforts completely crushing the fire of the guns on Lung-wang-miao.*

To assist the attack of the 5th Division other troops were now coming up from a westerly direction, for the order sent to the

commander of the 4th Division on the previous night had reached him at Hsiao-ssu-chia-tun at 5 a.m. on the 15th, in sufficient time to allow of his helping materially in the battle. At 6 a.m., a

squadron of cavalry, a company of engineers, a battalion of artillery, and the 19th Infantry Brigade, the whole under Major-General Ando, left Pan-chia-tun and, after a stiff march through a hilly region, arrived at Yang-chia-tun at 9 a.m. Here they came into communication with the left of the 5th Division, and half-an-hour later reached the heights south-west of Ma-chia-fang-hsin, just as the Russians at Sung-chia-tun were beginning to fall back. As no precautions appeared to have been taken by the enemy to meet an attack from the west, Major-General Ando detached a portion of his force with orders to move as quickly as possible to the high ground north-east of Ma-chia-fang-hsin, and with the remainder he opened fire upon the position in front of him.

About 10 a.m. the 11/36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment and two companies belonging to another battalion of that regiment, finding themselves exposed in front and flank to the attack of the 21st Japanese Regiment, while their rear was threatened by General Ando's troops, fell back, and about the same hour the left of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division began to waver. The news that the attack was developing on his right had reached Lieutenant-General Stakelberg some time earlier, and at 10.30 a.m. he ordered the 35th East Siberian Rifle Regiment to reinforce the troops on the heights east of Tung-lung-kou. That regiment had just reached its desired position when General Ando's batteries opened fire upon it, and before it could be fully deployed it came under the attack of the infantry of the 19th Brigade from Tung-lung-kou, while its left was so seriously threatened by a portion of the 21st Regiment that it seemed improbable that it could maintain its ground.

It was now about 11 a.m. when Lieutenant-General Stakelberg received a report, sent in by the cavalry at 6 a.m.,† that strong

* The Japanese artillery commander then turned his fire on to the Russian gun teams, with the result that the guns could not be removed, and thirteen of them were captured. The remainder were withdrawn by the help of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

† The attack of the Japanese on the 15th June appears to have taken place one day earlier than was anticipated by the Russians. In consequence, no telegraph or telephone lines had been erected on the position and great delays occurred in transmitting messages by orderlies,

Japanese forces were advancing on Te-li-ssu from a south-westerly direction. To restore the situation only four battalions were available, namely two battalions of the 34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment and two of the 9th Siberian Infantry Regiment which had just arrived by rail at Te-li-ssu. These the corps commander, who had remained on the right of the position, himself led towards the advancing Japanese, but the pressure of the attack was growing momentarily stronger, and about 11.30 a.m., before the two battalions of the 9th Siberian Infantry Regiment had reached the ground allotted to them, a general order to retire was issued.*

While everything was giving way before the Japanese attack west of the railway line, the condition of the 3rd Division, east of it, had not improved. The ground held by its right was only maintained with difficulty in face of a series of small but fierce counter-attacks, which were focussed on and around the village of Ssu-chia-chou. Again and again the Russians, who had brought up to their front line three regiments of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, flung themselves against their obstinate opponents with the utmost intrepidity, and at one point the hostile lines approached so close to each other that, when ammunition gave out, stones were freely thrown by both sides. Report after report reached Lieutenant-General Oshima, announcing the critical condition of his troops who, from the nature of the ground, could only be supported by a totally inadequate force of artillery. Every battalion, except the single one held in reserve, being hotly engaged, reinforcements were asked for from Head-Quarters, and at 11 a.m. General Oku despatched one battalion, the half of all that now remained with him.

This reinforcement came up opportunely, for Major-General Glasko's brigade was once more moving towards the scene of action. Some time before 10 a.m. an officer of the general staff from corps Head-Quarters had arrived with an order directing General Glasko to advance against the Japanese right flank and to support the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division. Accordingly three battalions and a battery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Perfiliev, moved forward by Cheng-chia-tun, while the main body of the brigade† marched to Wa-fang-wo-pu. Again co-operation between the two forces on the Russian right was doomed to failure. General Gerngross, who from early morning had watched the Japanese attack west of the railway line, had seen the gradual retirement of the detachments of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division from the high ground north of Ta-fang-shen. Soon after 10 a.m. the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment which faced the "railway gap" had come under a heavy flanking fire

* In this attempt to save the day General Stakelberg had two horses shot under him.

† Six battalions and three batteries. It will be remembered that the brigade, consisting of eight battalions and two batteries, had been joined by a battalion of the 34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and by the 1st and 2nd Batteries of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division.

from the guns and rifles of the 5th Division. This fire had lasted for about an hour, during which the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment had suffered many casualties. Towards noon the regiment, probably influenced by the withdrawal of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Regiment on its right, began to waver, upon which the Japanese advanced towards the village of Wu-chia-tun. This movement, which imperilled the situation of the Russian right, coupled with the non-arrival of General Glasko's troops, led General Gerngross, on his own initiative, to order his division to retire, and instructions to that effect were given soon after noon.*

Shortly before this the two detachments from General Glasko's brigade, near Wa-fang-wo-pu and Cheng-chia-tun, had at last begun to deploy, for their advance had been delayed owing to the difficulty experienced in bringing up the guns over broken ground. Colonel Perfiliev's column found before it the three squadrons of the 3rd Japanese Cavalry Regiment, which were dismounted on the right flank of the 3rd Division. Against these he pushed the attack and gained some slight advantage, but supports were at hand, for the 1st Japanese Cavalry Brigade which had passed the night at Sha-pao-tzu, had marched northward at an early hour and, on hearing the sound of guns on its left, had dismounted and prepared to join in the fight. Part moved north-west towards Ching-chia-hsiao-tun, to help the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, and the remainder turned against Fei-chia-tun. The brigade, though suffering very little loss, was greatly retarded by the enemy's field gun fire, and its situation caused its commander, Major-General Akiyama, some anxiety until the advance of Colonel Perfiliev's force was brought to a standstill between 1 p.m., and 2 p.m., when General Glasko's brigade was still on the line from Wa-fang-wo-pu to Cheng-chia-tun, where it had come under fire from the Japanese right flank battalion. Though unbeaten, the attack was arrested by the retirement of the 1st East Siberian Rifle division, which was already falling back.

Meanwhile the 3rd Japanese Division, reinforced by the remaining battalion of the army reserve,† pressed forward, and about 2 p.m. four of its batteries passing through the "railway gap"—no longer swept by projectiles—took position on Lung-wang-miao, where thirteen deserted guns were found, and thence raked the valley to the north, causing the four regiments of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, which had lately confronted it, heavy loss. General Glasko now received the corps commander's order to retire by the roads through Tsui-chia-tun and Cha-tao-fang. His retreat was covered by a rearguard, which the 1st Japanese Cavalry Brigade drove from the heights near the former place about 3 p.m.

Turning once more to the Russian right, the retreat in that quarter of the field had begun about midday. Under Lieutenant-

* The corps commander's order to retire did not reach General Gerngross till evening.

† This battalion was replaced by the 1/23rd of the 6th Division which came up a little after 2 p.m.

General Stakelberg's directions the troops were skilfully withdrawn from the position. The 36th Regiment, which was most exposed, first retired, followed by the 33rd and then the 4th and 5th by the 34th Regiments; while the 35th Regiment, Japanese assisted by the 2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Divisions. Artillery Battery, which frequently changed position to prevent the Japanese from obtaining the range, brought up the rear.

The cavalry division, as already stated, had fallen back some hours earlier, thus laying bare the right flank of the 35th East Siberian Rifle Regiment. The greater part had retired by Te-li-ssu, while a portion had withdrawn towards Wu-chia-tun,* following the route by which the corps commander had directed that any retirement should take place. About 10.50 a.m., when the commander of the 4th Japanese Division heard that the Russian mounted troops were falling back, he sent towards Wu-chia-tun two companies of the II/8th Regiment and a battery of field artillery, the remainder of the division pursuing its way to Sung-chia-tun. The detachment sent to Wu-chia-tun fell in with the Russian squadrons moving towards that place, and taking them by surprise, forced them to retreat by Chiao-chia-tun.*

From all sides the Japanese were now pushing forward, while the Russian commander endeavoured to stay their advance to gain time for his troops to clear the defile at Te-li-ssu. West of the railway the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division continued its retreat, its rearguard holding the heights west of Te-li-ssu, and covering the entrainment of the wounded at the railway station. Further north, a battalion of Major-General Ando's brigade seized the high ground at Lung-tang-ho, and thence pressed forward to cut the railway line. At this juncture, about 2 p.m., the two remaining battalions of the 9th Siberian Infantry Regiment arrived by train at the railway siding of Yang-chia-tun, whence they were hurried forward and successfully checked the threatening movement.

East of the railway the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division retired under the fire of the Japanese artillery, the three regiments furthest from the Fu-chou River being driven eastward into the hilly region where isolated parties were taken prisoners later. Of these units the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment was forced to quit its ground, leaving behind the men's knapsacks, which had been discarded before going into action, while the Frontier Guard mountain battery lost four of its guns.

For a time the road to the north was blocked at the Pan-lashan defile by the ill-timed march of transport, between which and the Japanese was the main body of the cavalry division, supported by a company of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment. Fortunately for the Russians, about 3 p.m., a blinding storm of rain began to fall, which effectually prevented the Japanese artillerymen from laying their guns, and helped to reduce in some degree the heavy losses. The victorious troops about this time ceased to

* North of the Te-li-ssu map.

pursue, for the men were exhausted with the efforts of the day, ammunition was running short, and the ground near and beyond Te-li-ssu is of a nature unsuited to the action of mounted troops. Two squadrons were, however, sent north to observe the retiring enemy, and behind them a line of outposts was established. In rear of it the three divisions of the Second Army bivouacked. On the left, the 19th Brigade of the 4th Division remained at Te-li-ssu; the rest of the division, which reached Chien-mei-tun at 2 p.m., halting there, with two companies of the 1/37th Regiment three and a half miles to the west on the main Fu-chou—Kai-ping road. In the centre, about Li-chia-tou, south-west of Te-li-ssu, was the 5th Division, while the 3rd Division on the right bivouacked east of the river at Lao-hsiao-kao.

The inability of the Japanese to follow up their victory greatly favoured the Russians, who made their way northward, covered by a rearguard consisting of the bulk of the cavalry division and the Cossack batteries. The 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, which was joined by the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, covered the fourteen miles to Wan-chia-ling without a halt, and thence moved into bivouac about two miles north of the railway station. The 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, keeping to the east of the railway line, reached Wan-chia-ling about 11 p.m., and on the following day came up abreast of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division. The 2nd Brigade, 35th Infantry Division, which had begun to fall back about 2 p.m., followed in rear of the 1st Siberian Army Corps, and halted on reaching the village of Wan-chia-ling, some three miles south of the railway station of that name.

Thus the attempt to relieve Port Arthur had resulted in signal failure and, while the Japanese had suffered barely twelve hundred casualties, the Russians had lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners at least three times as many.*

* See Appendix E.

CHAPTER IX.

THE ADVANCE NORTHWARD OF THE SECOND JAPANESE ARMY,
AND THE BATTLE OF TA-SHIH-CHIAO.

AFTER the victory of Te-li-ssu, which secured for the Japanese the defiles debouching on to the plain of Hsiung-yao, the Second Army halted for four days, during which it was reinforced by the remainder of the 6th Division under Lieutenant-General Okubo. Meanwhile the cavalry moved north by the road which runs parallel to the railway, and about 4 a.m. on the 17th June occupied Wan-chia-ling. Some twelve hours earlier the 1st Siberian Army Corps had marched thence in two columns, with orders to proceed by Hsiung-yao to Kai-ping, distant about forty miles, reaching the latter place in three days' time. The western column under Major-General Kondratovich, consisting of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division with the 9th Siberian Infantry Regiment, one and a half squadrons of cavalry, and half the 1st East Siberian Sapper Battalion, took the road along the railway; while the eastern column under Major-General Gerngross, consisting of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, a squadron of cavalry, and the 2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery, followed a parallel route further to the east. Covering the movement of these two columns was a rearguard under Major-General Samsonov,* formed of the 2nd Brigade of the 35th Infantry Division,† the remainder of the cavalry, two squadrons of Frontier Guards, and the 3rd Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery.

The departure of the Russian troops from Wan-chia-ling had not been intended to take place until the 17th June, but it seems probable that the movement of a portion of the 10th Japanese Division towards Kai-ping,‡ which took place about this time, led to its being hastened. The first stage of the march, which began on the evening of the 16th June, was carried out in some disorder. As night fell, the troops, shaken by the conflict of the previous day, saw

* Lieutenant-General Simonov had been replaced by Major-General Samsonov.

† In the original Russian order for the movement, the 2nd Brigade 35th Infantry Division is shown with three batteries. Two batteries only, however, were present at the battle of Te-li-ssu. In the same order batteries which had lost some or all of their guns at that battle, are mentioned as complete units.

‡ See Chap. X.

danger where none existed and, seized with panic, fired upon each other. Indeed to such an extent was the habitual stolidity of the men and their commanders overcome, that some shots fired by a Cossack detachment, about 3.30 a.m., caused the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, with which General Stakelberg marched, to deploy and remain halted in position until daybreak. At length about 9 a.m. on the 17th June, worn out, hungry, and dejected the troops reached their halting place at Hsiung-yao, where they remained until the following day.

By 7.15 p.m. on the 17th, an eastern flank guard under Major-General Maksimovich, consisting of a regiment of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, eight field guns, and half a squadron, had been despatched to Tung-chia-tun, seven and a half miles north-east of Hsiung-yao, with instructions to remain there until further orders. These troops were intended to keep the Japanese in check, should they advance from the east, until the main body of the 1st Siberian Army Corps had made good its retirement when General Maksimovich was to withdraw to Kai-ping. Lieutenant-General Stakelberg had been ordered to concentrate at that city without delay and there to reorganize his force; and at 2 p.m. on the 18th, the main body, still formed in two columns, marched northward from Hsiung-yao. To the south, the cavalry under Major-General Samsonov was ordered to watch the region through which the Second Japanese Army was expected to march, and to hold a line from the coast to the valley of the Pi-li Ho on the east, where touch was to be maintained with Major-General Mishchenko's mounted troops.

By the 20th June, the 1st Siberian Army Corps and the 2nd Brigade of the 35th Infantry Division were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Kai-ping; but, although the latter force had only marched in on the morning of that day, it was hurried north a few hours later to a point near Ta-shih-chiao.* South of Hsiung-yao some trivial cavalry skirmishing had taken place on the 18th June, but no indication that the Japanese were contemplating an immediate advance had been observed. Want of ammunition and difficulties of supply had prevented General Oku from following up his late antagonist, and a heavy fall of rain had made the roads over which his troops must march almost impassable. The Second Army was at this time practically dependent upon provisions brought to the front by Chinese carts from the central dépôt at Pu-lan-tien, for though the Russians had left some three hundred railway wagons at Ta-lien-wan and Dalny, they had been careful to remove all locomotives. Supply by means of local transport was far from satisfactory; vehicles were not forthcoming in sufficient numbers, and many of the carters, frightened by the heavy firing at

* This brigade was withdrawn from General Stakelberg's command and was not present at the battle of Ta-shih-chiao.

Te-li-ssu and unwilling to serve for hire beyond the environs of their homes, broke their contract and deserted. The strategical situation, however, demanded that the Second Army should advance simultaneously with the two forces east of it, which were about to make a forward movement, for it was important that all three should work in concert, though widely separated. Steady pressure exerted upon several points of the front held by the Russians, who, like the Japanese, were suffering from transport difficulties, would, it was hoped, create doubt in General Kuropatkin's mind as to where his greatest danger lay, and lead him to disperse his troops rather than to throw the mass of them in any one direction.

On the 20th June, therefore, the Second Army resumed its northward march, a division and the 1st Cavalry Brigade occupying Hsiung-yao on the afternoon of the following day. The main body of the army was obliged, by shortness of supplies, to halt south of that place, covered by a line of outposts whose front extended from the coast line on the west to a point on the high ground some twenty-four miles east of Hsiung-yao.*

On the 27th June, a detachment of the 5th Division, consisting of a troop of cavalry, a battery, and a battalion, was sent in a north-easterly direction to cover the right flank of the army and endeavour to gain touch with Major-General Tojo's column from the Ta-ku-shan army, which was then actively engaged.

The cavalry on both sides now displayed activity, and skirmishes took place almost daily, but until the 6th July no movement of importance was begun. By that date the problem of supply was nearing a solution. The rolling stock taken from the Russians had been organized in trains of from thirty to forty wagons, which, in the absence of mechanical traction, were pushed by gangs of men, sixteen to each vehicle. In addition to the railway line, Chinese carts still plied from Pu-lan-tien to the front through Fu-chou and Te-li-ssu, but road and rail did not suffice to meet the daily needs of the Second Army and at the same time to allow of the collection of a food reserve. Land transport for the moment had attained its limits, and those charged with the duty of provisioning the army next turned their thoughts towards the sea. It was at first proposed to send transports laden with supplies through the Straits of Pei-chih-li, past the entrance to Port Arthur. These vessels, escorted by a portion of the fleet, were to land their stores at some point on the coast near Hsiung-yao, whence carts would take them to the Second Army. This project, which would have simplified the commissariat difficulty, was aban-

* On the 23rd June, the Russian fleet made a sortie from Port Arthur which materially affected the land strategy. The Japanese were completely surprised by the reappearance of the battleships *Pobyeda*, *Retvisan*, and *Tsarevich* which had been repaired, and which rendered the Russians superior in strength to the blockading fleet. It is hardly too much to say that for a few hours the course of the campaign hung in the balance, until, for some unknown reason, the Russian fleet returned to harbour without bringing on a general action. As the result of this sortie it was necessary to make the blockade very much closer.

done as no fleet escort could now be spared, but in place of the transports some seventy Chinese junks were hired and sent through the straits to Chin-chou Bay, where they were loaded with supplies brought by cart across the isthmus of Nan Shan from Ta-lien-wan. After the 11th July they plied regularly between Chin-chou, Hsiung-yao, and other points on the coast line further north.

Thus by the first week in July the Second Army, reinforced by the 6th Division, was again in a condition to advance, and on the 6th July its four divisions began to move towards Kai-ping. On the 2nd and 3rd July, the Russian cavalry had noticed no change in the dispositions of the Japanese; but on the 4th, it was observed that their forces had increased, while on the 5th attempts to elucidate the situation had been repulsed by the mounted troops of the Second Army, who had been pushed forward all along the line.

About 9 a.m. on the 6th, part of the 5th Division, which had taken the place of the 3rd on the extreme right of the Japanese line,* attacked some 1,600 Russian infantry, who were holding a ridge about two-and-a-half miles north and north-east of Ssu-fang-tai, and forced them to retire. The main body of the army encountered little opposition on this date and halted for the night on a line extending from Chin-chia-kou, west of the railway, to Erh-tao-ho on the east, a part of the 4th Division occupying the heights at Ssu-chia-tung. On the 7th, the centre column dislodged a hostile force from the neighbourhood of Sha-kang-tai, and at noon the four divisions held a front from Li-chia-kou, on the right, to the hills near the sea coast east of the village of Ta-wang-hai-chai, with outposts some five miles south of the Russian main position at Kai-ping.

The city of that name stands on the right bank of the Kai-ping River and is dominated on its northern side by a semi-circle of hills which rise at a short distance from its walls. According to the reports of natives some 20,000 Russians under Lieutenant-General Stakelberg held the ground near the city, while 12,000 more were posted in the neighbourhood of Hai-shan-chai. Further north, in and around Ta-shih-chiao, was another force under Lieutenant-General Zarubaiev, reinforcements for which were continually arriving from Liao-yang. A reconnaissance made by the Second Army on the 8th showed that the Russian right was placed at Hai-shan-chai, while the left stood on the heights near Hsi-tai. It was observed that for some miles south of the hills overlooking the city the ground was level, and that in advancing to the attack the Second Army would be much exposed to the fire of the Russian artillery. Advantage was therefore taken of the hours of darkness to cross the level ground, and at 5.30 a.m. on the 9th July the Japanese artillery opened fire upon the enemy near Kai-ping. His forces, of which

* Presumably because it had mountain artillery suitable for employment on the eastern flank.

a considerable portion had been already withdrawn towards the north, next sustained an enveloping attack of all four divisions, and by 8 a.m. the heights north of the city were secured by the Japanese. Thence the Russian rearguard consisting of a single division,* fell back to a position astride the railway some five miles north of the Kai-ping River, where resistance was maintained until 3 p.m., by which hour most of its guns were silenced. The casualties† on both sides during the day were inconsiderable, for the Russian general, who was aware that the Japanese were coming on with four divisions and a cavalry brigade, withdrew his troops in good time and with perfect regularity.

From the 10th to the 22nd July, the Second Army remained in the vicinity of Kai-ping holding a fortified line some four miles to the north of that place and exchanging fire with the Russian cavalry and horse artillery, which frequently appeared before the outposts. During this period supply arrangements were improved, and junks, keeping level with the main body of the army, landed their stores on the coast, whence they were carried in carts to Kai-ping, seven miles distant. Thus, by the 15th July, the troops no longer lived from hand to mouth, and though heavy rain had fallen continuously for forty-eight hours, making the road almost impassable, supplies for twenty days for five divisions‡ had been collected at the front. While halted near Kai-ping, news was received of the Russian attack and repulse at the Mo-tien Ling on the 17th July,§ and information was obtained that the enemy, whose force opposing the Second Army had now increased to nearly four divisions, was in position near Ta-shih-chiao. He was reported to be holding a strongly entrenched line of defence, extending from Niu-hsin-shan to Tai-ping Ling. The position was important as it covered the railway junction of the Ying-kou branch and the main line. The possession of Ying-kou and the junction would simplify the troublesome question of supply for the Japanese, and thereby facilitate any further advance. Determined resistance might therefore be expected.

At 11 a.m. on the 20th July, orders were issued for the advance, but owing to a heavy fall of rain that afternoon, the movement, which was intended to have taken place on the 22nd, was postponed for twenty-four hours. The 5th Division was to retain its position on the right of the army; further west

* Part of the 1st and 9th East Siberian Rifle Divisions, some twenty squadrons and six batteries.

† The Japanese losses on this date are not precisely known, but it is understood that they were about 140, all ranks. Their losses from 5th to 9th July were 22 N.C.O.'s and men killed, 6 officers and 137 N.C.O.'s and men wounded. Lieutenant-General Stakelberg returned his losses on the 9th as 1 officer killed, and 5 wounded, and about 200 N.C.O.'s and men killed and wounded.

‡ From a supply point of view the personnel of the Second Army was at this time equivalent to five divisions.

§ See Chap. XI.

would be the 3rd Division, then the 6th, and on the extreme left flank the 4th Division; while the cavalry was to move beyond the 4th Division and reconnoitre the Russian right and rear.

At 4 a.m. on the 23rd, the divisions left the vicinity of Kai-ping and marched north to engage the Russians. North of that city, on both sides of the main road and stretching to the sea coast, is an extensive plain studded with villages of varying size. At the time of the battle this plain was covered with *kao-liang*, which, though not fully grown, had attained to a height of about six feet and afforded some degree of concealment. Some difficulty was experienced by those of the Japanese troops whose march led between Hua-lin Shan and the valley of the Tung-ta Ho, towards the Russian left wing which was heavily entrenched. Here a succession of hills extended up to the position, and the intervening valleys afforded no cover, while the recent heavy rains had converted the ground on either side of the river into a sea of mud. Before nightfall, however, the Japanese had taken up a line extending from Wu-tai Shan on the left, through Hua-lin Shan, to Liu-chiao-tien on the right, in readiness for the next day's operations. The resistance offered to the advance of the several divisions by portions of the 1st and 4th Siberian Army Corps had not been serious, but the 4th Division had met with some opposition and had repulsed a mixed force of cavalry, infantry, and horse artillery. Tang-chih, on the Russian left, had been taken by some troops of the 5th Division, but they were forced by superior numbers to relinquish it at nightfall. At 10 a.m., staff officers had been sent forward from Army Head-Quarters to reconnoitre, and according to their reports the Russians were assembling their troops at Ta-shih-chiao and were in position from the hill north of Tai-ping Ling, through Ching-shih Shan and Wang-ma-tai, to Niu-hsin-shan. The front held extended for about ten miles from east to west, and, on the several hills that marked it, redoubts for infantry had been constructed, while the intervening spaces had been prepared for rifle and artillery fire. The approaches to the entrenchments were protected by wire entanglements, abattis, and mines, and signs were not wanting that far greater care and more labour had been expended upon the defences near Ta-shih-chiao than upon those from which the Russians had been forced at Te-li-ssu. The infantry entrenchments, however, were plainly visible to the naked eye at some distance, but the gun positions were so artfully disguised as to defy detection on the part of the Japanese artillerymen. The lessons of Nan Shan and Te-li-ssu had not been altogether lost, but the ground lent itself better to concealment than was the case at the two earlier battles.

Meanwhile the Russians had daily been expecting the further advance of the Japanese. General Kuropatkin had himself selected the position on which the next stand was to be made, and had given orders for it to be fortified. The 1st Siberian Army Corps had fallen back slowly upon the 4th Siberian Army Corps, and the combined force had been placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Zarubaiev. In an order issued on the 19th

July, this officer had detailed the positions to be occupied by the troops in case of attack; and on the 23rd, in accordance with this order, the Russian rearguard, belonging to the 1st Corps, retired before superior numbers of Japanese to the line Liu-pai-ta-ssu—Lin-chia-tun. At the same time the main body of the 1st Corps took up its allotted post on the line Tien-chia-tun—Ching-shih Shan, while the cavalry moved out to the assistance of the rearguard. About 10 a.m., the Japanese brought thirty-six guns into action at Ma-kuan-tsui against the Russian centre, and at 4 p.m. forced the rearguard to retire to the main position.

At 1.30 p.m., General Zarubaiev received a report from General Mishchenko, who had been forced back from Hsiu-yen by the 10th Japanese Division, that the enemy was advancing from Pan-chia-fu on Meng-chia-tun where there was about a brigade of infantry; and that a force of about one regiment had pushed into the valley of Hsiao-ko-pu. At the same time information was received from General Stakelberg that an infantry division, with artillery, was advancing by the defile south of Tu-lao-po-tien.

From these reports General Zarubaiev's staff concluded that at least three Japanese divisions were advancing to the attack, as follows:—

Between the railway and Lin-chia-tun, one division.

In the Tu-lao-po-tien defile, one division.

On the line Meng-chia-tun—Hsiao-ko-pu, one division.

The position of the reserves had not been ascertained, but they were assumed to be near the Japanese right.

The Russian rearguard was not followed up as it fell back, and General Zarubaiev was able, undisturbed, to make his final preparations for the battle which was to take place on the following day.

Disposition of
the Russian
troops.

On the morning of the 24th his troops were distributed as follows:—

(a) On the Tai-ping Ling position, under Major-General Shileiko—

Tobolsk* Regiment (less 2 companies with Major-General Mishchenko).

11th and 20th Horse Artillery Batteries.

2nd Battery 1st Siberian Artillery Brigade.

These troops were in position east of the Tang-chih—Tai-ping-ling—Ying-feng-chai road, and were drawn up as follows:—

In the centre, 2nd Battery 1st Siberian Artillery Brigade and the 20th Horse Artillery Battery. On the right of the batteries was the 1st Battalion Tobolsk Regiment; on the left the 5th and 6th Companies of that regiment. Further to the east stood the 11th Horse Artillery Battery and the 4th Battalion of the

* 9th Tobolsk Regiment of 1st Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division (4th Siberian Army Corps).

Tobolsk Regiment; the 3rd Battalion was in reserve behind the left flank.

All the units, except the reserve, which was under cover in a hollow, were in shelter trenches fronting towards Tang-chih.

West of the road, but also under Major-General Shileiko—

1st Battalion Semipalatinsk* Regiment.

2nd Battalion Semipalatinsk Regiment.

Both battalions were in shelter-trenches.

(b) On the central position, under Major-General Oganovski†—

4th Battery 1st Siberian Artillery Brigade in trenches on a saddle about two-thirds of a mile south of Pai-chai-tzu.

4th Battalion Barnaul‡ Regiment, covering the battery.

2nd Battalion Barnaul Regiment, to the left front of the 4th Battalion.

1st Battalion Barnaul Regiment, in local reserve in rear of the right flank.

These troops held the main position, but in advance, maintaining connexion between the Tai-ping Ling and the 1st Siberian Corps, were—

1st Battalion Tomsk§ Regiment, on the heights north-west of Ta-fang-shen.

4th Battalion Tomsk Regiment, on the heights south of Ying-feng-chai.

(c) At Pai-chai-tzu, in reserve in rear of the central positions—

2nd Battalion Tomsk Regiment.

3rd Battalion Tomsk Regiment.

(d) In the valley west of Pai-chai-tzu, and forming the general reserve of the 4th Siberian Army Corps—

3½ battalions Omsk|| Regiment

3rd Battery 1st Siberian Artillery Brigade.

(e) On the line Tien-chia-tun—Yung-an-tun—San-chia-tzu—1st Siberian Army Corps.

(f) At Huang-ta-ssu, the army reserve—

7th Krasnoyarsk¶ Regiment.

34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.**

35th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.**

1st and 4th Batteries 9th East Siberian Artillery Brigade.††

* 11th Semipalatinsk of 2nd Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division.

† Commanding 2nd Brigade 2nd Siberian Infantry Division.

‡ 12th Barnaul Regiment of 2nd Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division.

§ 8th Tomsk Regiment of 2nd Brigade 2nd Siberian Infantry Division.

|| 10th Omsk Regiment of 1st Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division.

¶ Of 2nd Brigade 2nd Siberian Infantry Division.

** Of 9th E.S.R. Division.

†† This distribution is taken from General Zarubaiev's report, but is far from being complete; it should be compared with the order of battle in Appendix F. The way in which some units were subdivided is very remarkable.

On the western flank was the cavalry brigade under Major-General Kossakovski, who had succeeded Major-General Samsonov in the command; on the eastern flank was Major-General Mishchenko's cavalry brigade.

The troops were ordered to be prepared for action at 4 a.m.; they were not to occupy the trenches, but were to be in readiness under cover on the rear slopes of the hills. It was hoped that this precaution would render it more difficult than in previous battles for the Japanese to obtain accurate information, through Chinese spies, as to the exact distribution of the defenders.

Turning now to the Japanese, General Oku's orders for the attack, issued on the evening of the 23rd, were:—

- General Oku's orders for the attack on the 24th.
- (1) The army will attack the enemy to-morrow on the high ground immediately to the west of Tai-ping Ling.
 - (2) The 3rd Division—less 2 squadrons of cavalry with the cavalry brigade, and 1 regiment of infantry in the general reserve—will leave its position between Shih-ku-ao and Hua-lin Shan, and will attack the enemy's defences on a front extending from 2,000 yards west of Tai-ping Ling to the hill north of Shan-hsi-tou.*
 - (3) The 5th Division will leave its quarters at 4 a.m. and, keeping communication with the right wing of the 3rd, will attack the enemy at Tai-ping Ling. It will watch the right flank of the army, more especially towards Chien-tzu-lao-kou.
 - (4) The 6th Division—less 2 squadrons of cavalry with the cavalry brigade and 1 regiment of infantry in the general reserve—will march from Li-chia-tun at 4 a.m., and keeping touch with the left of the 3rd Division, will attack the enemy on the hill north-east of Kan-chia-tun. This division will take particular care to protect the front of its left wing.
 - (5) The 1st Artillery Brigade—less the 14th Regiment attached to the 4th Division—will take up a position near Hua-lin Shan at 4 a.m., and will open fire at daybreak against the hill west of Tai-ping Ling and Wang-ma-tai.
 - (6) The 4th Division will take up a position near Wu-tai Shan and will hold it in strength as a protection for the left flank of the army. No advance will be made therefrom until it is observed that the general attack elsewhere is succeeding. The 14th Regiment of Artillery is attached to this division.
 - (7) The 1st Cavalry Brigade will cover the left flank of the army beyond the 4th Division.
 - (8) The general reserve—18th and 23rd Regiments of infantry—will be at Tu-lao-po-tien by 4 a.m.

* No hour appears to have been assigned for the movement of this division. Doubtless it was clearly understood.

- (9) Army Head-Quarters will move at 2.30 a.m., and proceed to the hill 2,500 yards north-east of Tu-lao-po-tien.

In accordance with these orders the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Divisions resumed their advance on the morning of the 24th, but the 4th Division with the 14th Artillery Regiment remained halted at Wu-tai Shan. The earliest glimmerings of daylight revealed the movements of the enemy to the Russian outposts, and the troops of the 4th Corps moved at once into the trenches. At 5.30 a.m.,

the first Japanese gun opened fire. In a few minutes two batteries were in action on the crest south of Pao-lo-pu, followed a little later by another battery somewhat further to the east. They were answered by indirect fire from the 2nd and 3rd Batteries of the 9th Siberian Brigade, which were posted behind some rising ground near the village of Yung-an-tun, aided by the 4th Battery of the 1st Brigade south of Pai-chai-tzu. In this section of the battlefield the ground was perfectly open, and the fighting took the form of a great artillery duel. On the Japanese side the attack of the 6th Infantry Division was not pushed with great vigour, thus allowing Lieutenant-General Stakelberg to keep the defending infantry under cover instead of in the trenches. Nevertheless, at 1 p.m., apparently under the impression that the main efforts of the Japanese were directed against the 1st Corps, he sent word to General Zarubaiev that if he should be compelled to occupy the trenches, he would suffer heavy loss, and that, in his opinion, this would not be in accordance with General Kuropatkin's plan of campaign. Under these circumstances he considered it his duty to advise a retreat.

General Zarubaiev replied that a retreat was impossible by daylight, but that he would consider the question of carrying it out at nightfall.

By 2 p.m., the Japanese had thirteen batteries in action against the 1st Siberian Corps, twelve of which, the 13th and 15th Artillery Regiments, concentrated their fire against the two batteries of the 9th Siberian Brigade. For nine hours and a half these two batteries held their own against greatly superior numbers. So well were they concealed, both by the rising ground and by the millet crops, that the attack failed to inflict any serious loss upon them, and so stubborn was their resistance that the infantry advance was easily checked. At 9 a.m., the firing line of the 6th Division pushed forward, and about 10.30 a.m. occupied the hills north-east of Kan-chia-tun, but it was quite unable, in spite of the support of the artillery, to make any further progress. About 3 p.m., the two Russian batteries were reinforced by the 4th Battery of the 1st East Siberian Artillery Brigade from the reserve, and were thus enabled to maintain the unequal duel till nightfall. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Batteries of the 1st East Siberian Artillery Brigade, though belonging to the 1st Corps, co-operated loyally throughout the day with the 4th Corps in repelling the attacks of the 3rd and 5th Japanese Divisions.

As soon as the 6th Division had occupied Kan-chia-tun, the

* See Appendix F,

4th Division advanced to Hsiao-chia-tzu, but was checked for a time by the Russian cavalry under Major-General Kossakovski and by the 3rd Trans-Baikal Cossack Battery. About 3 p.m., the appearance of a Japanese brigade near Kuan-tien-pu caused the Russian cavalry to retire to Hsiao-chia-tzu. At the close of the day's fighting, the 4th Division held a line from Liu-pai-ta-ssu to Niu-chia-tun, while its own artillery and the 14th Artillery Regiment were in position at Pao-lo-pu and near Hsiao-chia-tzu.

At 8 p.m., General Oku had sent the 23rd Infantry Regiment from the general reserve to the 6th Division, with orders to take position between that division and the 4th, so as to give additional strength to the latter's right. Information had come in that a strong force of the enemy had assembled before sunset near Chiao-tai-pu and Tien-chia-tun, and a counter-attack upon the left of the Second Army seemed probable.

Throughout the day the Japanese cavalry brigade, with its main body at Huang-lu-tsui, kept a watch upon that flank,

Operations of
the Japanese
cavalry.

but nothing of importance occurred. About noon a portion of the Russian mounted troops with a battery of horse artillery moved south to Li-chia-wo-feng, whence fire was opened upon the 14th

Artillery Regiment near Hsiao-chia-tzu. The guns attached to the 1st Cavalry Brigade replied, and about 1 p.m. the enemy withdrew towards the north. No further attempt was made against the left flank of the Japanese, and the action of their cavalry upon the 24th was altogether of a passive nature.

In the hills to the east the fighting was of an entirely different character from that which has been already described.

Attack on the
4th Siberian
Corps.

Here, between 7 and 8 a.m., the 5th Division, supported by the 3rd, moved against the Russian left, and occupied the high ground west of Tang-chih. No sooner had the division taken up this line than the Russian concealed batteries on Tai-ping Ling, Pin-han-kou, and Cheng-chia-kou opened a heavy fire to which its own mountain guns were unable to reply.

The 3rd Division now came up on the left of the 5th, and about 10 a.m. the attack was renewed. The 1st Battalion of the Tomsk Regiment was forced to retire from its advanced position north-west of Ta-fang-shen, and to fall back upon the main position held by the troops under General Oganovski. The hills it had held were at once occupied by Japanese infantry and artillery, and thence a heavy fire was brought to bear upon the 4th Battery of the 1st Siberian Artillery Brigade and upon the battalions of the Barnaul Regiment about Cheng-chia-kou. So severe was the pressure against the centre that General Oganovski appealed to General Shileiko to turn his artillery against the troops advancing from Ta-fang-shen. The co-operation between the two sections of the defence was very effective, and General Oganovski's request was promptly complied with. The 2nd Battery of the 1st Artillery Brigade and two guns of the 11th Horse Battery changed front to the south-west; a little later the 20th Horse Battery was sent to join the Semipalatinsk Regiment west of Ying-feng-chai.

But the danger from the attack was by no means over, and at about midday one battalion and the 3rd Battery of the 1st Artillery Brigade were brought up into the firing line from the reserve of the 4th Corps.

The advancing infantry was thus exposed to the fire of six batteries of field artillery, three of which were armed with quick-firing guns, as well as to that of the 20th Horse Artillery Battery (Q.F.), and two guns of the 11th Horse Artillery Battery (56 guns in all, 32 of which were quick-firers). Against these the Japanese were able to bring into action the six batteries of mountain artillery belonging to the 5th Division, and six batteries of field artillery with the 3rd Division, or a total of seventy-two guns, which, though superior in numbers, were inferior both in range and rapidity of fire to those of the defenders. Nevertheless, at 2 p.m., the army commander sent word that the attack must no longer be delayed for want of artillery preparation. The artillery of the 3rd Division, therefore, came into action at 3.30 p.m. from positions in rear of the infantry line, and, in conjunction with the mountain guns of the 5th Division, opened on the enemy. Again the infantry advanced to the attack, but the fire of the artillery was of no material assistance. The supports of the 5th Division were now sent up to join the first line, and the troops strove to press forward, regardless of the enemy's guns. As they approached the hostile trenches they were met by a withering rifle fire, which first checked the attack and then brought it to a standstill. The 5th Division then ceased its efforts to close with the enemy, but the guns on both sides kept up a fierce duel until sunset.

At 4 p.m., fresh troops were added to the firing line of the 3rd Division, and the impetus given by their arrival sent the whole forward to some commanding ground further north. General Oganovski replied by bringing the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Tomsk Regiment up into the fighting line.

One of the foremost Japanese battalions now boldly attempted to take the hill held by the Barnaul Regiment under Colonel Dobrotin, but was met by a determined charge and driven off the ridge. Here for a time it remained, separated from the defenders only by a score of yards, but at length it was repulsed by a counter-attack, and was forced to seek refuge in the valley beneath.

Since from the first General Oku had kept but two regiments in his general reserve, he had no fresh men to throw into the fighting line as the day wore on, for he could not part with the only troops available to meet a possible counter-attack. Again and again the attack was renewed, but the Siberian infantry and artillery stood firm. At 7.30 p.m., the 34th Regiment and a battery were taken from the Russian reserve and brought up to strengthen the position held by General Oganovski. About the same time a contemplated counter-attack by the Tobolsk Regiment was abandoned, as the troops were needed to reinforce the Semipalatinsk Regiment, which was sorely pressed. Elsewhere the attack had been suspended, yet the fight between the 3rd Japanese Division and the right of the 4th Siberian Corps went

on while the bulk of the infantry of both sides remained inactive. At sunset the only remaining Russian reserves were six battalions of infantry and one battery of artillery, but the efforts of the Japanese infantry had failed to dislodge a single Russian battalion from the main position; and no effort had availed to compensate for the lack of adequate artillery support. At the same hour, General Oku had but a single regiment in hand, for the 23rd, as already related, had been sent to strengthen the left wing.

Thus the frontal attack of the Second Army, supported by two hundred and fifty-two guns, had made but little impression upon the Russians, whose artillery, at the highest estimate, fell short of half that number of pieces. The skilful use of ground by the Russians kept the positions of their guns hidden from the more numerous artillery of the Japanese, who, in order to support the infantry advance and to counteract the longer ranging weapons of their adversary, were forced to make frequent changes of position at the cost of casualties in men and horses. The Russian army had, indeed, much reason for satisfaction at the result of the day's fighting. For fifteen hours it had withstood the assaults of its formidable, and hitherto successful, opponents; while the brunt of the attack had been borne by a reserve division. Yet all the self-sacrifice and courage of the troops were to be wasted, and the battle was to be decided, as many other battles have been, by events beyond the immediate scene of action and by the character of the rival generals; for while the Japanese were preparing to renew the attack General Zarubaiev was beginning to retire.

As night fell, the commander of the 5th Japanese Division, dissatisfied with the part which his troops had taken, and rightly judging that their fruitless efforts to capture Tai-ping Ling had by no means quenched their ardour, applied to the commander of the army for leave to attack the position under cover of darkness, and asked that the co-operation of the 3rd Division might be given. The request met with General Oku's approval, and the commander of the 5th Division was informed that, although the whole 3rd Division could not be spared, that portion which was not required to guard the ground it held should be sent to join in the assault.

Orders were then issued by General Oku for the following day, to the effect that the attack would be resumed at 4 a.m., but that the 4th and 6th Divisions must await the result of their own artillery fire before advancing. These orders were, however, never executed, for at 10 p.m., as soon as the moon rose, the infantry of the 5th Division—without the assistance of the 3rd, which was withdrawn at the last moment—silently stealing down the hillside and crossing over the valley that lay between it and the goal, mounted the slopes upon the further side, and rushing forward, delivered an assault from three points upon the hill west of Tai-ping Ling. Under a heavy fire the works of the first line were captured, and by 3 a.m. those of the second and third lines fell with little opposition. The men of the 3rd Division, joining

Failure of the
Japanese
attack.

Japanese night
attack.

in the attack in the early morning, captured Pin-han-kou, and shortly afterwards took possession of the hill north of Shan-hsi-tou, thus securing the ground which had defied all efforts on the previous day. There they assembled, and at noon advanced and occupied a position east and west of Pai-chai-tzu.

To the west the artillery of the 6th Division opened fire at 6.40 a.m., and, as no reply came from the enemy, some infantry occupied the hill north of Pei-wang-chia-tzu while another force went further, and by 3 p.m. held the ground north-east of Pai-hu Shan. The advance of the 6th Division was followed at 8 a.m. by that of the 4th, which at 1 p.m. held the line from Pai-hu Shan to Niu-hsin-shan.

This success was lightly gained, for the night attack was opposed only by a Russian rearguard. Lieutenant-General

Russian	Zarubaiev, considering that he had not sufficient
retreat.	fresh troops available to justify him in renewing
	the contest next day, and influenced, perhaps, by

hearing that the Fourth Army was advancing from the east, had begun to retire at nightfall. Shortly after 11 a.m. on the 25th, his reserves passed through Ta-shih-chiao, and when the 6th and 4th Japanese Divisions arrived at that place at 1.20 and 2 p.m. respectively, they found that the stores which had been collected there were on fire and that the main body of the enemy was far beyond their reach. No pursuit was therefore made beyond a line some four miles north of Ta-shih-chiao. The cavalry was still on the left flank at Ta-ping Shan, which it occupied at 1 p.m., sending a detachment of some fifty men to seize Ying-kou.

The two Siberian army corps which had held the position south of the railway junction at Ta-shih-chiao thus withdrew unmolested to the north, the 1st Corps covering the retirement of the 4th which had borne the brunt of the attack and had become somewhat disorganized. Lieutenant-General Zarubaiev reached Hai-cheng on the 27th July and halted there, covered by the cavalry which held the ground some twelve miles south of that city.

The losses suffered by the Russians in this battle are said to have been 20 officers and 600 non-commissioned officers and men killed and wounded, but from independent sources they have been estimated to amount to 2,000 killed, wounded, and missing. One battalion—the 12th Siberian (Barnaul) Infantry Regiment—suffered a loss of forty per cent. of its numbers. The casualties of the Japanese, on the other hand, although they attacked the Russians in a strongly defended position, amounted, from the 23rd to the 25th July, to only 1,043 killed and wounded of all ranks.*

From the 25th to the 31st July the Second Army halted at Ta-shih-chiao, its cavalry keeping touch with that of the Russians to the south of Hai-cheng and with the Fourth Japanese Army on	its right. Ying-kou had been occupied by the detachment of the 1st Cavalry Brigade on the evening of the 25th July, and troops sent to
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Capture of
Ying-kou.

* See Appendix F.

replace it arrived there on the following day. About midnight on the 24th the Russian garrison* had marched out and had retired north-west, after setting fire to all buildings in the neighbourhood of the railway station and sending all rolling stock to Ta-shih-chiao. A Russian gunboat and four armoured launches steamed up the Liao Ho, the former being blown up by her crew on the 2nd August, while the latter proceeded to Liaoyang or Tieh-ling. On the 28th July, the 5th Division was despatched from Ta-shih-chiao through Tang-chih to join the Fourth Army, a distance of some thirty miles through hilly country. This division arrived in time to take part in the action at Hsi-mu-cheng,† which was fought on the 31st July, relieving a Guard Brigade which had left early in that month to rejoin its own division under General Kuroki, who engaged the Russians successfully at Yu-shu Ling—Yang-tzu Ling on the 30th–31st July.‡

General Oku, knowing that the greater part of the force with which he had been engaged at Ta-shih-chiao had retired north-eastward, marched against Hai-cheng at 4 a.m. on the 1st August. Moving in five parallel columns the Second Army drove back several small bodies of all arms, to the total strength of about one division, and occupied the town during the afternoon of the 3rd.§ It was then found that although the enemy had carefully fortified the surrounding hills,|| he had withdrawn his main body to An-shan-chan, twenty-two miles to the north-east, where he had taken up a position covered by two of his divisions. The railway bridge over the river which skirts the city walls had been left intact, but a number of store-houses near the station were in flames. These were in great part saved from total destruction, and a considerable quantity of provisions was rescued.

The Fourth Army reached the vicinity of Hai-cheng almost simultaneously with the Second Army, and occupied the ground which lies to the eastward of that city. As the result of the successes which had been gained all along the Japanese line the front of the three armies had been reduced from 140 to 45 miles, the passes over the Hsiao Shan and the Fen-shui Ling had been wrested from the Russians, and the two western armies were no longer separated.

* The Japanese state that at the time of the evacuation of Ying-kou, the garrison consisted of 500 cavalry, 4,000 infantry and 10 guns. From another source it would seem, however, that there were only some 2,000 men of all ranks.

† See Chapter X.

‡ See Chapter XI.

§ Niu-chwang was also occupied on this day.

|| The hills round Hai-cheng had a special interest for the Japanese, since in 1894–5, they had held them successfully against the Chinese.

CHAPTER X.

OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH JAPANESE ARMY AND THE ACTIONS
AT HSIU-YEN, THE FEN-SHUI LING, AND HSI-MU-CHENG

It has been already mentioned that, besides the armies under Generals Kuroki and Oku, the Japanese had thrown into Manchuria a third force, which had begun to land near Ta-ku-shan on the 19th May. This force, which was to consist at first only of the 10th Division under Lieutenant-General Kawamura, was known later as the Fourth Army, and was intended to operate between the First and Second Armies, linking them together and rendering them assistance should necessity arise. Great care was taken by the Japanese to conceal from the Russians its organization and strength. Its mobilization, for which orders were issued on the 16th April, was completed by the 1st May when the troops moved to Kobe, where they had been ordered to embark. Only a limited number of transports* could be collected, for the Second Army was at this time engaged in disembarking, and it was therefore decided to despatch the 10th Division to its destination in three groups. Of these the first was composed of nine battalions of infantry, four mountain batteries, a squadron of the 10th Cavalry Regiment, and the 10th Engineer Battalion; the second group consisted of the remainder of the fighting units of the division, and took with it, as did the first troops, its regimental transport and one month's supplies; while the third group comprised troops for the line of communication, supply columns, and miscellaneous stores.

On the 9th and 10th May, the leading portion of the division, with Head-Quarters, embarked on board eleven transports which sailed in twos and threes to the rendezvous off Chinampo. By the 14th May, the convoy was assembled there, and final arrangements were made by the naval and military authorities for a descent upon the coast in the neighbourhood of Ta-ku-shan. The actual point selected for this operation was Nan-chien, a place on the western side of a promontory fifteen miles south-west of Ta-ku-shan, which had been reconnoitred by the navy on the 4th May. The foreshore, as at Pi-tzu-wo, consists of mud flats, of which a large expanse is exposed at low water, and, under certain conditions of wind and tide, landing by boats becomes impossible.

* Nineteen steamers, of 54,932 gross tonnage, exclusive of two steamers allotted to the harbour commander for purposes of communication.

Yet no better place was available,* and, at dawn on the 19th May, the torpedo boats of Rear-Admiral Hosoya's covering squadron crept close inshore, and opened fire on some Russian scouts who were keeping guard along the coast. The convoy which had sailed from the Korean coast on the 17th May, had arrived at dusk on the evening of the 18th, and had anchored at a distance of about ten miles from the shore, when boats had been got out and everything made ready for the landing. In order to mislead the Russians as to the destination of the expedition, the larger launches had been despatched from Chinampo to the mouth of the Ya-lu, whence they now sailed along the coast to an island situated south of Ta-ku-shan. While the torpedo boats were firing on the Russian scouts, a party of five hundred bluejackets landed at the neck of the promontory, and took possession without opposition. On a signal that the landing was successful, the transports moved in to their second anchorage, distant some three miles from the shore, and the disembarkation of the troops began. Their landing was unopposed, and by the evening of the first day six battalions, a battery, and a company of engineers were on shore. Encouraged by his good fortune, General Kawamura decided to concentrate his division as quickly as possible at Ta-ku-shan, and, with this object, he despatched a covering force of one regiment of infantry under Major-General Marui to Wang-chia-tun. A detachment from this regiment was sent to Kuan-chia-tun to watch the approaches from Hsiu-yen; and a company from the main body of the division was sent to Ling-chia-to-tzu (S.W. of Ta-ku-shan) to watch those from the north-west and to protect the road from Nan-chien to Ta-ku-shan. These movements began early on the 20th May, and the troops reached their allotted positions the same evening.† The next day (21st), hoping to secure the occupation of the Ta-ku-shan plain, General Kawamura reinforced General Marui with a squadron, two battalions, and a company of engineers. The main body of the covering force was concentrated near Wang-chia-tun, and detachments were sent to occupy the line Kuan-chia-tun—Ta-chia-lu and the hills at Hsiao-yang-ho. Another battalion was sent to watch the line Wa-kou—Li-chia-tun, its Head-Quarters remaining near Chang-chia-tun.

Meanwhile the weather was not unfavourable for the disembarkation and, in spite of the defects of the landing-place, all went smoothly, thanks to the exertions of the naval directing officer and the hard work of the transport department. By the fourth day six battalions, one squadron, two batteries, and three companies of engineers had been landed; and by the twelfth day the whole

* Notwithstanding its inconvenience, Ta-ku-shan continued to be used by the Fourth Army as a base until October, 1904.

† A few days before the arrival of the 10th Division, a party from the First Army had reached Ta-ku-shan by sea, and had established a telegraph station at that place; thus, in order to put General Kawamura in telegraphic communication with the First and Second Armies, it was only necessary to connect this station with the existing cable between the Taitong River and Pi-tzu-wo.

of the first group had disembarked. Since, however, it was calculated that thirty more days might be required for the concentration of the complete division,* the general officer commanding, in view of the possible necessity for an early advance, hurried on the landing of the troops, and established supply depots at Ta-ku-shan, Tu-cheng-tzu, and Tung-fang-hsin so as to be ready to move when called upon.

When the first troops, consisting of the 20th Regiment, were put on shore, it was known that Major-General Mishchenko's Trans-Baikal Cavalry Brigade was gradually moving southward from its Head-Quarters at Hsiu-yen, while another force of cavalry, under Major-General Chirikov,† was posted on the Japanese left, at a point to the north of Chuang-ho. At the end of April General Mischenko's troops had been distributed as follows :—

Disposition of
the Russian
troops.

- (a) At Chien-san (about 16 miles south-west of An-tung)—
Head-Quarters of the Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade.
1st Chita Cossack Regiment (six squadrons, one of which was detached to Ta-tung-kou, and to a point on the Ya-lu midway between that place and An-tung).
1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery.
 - (b) At Ta-ku-shan—
2½ squadrons, 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment.
1st Battery, 6th East Siberian Rifle Division.
2¾ battalions, 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment.
 - (c) Watching the coast line between Ta-ku-shan and Pi-tzu-wo—
2½ squadrons, 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment.
- In all, approximately, 1,100 sabres, 2,400 bayonets, 8 field and 6 horse artillery guns.

The brigade had remained in these positions until the 1st May when, in accordance with Lieutenant-General Zasulich's instructions, Major-General Mishchenko had ordered a retirement in the direction of Pien-men. Before he had reached that place he had received orders from General Kuropatkin that, in view of rumours of an intended Japanese landing, he was to move his force to the neighbourhood of Sha-li-chai, whence he could watch the coast and block the route from Ta-ku-shan through Hsiu-yen to Hai-cheng. To support him in carrying out these duties, the 18th Regiment of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division was pushed forward from Hai-cheng to the Fen-shui Ling,‡ whither the 21st Regiment and the 1st/6th Battery, which had taken part in the

* The actual time required proved to have been greatly overestimated, for the whole division was on shore by the 9th June.

† This officer commanded the 2nd Brigade, Siberian Cossack Division.

‡ This pass was known as the Ta-Ling (or Dalin) by the Russians, and is so called in most foreign accounts. The Chinese rendering of the Japanese name has been adopted here. Neither name is to be found on Chinese maps. This pass must be distinguished from two others of the same name further east.

retirement towards Pien-men, were also sent. Thus, towards the middle of May, the Russian troops nearest to the projected point of landing of the Fourth Japanese Army, consisted only of eleven squadrons and six horse artillery guns, supported by two infantry regiments and one field battery; and in order to carry out his instructions Major-General Mishchenko had distributed his command, retaining under his own hand two squadrons of the 1st Chita Cossack Regiment and the 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery.

About 7 p.m. on the 20th, the 3rd Squadron of the 1st Verkhne-Udin'sk Cossack Regiment, which was reconnoitring towards Ta-ku-shan, arrived near Wang-chia-tun, where it was surprised by Major-General Marui's infantry and lost thirty officers and men.* Other minor engagements followed between patrols sent out to reconnoitre by both sides, but no attempt was made by Major-General Mishchenko to interfere with the disembarkation of the 10th Division; for between him and Ta-ku-shan was General Marui's force, covered by the divisional cavalry and forming a screen through which the Russian reconnoitring parties could not penetrate. On the 26th May, a patrol of the 10th Japanese Cavalry Regiment moved up from Kou-lien-ho towards the Lao Ling, where it was joined on the 30th by a troop of cavalry and two companies of infantry. On the 31st, a reconnaissance was made which showed that the pass was held by the Russians, and the little force fell back and joined General Marui's detachment at Kou-lien-ho.

Affairs were still in this condition when news was received in Tokio that a strong Russian force was advancing against the Second Army. The reports from Europe, combined with information obtained in the field, left no doubt as to the intention of the enemy to undertake an offensive movement, and the Japanese expected that they would have to fight a decisive battle in the near future. Imperial Head-Quarters decided that the 10th Division should participate in the forthcoming operations, by moving towards Kai-ping against the Russian line of communications. On the 2nd June, therefore, General Kawamura received orders to the following effect: "Your division will hold itself in readiness to advance on Kai-ping at any moment. With this object it will collect as much transport and provisions as possible, at points as far north as is practicable in the district which it now occupies."

Lieutenant
General Stakel-
berg's advance
southward.

Counter move-
ment of the 10th
Division.

As a preparatory step towards his advance on Kai-ping, General Kawamura determined to occupy Hsiu-yen; and General Kuroki decided to assist him by sending a detachment from the First Army to Erh-tao-yang-ho, under General Asada, commanding the 1st Guard Brigade. The following information from General

* The Russian losses were: 1 officer and 9 men killed: 2 officers (both taken prisoners) and 19 men (4 of whom were taken prisoners) wounded. The Japanese had only one man killed.

Kuroki reached General Kawamura at 10 p.m. on the 4th June : "I have instructed General Asada to advance to Erh-tao-yang-ho with his detachment, consisting of a brigade of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and one company of engineers;* he will be at Sha-li-chai by the 6th, and I have ordered him to place himself under your command whenever it becomes necessary to co-operate with your division." At the same time General Kawamura received the following information from the Second Army : "The strength of the enemy who has advanced south of Kai-ping is at least one division of infantry and one brigade of cavalry. His main force is concentrated near Yang-chia-tun (15 miles N.E. of Fu-chou). Our cavalry brigade has been in touch with the enemy since the 30th May. There is no strong force of the enemy near Fu-chou. The Second Army will try to divert the enemy towards Pu-lan-tien, and intends to deliver a counter-attack with its whole strength. The fight should take place on the 5th June."

The situation in front of the 10th Division at this time was believed by the Japanese to be as follows. At the Fen-shui Ling a mixed force of the enemy was busily preparing a position, entrenching itself and making no signs of advance; General Mishchenko, with twelve squadrons, one horse artillery battery, and, at most, one or two battalions of infantry, was near Hsiu-yen, two or three squadrons being continually in collision with the advanced troops of the 10th Division at Ta-chia-lu and Ho-chia-pu; the main body of Major-General Chirikov's brigade was at Tang-chia-tun, and he was continually moving small bodies towards Chuang-ho and Chin-tsui-tzu. As this information, derived from

General
Kawamura's plan
of operations.

prisoners and spies, was considered fairly reliable, General Kawamura did not think it necessary to employ his whole force (12 battalions, 3 squadrons, 5 batteries), but preferred to await the arrival of General Asada at Erh-tao-yang-ho and then to order him to attack Hsiu-yen from Ta-hu-ling, while his own advanced force under General Marui (4 battalions, 1 troop cavalry, 3 batteries, 1 company engineers, $\frac{1}{2}$ sanitary detachment) operated against the same place from the south. The main body of the division, which for convenience of supply was concentrated about Kuan-chia-tun, was held in readiness to advance at short notice.

To reach Hsiu-yen two routes were available. One road, trending north-westward from Ta-ku-shan, strikes a tributary of the Ta-yang Ho at Tu-cheng-tzu, and follows it for about ten miles. It then turns northward, and, after passing over an intervening ridge descends to Kou-lien-ho, beyond which place it crosses the Lao Ling and debouches into the plain round Hsiu-yen. The other route lies at first on the right bank of the Ta-yang Ho, then crosses the stream by an indifferent ford south-west of Sha-li-chai, and leads up the left bank by Ta-hu-ling to Hsiu-yen.

* General Asada also had two field batteries under his command which are not mentioned in this message; they may have been added later.

Of these, the former was chosen for the northward march, for although the alternative route joins the road to Feng-huang-cheng near Sha-li-chai, thus opening up communication with the First Japanese Army, it is longer than the road through Tu-cheng-tzu, and troops moving along it could not directly cover Ta-ku-shan. Moreover, the mixed brigade under General Marui was already in position on the road which it had been decided to follow, and was now ordered to advance to Kou-lien-ho, while behind it the remainder of the 10th Division was assembling at Ta-ku-shan.

Simultaneously with the Japanese preparations to advance, Major-General Mishchenko sent a reconnaissance, on the 3rd June, towards Kou-lien-ho, the troops employed numbering eight squadrons and two guns. About 1 p.m., the advanced guard of this force, consisting of three squadrons of the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment,* met and engaged the Japanese. Shortly afterwards the main body of the Russian cavalry and the two guns arrived, and fighting was continued until 6 p.m., the Russians maintaining their ground, though losing the commander of the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment, as well as two officers and thirteen men. During this day, by carefully concealing their strength, the Japanese led General Mishchenko to infer that their main body was still at Ta-ku-shan.

On the 4th, however, three Japanese batteries were observed in movement towards the Russian right, whereupon Major-General Mishchenko withdrew his force and concentrated it on the Lao Ling. On the same day he received information that a detachment of Japanese infantry from Feng-huang-cheng had occupied Sha-li-chai, and had thence pushed forward into the valley of the Ta-yang Ho towards Hsiu-yen. These troops were the advanced guard of the mixed brigade under General Asada, which had left Feng-huang-cheng on the 6th June to co-operate, by way of the valley of the Ta-yang Ho, in the capture of Hsiu-yen. This movement of troops upon his left caused so much uneasiness to General Mishchenko, that, on the 5th June, he withdrew from the Lao Ling and reported what was happening to Head-Quarters, whereupon General Kuropatkin sent the 1st Brigade, 2nd Siberian Infantry Division, to Hsi-mu-cheng.

The converging movement of the Japanese troops actually began on the morning of the 6th June, when General Asada left Feng-huang-cheng. His cavalry reached Sha-li-chai that evening, and his main body bivouacked on the line Shih-ya-tien—Tao-wo-pu-tzu, where a message was received from General Kawamura saying, "I intend to attack the enemy near Hsin-yen on the 8th. I look to you to protect the right flank of

* The 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment and one or more squadrons of the 5th Siberian Cossack Regiment had joined Major-General Mishchenko by this date, bringing his strength up to about twenty squadrons with six guns.

the division from the direction of Ta-ying-tzu* and to co-operate in the attack on Hsiu-yen." The independent cavalry of the 10th Division (2 squadrons, with 1 company of infantry) also moved on the 6th and advanced towards Hsiao-tzu and San-tao-hu-ling-kou, establishing touch with General Asada's cavalry at the foot of I-men Shan the same evening. The force under General Marui commenced moving on the 7th, and its leading troops reached the line Tung-i-chia-tun—Chu-chia-tun—Kan-chia-tien,† while its main body arrived at Kou-lien-ho. The same day (7th) the independent cavalry of the division reached Tung-ta-kou, four miles south of San-tao-hu-ling-kou, while the main body of the division remained round Hsiao-yang-ho‡ and south of that place. In order to superintend the line of communication, divisional Head-Quarters remained at Tu-cheng-tzu,† but the general officer commanding advanced to Tung-fang-hsin, where, at 11 p.m., he received the following message from General Asada, whose detachment had reached the line I-chia-pu-tzu—Erh-tao-yang-ho: "In order to produce any real effect in the decisive battle about to be fought by the Second Army, it is necessary that we should deal the enemy in our front a severe blow; but as he is at present some distance away from us, to surround and annihilate him will be difficult. I therefore suggest that I should advance as far as San-tao-hu-ling-kou on the 8th, and that I should attack him from the east and north on the 9th in co-operation with the Marui detachment." This suggestion did not meet with the approval of the general commanding the 10th Division, who considered it inadvisable to postpone the attack for twenty-four hours, as the enemy had only a weak force of cavalry and a few horse artillery guns; indeed it was even doubtful whether he had not begun to withdraw northward on the 7th. Further, the situation in front of the Second Army required that General Kawamura should attack without delay. But even if he had approved of General Asada's suggestion it was too late to act upon it, for General Marui's force had already begun its movement on Hsiu-yen. He therefore adopted the only possible course, and sent word that General Asada was to continue his advance and to overcome his difficulties as best he could.

General Mishchenko had now in front of him two mixed brigades, consisting in all of four and a half squadrons, ten battalions, and five batteries, one of which was a mountain battery. Against this force which, according to the reports of his reconnoitring parties, numbered twelve battalions and four batteries, with cavalry, he could only bring some eighteen squadrons of Cossacks and six guns. Of his mounted troops about six squadrons were employed in reconnoitring, and the actual numbers available were only between 1,500 and 1,600 men. With these he took up a position on the 7th on the high ground to the south and east of Hsiu-yen, watching both the route up the valley of the Ta-yang

* 10 miles north of Sha-li-chai,

† South of Hsiu-yen map,

and that by the Lao Ling; at the same time he despatched his transport some distance to the rear.

Everything on the Japanese side was now ready for the combined attack upon General Mishchenko's force. On the morning

The Japanese advance against Hsiu-yen. of the 8th, General Marui's detachment pushed forward; his advanced and flank guards drove back small parties of the Russian cavalry, and, by 11 a.m., occupied the high ground north of

Hung-chia-pu-tzu, while the main body of his force deployed on the south side of that village. There it came under the fire of the 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery, which was posted west of Hsiu-yen, while, on a line of heights before it, were some six squadrons of the 1st Chita and 7th Siberian Cossack Regiments. Part of the Japanese advanced guard was now directed to attack, but, on moving forward to carry out his orders, the commander reported that his artillery could not reach the Russian guns which commanded the valley of the Ya Ho. Major-General Marui therefore decided to postpone the attack until the following day. Meanwhile, on receipt of General Kawamura's reply, General Asada, in order not to be late in delivering his attack on the 8th, sent on his independent cavalry from Tung-tao-tzu-kou via Hung-chi-ying to Tao-chia-pu-tzu and divided the remainder of his command as follows:—

(a) Flank Guard—

1 battalion 2nd Guard Regiment, to remain at Hung-hua-ling, two miles north-west of I-chia-pu-tzu, and to protect the right rear of the advance.

(b) Right Column—

1st Battalion, 1st Guard Regiment, to march at 4.30 a.m. from Erh-tao-yang-ho via Tung-tao-tzu-kou—San-tao-hu-ling-kou—Hung-chi-ying and to cut the enemy's line of retreat at Leng-chia-wei-tzu.

(c) Centre Column—

1 troop, Guard Cavalry Regiment.

2nd and 3rd Battalions, 1st Guard Regiment, to march at 6.30 a.m. from Tung-tao-tzu-kou via San-tao-hu-ling-kou—Kung-tung-kou to Huang-chi-kou.

(d) Left Column, under Major-General Asada—

1 troop, Guard Cavalry Regiment.

2 battalions, 2nd Guard Regiment.

2 batteries, 1st Battalion, Guard Artillery Regiment.

3rd Company, Guard Engineer Battalion.

$\frac{1}{2}$ Guard Bearer Company, to march at 6.30 a.m. from Pao-tai-ti-hsia* via Chao-chia-pu-tzu* and Shang-ying-tzu on Hsiu-yen.

At 11.30 a.m., while the left column was making a short halt in the vicinity of Shang-ying-tzu, a report was received which stated that part of the 10th Division was engaged with some six hundred cavalry near Ta-hu-ling. The Russian troops on this

* Respectively two and five miles north-west of Erh-tao-yang-ho.

portion of the field at first consisted only of one squadron of the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment, which held the saddle immediately east of Hsiu-yen over which the road from Shang-ying-tzu runs; but as the Japanese pressed forward to attack, three more squadrons of the same regiment were brought up in support. On receiving this report, General Asada at once ordered his command to advance, and despatched six companies of infantry to take part in the fighting. These troops, in co-operation with the right flank guard of General Marui's force, almost enveloped the enemy at Ta-hu-ling and by 2.30 p.m. forced him back to the westward. The left column now moved forward towards Hsiu-yen, but, on debouching on to the saddle west of Ta-hu-ling, it came under a heavy fire from the Russian horse artillery guns posted west of the former place. At this time, the two batteries of field artillery with the left column, delayed by the difficulty of the road, were a considerable distance to the rear, while the mountain battery with General Marui's force, which had come into action on the heights south of the town, had been silenced. General Asada, therefore, decided that it was advisable to postpone the attack until his right column had worked its way to the north of Hsiu-yen. Soon afterwards Major-General Mishchenko, seeing that the retirement of the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment had imperilled the situation of his troops south-west of the town, and hearing that a battalion of Japanese infantry was advancing against his line of retreat, ordered a general retirement towards the north. This Japanese battalion belonged to General Asada's right column, which, after driving back some weak detachments of Cossacks, succeeded at 4 p.m. in occupying Leng-chia-wei-tzu. It then advanced towards Shih-chia-pu-tzu, a movement which made the Russians hasten their retirement and caused some disorder in their ranks. Perceiving the enemy's condition, the centre Japanese column now pressed forward rapidly from Cheng-tung-kou, while the left column, which was in close touch with the troops on its right, advanced against the south of Hsiu-yen. Hearing the musketry fire of General Asada's detachment and noticing that the Russians south of Hsiu-yen were changing their position, General Marui realized that the attack from the east was developing, and ordered a battery to move up to the hill north of Hung-chia-pu-tzu and to open fire on the enemy on the spur south of Hsiu-yen. At 4 p.m., he observed that the hostile artillery had begun to retire,* and promptly ordered a general advance. The Russian cavalry had by this time fallen back to the bed of the river, north of Hsi-pei-ying-tzu which was held as a defensive position, covered by two squadrons of the 1st Chita Cossack Regiment from the reserve, and by the horse artillery guns posted on the heights west of Hsiu-yen. But the Japanese pressed on and, by 5.20 p.m., General Mishchenko's troops were hurrying in disorder to the rear, some taking the Hai-cheng road, but the greater number

The capture
of Hsiu-yen.

* The Japanese account states that the artillery was "followed by the infantry." It seems probable, however, that these were dismounted cavalry, for no Russian infantry were present.

following that leading to Kai-ping. Those who took the latter road were assembled some miles north-west of Hsiu-yen, and during the night marched to join the remainder on the direct route to Hai-cheng.

The Russian losses in this action were insignificant, as were those of the Japanese,* whose force greatly out-numbered that of their antagonists.

This success furnished Lieutenant-General Kawamura with a convenient centre for carrying out the preparations necessary for his further movements. On the day following the action the detachment under Major-General Asada was disposed so as to cover Hsiu-yen from the direction of Huang-hua-tien and Hsi-mu-cheng; that of Major-General Marui watched the routes from Kai-ping and the south-west, while the remainder of the 10th Division moved up the line of communication and concentrated in the neighbourhood of the town. No further advance could for a time be undertaken, for although the Second Army was about to move from Pu-lan-tien against the 1st Siberian Army Corps, General Kuroki was still at Feng-huang-cheng, where circumstances had compelled him to remain halted for several weeks. Moreover, the Russian movement against General Oku had not been pushed energetically, and the battle which the Second Army had expected to take place on the 5th was still delayed. Imperial Head-Quarters therefore ordered the general commanding the 10th Division not to advance from Hsiu-yen for the present. On receipt of these instructions, General Kawamura, bearing in mind the necessity of collecting supplies and the presence of General Chirikov's brigade in the plains to the south, determined to concentrate his command at and about Hsiu-yen, and to perfect its organization. The delay was not unwelcome, for so bad were the roads which constituted his line of communication that his transport had not been able to work as rapidly as he had expected, and shortly after the capture of Hsiu-yen he found it necessary to distribute his command as follows:—

Disposition of
General Kawa-
mura's force.

- (a) The Guard Mixed Brigade, east of Hsiu-yen and holding the line Tao-chia-pu-tzu—Tung-chia-pu-tzu.
- (b) The 20th Brigade (less the 20th Regiment) and three batteries, west of Hsiu-yen and holding the line Wu-tao-kou—Chao-chia-pu—Tang-ti.
- (c) I/20th Regiment near Hsien-chien-chu-tzu with a detachment at Li-chia-pu-tzu watching the approaches through Hsing-tien.
- (d) Five battalions of infantry and three batteries concentrated at Tu-men-tzu and to the north of that place.
- (e) Three battalions of infantry and one squadron distributed south of Chang-chia-tun.

* Japanese losses : killed, 3 men ; wounded, 2 officers and 31 men.
Russian losses : killed, 3 men ; wounded, 2 officers and 17 men.

(f) The train of the division, which had at last completed its disembarkation, south of Tu-men-tzu.

(g) Divisional Head-Quarters at Hsiu-yen.

It will be remembered that want of proper transport had hitherto prevented General Oku from undertaking any offensive operations against Lieutenant-General Stakelberg. By the 12th June, the difficulty had at last been overcome, and on the 13th he began his northward march. There was, therefore, no further cause for holding back the 10th Division and, in conformity with the general plan for co-operation between the two forces, the Japanese Imperial Head-Quarters telegraphed instructions to General

Kawamura as follows: "When your transport arrangements admit of it, prepare to threaten the Russian flank and rear, advancing for that

purpose on Kai-ping if necessary. The Asada Detachment will remain at Hsiu-yen to protect the flank and rear of your division from the direction of Hsi-mu-cheng." These instructions were received at Hsiu-yen on the 13th, and General Kawamura decided to occupy the passes over the Hsiung-yao-Shan, the watershed between Hsiu-yen and Kai-ping, and then to concentrate his main force in the valley about Shih-hui-yao-tzu. He therefore despatched a detachment, consisting of the 1st Squadron of the 10th Cavalry Regiment, the 10th Infantry Regiment, the 4th Battery of the 10th Artillery Regiment, the 1st Company of the 10th Engineer Battalion, and half a Sanitary detachment, under General Tojo towards the Hsin-kai Ling; three battalions of infantry were moved from Hsiu-yen to near Chao-chia-pu; three more battalions and two batteries were transferred from Tu-men-tzu to near Shih-hui-yao-tzu. (See map II/5.)

General Tojo's detachment halted near Shih-hui-yao-tzu on the 15th, and on the evening of the 16th drove back some Russian infantry and cavalry and established itself on the Ssu-tao-hu Ling, the Lan-kan Ling and the Hsin-kai Ling.* By this time the Second Army had crushed the Russians at Te-li-ssu and had prepared the way for a further advance. It was, therefore, no longer necessary to employ the 10th Division solely in support of the Second Army, and Imperial Head-Quarters decided to make use of it to fill the gap between the First and Second Armies. With this object the following instructions, dated the 19th June, were sent to the general officer commanding 10th Division:—"Your main force will remain at Hsiu-yen, detaching troops to hold the passes leading to Hsi-mu-cheng and Kai-ping. You will collect at least 20 days' supplies in the vicinity of Hsiu-yen, to be ready by the 5th July." As a first step in this fresh movement, General Kawamura decided that when the Second Army had reached Kai-ping he would attack the Fen-shui Ling, which was held by a mixed brigade strongly entrenched.

After their defeat at Hsiu-yen, the Russians had withdrawn slowly in front of the 10th Division and shots had been exchanged

* It seems probable that the Russians regained possession of these passes, for the Japanese did not finally secure them until the 25th.

Russian dispositions. daily. Some Russian cavalry, estimated at three or four hundred, were stationed round Huang-hua-tien,* and their patrols appeared now and then at Wang-chia-pu-tzu,† Sung-shu-kou,* and in the plains to the south-east of the latter place. Near Hsi-mu-cheng was a Russian force of unknown strength. Russian cavalry, in superior numbers, appeared in front of General Tojo's detachment on the Hsin-kai ridge, while some infantry and artillery were reported to be about Shih-men-ling,‡ Hsia-ho-ta, Shang-hsien-chia-ho-kou, and Chieh-kuan-ting.

According to information derived from prisoners taken on the 19th, General Mishchenko§ was in command of four regiments of cavalry, one horse artillery battery, and three battalions of infantry, and had been ordered to protect the Russian main body from Japanese threats along the Hai-cheng and Kai-ping roads. His main body had at first been north of Hsiu-yen, but after the 17th he had left a covering detachment there, and had withdrawn the bulk of his force to Hsia-ho-ta. He had occupied the Hsin-kai Ling, the Ssu-tao-hu Ling, and Ta-chu-tun, and had distributed his troops as follows :—

12 squadrons,	1 battalion	near Wang-chia-pu-tzu.
6 " 1 "	near Chieh-kuan-ting.	
2 " 1 "	1 horse artillery bat-	
	tery near Hsia-ho-ta.	
4 " "	near Shih-men-ling.	

This information was confirmed by spies, and the general officer commanding the 10th Division also learned that there was another mixed force near Tang-erh-kou.

The Russians were thus holding a position on the crest of the main Fen-shui range, which forms the main watershed between the Bay of Korea and the Gulf of Liao-tung, and which must be crossed before the Fourth Army could join hands with the Second. Though the slopes of the range are steep and rugged, it can be traversed by wheeled traffic at several points north-west of Hsiu-yen. The principal pass is known by the same name as the range itself, and to cover it the Russians had erected works of a semi-permanent character. So far as the purely local conditions were affected, any further delay in assuming the offensive was obviously undesirable, yet the General feared that if he were to take the Fen-shui Ling his division would find itself isolated, and be obliged to occupy a defensive position for some days. He therefore thought it advisable to postpone his attack

* N.E. of Hsiu-yen. See also p. 97. The "cavalry" were probably mounted scouts from the 2nd Brigade 2nd Siberian Infantry Division.

† N.W. of Hsiu-yen.

‡ Four miles S.W. of Hsia-ho-ta.

§ Apparently General Mishchenko was still in command in this portion of the theatre of operations, but he was reinforced by about one brigade of infantry under Major-General Leyestam, who commanded in the engagement on the 27th.

until the 27th, the date on which he had reason to believe that the Second Army would reach Kai-ping. In the meanwhile he completed all his dispositions for forcing the passage of the mountains, and with this object he re-distributed his troops as follows:—

- (a) Major-General Asada's detachment.
 Guard Mixed Brigade.*
 2 batteries, 10th Artillery Regiment.
 1 company, 10th Engineer Battalion.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ an infantry ammunition column.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ an artillery ammunition column.
 1 field hospital.
- (b) Colonel Kamada's detachment.
 1 squadron of cavalry.
 1 battery, 10th Artillery Regiment.
 2nd and 3rd Battalions 40th Regiment (less one company).
 1 section, 10th Engineer Battalion.
- (c) Major-General Marui's detachment.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ of the 10th Cavalry Regiment.
 1 battery, 10th Artillery Regiment.
 1 battalion, 20th Regiment.
 39th Regiment.
 2 sections, 10th Engineer Battalion.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ Bearer Company, 15th Division.
- (d) Major-General Tojo's detachment.
 1 squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
 2 batteries, 10th Artillery Regiment.
 10th Regiment.
 1st Battalion, 40th Regiment.
 1 company, 10th Engineer Battalion.
- (e) General Reserve.
 1 squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
 1st Battalion, 20th Regiment.†

At 4 p.m. on the 24th June, orders for the attack were issued, and the special task allotted to each detachment was made known.

(1) Major-General Asada was ordered to send a small force to watch the road leading from Huang-chia-tien, while the main body leaving Wu-tao-ho-tzu at 7 a.m. on the 26th was to occupy Wang-chia-pu-tzu. On the following day a movement was to be made against the front of the position held by the Russians, with the object of drawing their attention from the turning movement. At the same time their line of retreat was to be threatened from the direction of Yang-pan-kou.

* For composition of this brigade, see Appendix G.

† This distribution, which comes from Japanese sources, does not account for a battalion of the 20th Regiment and a company of the 40th Regiment. The cavalry present would appear to have amounted to $4\frac{1}{2}$ squadrons, of which $3\frac{1}{2}$ are shown as belonging to the 10th Cavalry Regiment (a corps of 3 squadrons). Two squadrons of Guard cavalry were, however, present, and on this occasion were possibly detached from the mixed brigade.

(2) Further south Colonel Kamada was instructed to march on the afternoon of the 25th to the neighbourhood of Li-chia-pu-tzu. On the 26th he was to advance through Hsu-chia-pu-tzu and Pu-chia-pu-tzu, and on the 27th, in conjunction with the detachment under Major-General Asada, to attack the Russian right from Ta-san-pi-huo.

(3) On Colonel Kamada's left, Major-General Marui was ordered to advance through Ta-chu-tun and Pan-chia-pu-tzu (S) and to halt east of Chieh-kuan-ting on the 26th, with his advanced troops occupying that village. On the 27th a detachment was to capture the hill 1919', which lies about a mile and a quarter north of Chia-shan-kou, while the main body threatened the Russian line of retreat from the direction of San-tao-kou.

(4) Finally, Major-General Tojo, on the extreme left of the Japanese attack, was ordered to take possession of the ridge running from south of Hsia-ho-ta to the east of Chou-chia-chuang on the 26th, and to detach a party to occupy the Hsin-kai Ling, the Ssu-tao-hu Ling, and the Lan-kan Ling for the protection of General Marui's left flank.

Lieutenant-General Kawamura was to be with the general reserve at Wang-chia-pu-tzu on the morning of the 27th June.

The exact strength of the Russian troops holding the passes can only be approximately estimated. On the one hand, the Japanese official reports state that there were seven battalions, nine squadrons, and two batteries at the Fen-shui Ling; and that on the 26th, opposite Major-General Tojo's detachment, there were three battalions, nine squadrons, one horse artillery battery, and two machine guns, which were increased on the following day by three battalions and two batteries. On the other hand, the most reliable Russian account states that there were three regiments present at the battle on the 27th under Major-General Levestam, but does not state which they were. It is known that one battery of artillery and two regiments, the 18th and 21st (*i.e.*, 6 battalions), had been at the Fen-shui Ling for some weeks, and had been reinforced by the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division (8 battalions). These units, with General Mishchenko's cavalry brigade which had retired from Hsiu-yen, would give a total available strength of fourteen battalions of infantry, twenty-three or twenty-four squadrons of cavalry, one battery of field, and one of horse artillery. There seems, however, to be no doubt that the force of infantry and cavalry actually engaged on the 27th, was rather under these figures, and that three batteries of field artillery which have not been accounted for, took part in the fight. The whole force was now under the command of Major-General Levestam.*

To resume the narrative, at 11 p.m. on the 24th, after the

* The Russian account says that the 12th (Barnaul) Regiment was with General Mishchenko about this date, but this seems improbable. The 21st E.S.R. Regiment rejoined the 6th E.S.R. Division under Count Keller about this time and it is possible that the four squadrons of the 5th Cossack Regiment had joined General Samsonov's brigade on the right of the 1st Siberian Army Corps.

Japanese troops had already begun to move, the following order was received from Tokio: "The fact has been proved that the Russian fleet is able to issue from the harbour of Port Arthur. The transport by sea of the provisions which will be required for the combined Manchurian armies after their arrival at Liao-yang is therefore rendered uncertain, and it is not advisable for the Second Army to advance further north than Kai-ping for the present. The battle of Liao-yang, which it was anticipated would be fought before the rainy season, will now be postponed till after it. Arrange your operations accordingly." At the same time General Kawamura was informed by the commander of the Second Army, who was at this date about thirteen miles north of Te-li-ssu, that his land transport was insufficient for his needs, and that he would be obliged to put off his advance on Kai-ping for some time. Nor could he say when he would be able to undertake a further forward movement. In spite of this change in the scheme of operations, the general officer commanding the 10th Division decided that, as his detachments had begun to move already, he would carry out his original plan.

Major-General Asada's force advanced on the morning of the 26th June along the Hsiu-yen—Hsi-mu-cheng road. At 9 a.m.,

Movements on
the 25th and
26th June.

the advanced guard found itself opposed by two or three companies of Russians at Chiao-chia-pu-tzu, but drove them from their position and continued its advance. The same evening the 2nd Guard Regiment reached Ku-chia-pa-tzu, the 1st Regiment reached Wa-fang-tien, and the remainder of the detachment bivouacked about Wu-hsien-fang and Wang-chia-pu-tzu.

At 10 a.m. on the same morning (26th), Colonel Kamada's detachment left Pu-chia-pu-tzu and bivouacked at Ta-san-pi-huo, after having opened up communication with General Asada. A few hostile patrols were encountered during the day.

Meanwhile General Marui's command bivouacked at Ta-chu-tun on the 25th, and reached Chieh-kuan-ting at 2.30 p.m. on the 26th, driving back a few Russian cavalry on the way. Great difficulty was, however, experienced in opening up communication with General Tojo, and it was not till 5.30 p.m. that General Marui heard that the detachment on his left was held in check by the enemy near Hsien-chia-ho-kou, and was unable to reach its destination. He at once decided that the best means of helping General Tojo was to attack a body of the enemy which was holding a position on the hills between Hsiang-yun-tzu and Chou-chia-chuang. The movement was successful, and at 9 p.m. General Marui's advanced guard bivouacked on the hill east of Chou-chia-chuang, with his main body round Kuan-tun.

On the extreme Japanese left General Tojo, leaving one company of infantry to hold the Lan-kan and Hsin-kai passes, had marched on the afternoon of the 25th toward Hsia-ho-ta, in two columns, and on the morning of the 26th had found the enemy in position on the hill north of Hsia-hsien-chia-ho-kou. He attacked at once, but the ground was unfavourable, and the Russians, whose strength was estimated at five or six companies,

offered a stubborn resistance in a naturally strong position. At about 8 a.m., two Russian guns opened fire near Tang-erh-kou, and reinforcements estimated at three battalions appeared on the hills north of San-tao-ho. An attack on Shang-hsien-chia-ho-kou also failed, partly owing to the extremely intricate and precipitous country, and General Tojo finally had to content himself with ordering his troops to hold on to the positions they had gained. The Russians did not venture on a counter-attack, and the Japanese passed the night undisturbed.

Returning now to the Japanese right, where Major-General Asada was conducting the main operations against the Fen-shui

Ling, the plan for the attack on the 27th was as follows. The 2nd Guard Regiment, less two companies, was directed to move from the northern

side of the Fen-shui Ling against the left of the Russian position, while the 1st Guard Regiment, less half the 3rd Battalion, was instructed to proceed to hill 1600' south-west of San-hsien-fang, and to attract the enemy's attention. To support these movements the four batteries of the Guard and 10th Divisions, to which were attached the two engineer companies, were ordered to take up a position on the hill west of Wa-fang-tien, while near that place Major-General Asada retained as a reserve a troop of cavalry and two companies of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Guard Regiment.

The fighting opened at 5.15 a.m. on the 27th with a duel between the Japanese Guard Artillery, aided by a mountain battery, and nineteen Russian guns in position on Ti-hsiung Shan (N.). The firing was heavy while it lasted, but ceased a little before 6 a.m. when the Russian guns appeared to have been silenced. Although General Asada had received no information from the forces on his left, nor from the 2nd Guard Regiment on his right, he felt that there was nothing to gain by delay and that he could aid them most effectively by promptly following up his initial success. He therefore ordered the 1st Guard Regiment to attack, while he himself moved forward towards San-hsien-fang at the head of the two companies which constituted his reserve. The right battalion of the 1st Guard Regiment had just succeeded in reaching the western edge of San-hsien-fang when the Russian guns suddenly reopened fire upon it. The Japanese artillery replied, and a hot duel ensued. San-hsien-fang was occupied successfully, but further advance was found to be impossible until the battle should develop elsewhere, and the troops were compelled to remain under cover awaiting a favourable opportunity to resume the attack. They did not have long to wait; for General Kamada's detachment, which had left its bivouac at 1 a.m., had heard artillery fire away to the north and had marched to the sound of the guns. The ground to be traversed was very difficult, but by 6.30 a.m., with the help of the engineers, two guns had been got into position on a col south-east of Ti-hsiung Shan (S.). The remainder of the battery followed and immediately joined in the artillery fight, with the result that the Russian fire was gradually subdued and, at 7.30 a.m., the hostile guns began to retire.

The infantry advance was now resumed, but the country

favoured the defence, and a body of the Russian infantry was covering the retirement from the hills south of the main road. The two companies in reserve were then brought up and, at 10 a.m., the ridge south of the pass was captured, and from that point heavy infantry and artillery fire was brought to bear upon the Russians, who were retiring in some disorder to Hsi-mu-cheng. Meanwhile the 2nd Guard Regiment had encountered considerable resistance in their turning movement, and only succeeded in reaching hill 2781', two miles north of the Fen-shui Ling at 11.30 a.m., by which time the Russians had made good their retreat. One battalion from this regiment followed some of the enemy who were retiring towards Hsi-mu-cheng by Yang-la-huo (see map II/6).

It is now time to turn to the two western detachments whose action had materially lessened the difficulties of the main operations. Of these, General Marui's column had bivouacked about Kuan-tun on the 26th and at 3 a.m. on the 27th his main body left Pan-chia-pu-tzu (N.) for San-tao-kou, arriving there at 7 a.m. The commander then decided to wait until he should hear the guns of the detachments on his right, and in the meantime he ordered his advanced guard to occupy the hills north of Erh-tao-ho-tzu and San-tao-kou. At the same time he detailed one battalion to capture hill 1350' west of Ho-ta-ling.

Till 10 a.m. General Marui heard no firing in the direction of the Fen-shui Ling, but at that hour his attention was attracted by heavy columns of dust in the direction of Sung-ta-tzu. These clouds grew thicker, and at 11.30 a.m., feeling convinced that the Russians were retreating in front of General Asada he advanced on Hsiu-chia-kou, in hopes of intercepting their retreat. The bad roads caused considerable delay, but at mid-day his main body reached Ho-ta-ling, where he found that his flank guard was on hill 1356' facing a body of Russians at La-mu-fang and unable to make further progress. Just at this moment all operations were abruptly checked by a storm, which burst with such violence that the men were unable to see a yard in front of them. When the rain ceased it was found that the Russians had succeeded in retiring from La-mu-fang, and that further pursuit was hopeless. General Marui's column therefore halted in the positions it was then occupying.

Still further south, General Tojo, who, it will be remembered, had made indifferent progress on the 26th, was led to believe, by reports which came in during the night, that the greater part of the force which opposed him had been moved away to the north-east. To prevent

General Tojo's detachment.

the enemy from sending further assistance to the Fen-shui Ling, he decided to attack, and at 5 a.m. on the 27th his guns opened fire. The movements of the Russians in this quarter of the field are not definitely known beyond the fact that from 9 a.m. onwards they received considerable reinforcements. As General Tojo could make no further headway against his particular enemy he confined his operations to holding the Russians to their positions,

thus aiding indirectly in the general scheme of attack until, hearing that the Fen-shui Ling had been secured, he withdrew under cover of darkness to the west of Ssu-tao-kou.

The operations of the 26th and 27th had thus terminated favourably for the Japanese, who had secured the passage of the main Fen-shui range with a loss of little more than two hundred killed and wounded.

Nevertheless, so greatly had the sudden reappearance of the Russian fleet on the 23rd June complicated the naval situation

Movements of both forces after the action. that the movement of Japanese transports had to be suspended and the advance of the Second Army was temporarily checked. General Kawamura therefore decided not to follow up his success

but to remain in occupation of the line of heights between the Fen-shui Ling and the Hsin-kai Ling and to await an opportunity for a further forward movement. With this object Colonel Kamada's detachment was posted at Ta-chu-tun, that of Major-General Tojo remained at Ssu-tao-kou, while Major-General Asada was recalled to Hsiu-yen to watch the road from Huang-hua-tien. The detachment under Major-General Marui was ordered to hold the Fen-shui Ling and was reorganized so as to consist of the following troops:—

- 1½ squadrons, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
- 2 batteries, 10th Artillery Regiment.
- 39th Regiment.
- 2nd Company, 10th Engineer Battalion.
- ½ Bearer Company, 10th Division.

Attached.

- 2 batteries, Guard Artillery.
- 2nd Guard Regiment.
- 3rd Company, Guard Engineer Battalion.

The troops of the 10th Division and the Guard Mixed Brigade were thus disposed so as to watch the routes by which they would eventually continue their advance.

This delay was of the greatest service to the defeated Russians, for it enabled them to withdraw their forces, and to organize a fresh line of defence at Hsi-mu-cheng to protect the left of the 1st and 4th Siberian Army Corps which were concentrating about Ta-shih-chiao. General Mishchenko, with his cavalry brigade, moved to Tang-chih, while the troops which had fought at the Fen-shui Ling appear to have retired to Hsi-mu-cheng, where they rejoined the remainder of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division.

Meanwhile the Japanese infantry and engineers under the command of Major-General Tojo were employed in making the roads over the Hsin-kai and neighbouring passes sufficiently good for light Chinese carts, but the tracks by Ta-chu-tun and Chieh-kuan-ting were only fit for pack animals.

On the 5th July, General Kawamura heard from General Oku that he was about to resume his advance and that he expected to

attack the Russians at Kai-ping between the 9th and the 11th. The 5th Division was to threaten the enemy's left flank and to send a detachment to get into touch with the left of the 10th Division. In view of the great strength of Russian forces now concentrated about Hsi-mu-cheng, estimated at about 25,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, and 60 guns General Kawamura decided that he would not move his whole division towards Kai-ping, for to do so would expose General Asada's brigade to attack by greatly superior numbers. He therefore despatched two detachments on the 9th July, under General Tojo and Colonel Kamada, from Chieh-kuan-ting and Ssu-tao-kou respectively. They were to cross the passes independently, and to effect a junction in the valley of the Ching Ho, whence they were to advance under General Tojo towards Tang-chih. Both columns met with some opposition, but by 10 a.m. on the 10th they were in close touch, and were preparing to continue their advance when news was received that Kai-ping had already been occupied by the Second Army. The movement was therefore stopped. A third column was sent towards Hsi-mu-cheng, but returned to the Fen-shui Ling after finding the Russians in considerable force about Yang-la-huo.

From the end of June onwards, the Russians had been pushing troops up into the front line as quickly as they arrived from Europe. On the 26th of that month, General Kuropatkin himself had come to Hai-cheng from Ta-shih-chiao and had withdrawn every man that could be spared from the Eastern force under Count Keller.* Thus, by the middle of July, the force in front of 10th Japanese Division (*i.e.*, at and south of Hai-cheng, but not employed against the Second Army) consisted of:—

1st Brigade, 2nd Siberian Division from the 4th Siberian Corps.

5th East Siberian Rifle Division from the 2nd Siberian Corps.
35th Infantry Division from the XVIIth Corps.

†2nd Brigade, 31st Infantry Division from the Xth Corps.

The confusion of units, and the breaking up of commands, caused serious misgivings in the minds of the Russian officers, and unnecessary fatigue to the men.

The Japanese were aware that the 10th Division was no longer sufficiently strong to carry out its task unaided, but since the Ta-ku-shan—Hai-cheng road had proved better than had been expected the Imperial Head-Quarters had already decided to add to it another division, and so to organize a Fourth Army. With this object the 10th Reserve, or *Kobi*‡ Brigade had received orders to mobilize on the 17th June, and had reached Ta-ku-shan on the 24th of that month. On the 12th of July it reached Hsiu-yen, and on the 16th General Count Nodzu took over the command of the army at that place. The Fourth Army was now

* See Chap. XI, p. 100, some of these troops were sent back immediately.

† The 1st Brigade of this division remained in reserve at Liao-yang (see footnote p. 101).

‡ The 10th *Kobi* Brigade, although organized as a "mixed" brigade, was composed, at this period, of only three regiments, each of two battalions.

considered to be sufficiently strong for immediate requirements, and on the 22nd, under orders from Imperial Head-Quarters, the Mixed Brigade of the Guard Division was despatched by way of Huang-chia-tien to rejoin the First Army. At this time the Japanese feared that, as soon as the Second Army should begin its advance towards Ta-shih-chiao, the Russians might move down in force from Hai-cheng and deliver a great counter-attack with superior numbers. It was, therefore, imperative that the Fourth Army, as well as the First Army further to the east, should hold the enemy in front of them to their positions. With this object the Fourth Army moved forward slowly towards Hsi-mu-cheng on the 24th July, and by the 28th the advanced troops of the 10th Division and the 10th *Kobi* Brigade, less the 40th Regiment of *Kobi* infantry in reserve at San-hsien-fang (5 miles south-west of Yang-la-huo) held a line extending from the high ground east of Yang-la-huo to the vicinity of Chang-chia-pu-tzu; the main body of the army was at La-mu-fang. At 10.30 p.m. on the same date, General Nodzu was informed that the 5th Division, which was then five miles north of Tang-chih, was to join his command, and that he was to capture Hsi-mu-cheng "when opportunity offers."

It was known that, after their defeat at Ta-shih-chiao, the Russians had retired to Hai-cheng, and it was believed that there was a force of about one division near Hsi-mu-cheng holding a position west of, and covering, the main road to Hai-cheng. This was, however, an overestimate, for the only troops still remaining so far south were the 2nd Brigade of the 31st Infantry Division with some artillery. From Chin-ta-szu to the south-east of San-chiao-shan the position was strongly entrenched, with artillery on the hills north and south of Hung-yao-ling and a formidable work on the high ground east of Hsiao-fang-hsin. South of Hsi-mu-cheng, between the roads leading from Hsiao-ku-shan and La-mu-fang, was an advanced detachment which held the ground from Shan-cheng-tzu to Hsia-fang-hsin. General Mischenko's cavalry brigade, which had fought at Ta-shih-chiao, appeared to be about Miao-erh-kou and Hsi-yang-shu-kou supported by other troops in small numbers; but to the west of San-chiao-shan there were only weak entrenchments.

Although General Nodzu fully realized that he could not employ his superior numbers to the best advantage in the mountainous country about Miao-erh-kou, he resolved to deliver a frontal attack with the 10th Division directly against Hsi-mu-cheng, and with the 5th Division to cut the enemy's line of retreat about Pai-lu-tun.

With this object, orders were issued at 11 a.m. on the 29th July, directing the army to occupy certain positions on the following day, in anticipation of the general attack which was fixed to take place on the 31st. The 10th Division and the 10th *Kobi* Brigade were to push forward on the 30th, and to seize a line extending from Ta-fang-hsin through Shan-cheng-tzu to the hill north of Hsia-pa-fan-kou. On their left, the 5th Division was directed to assemble its main body in the neighbourhood of Hou-

shih-la-kou, its advanced troops establishing themselves upon a line extending from the hill east of Su-chia-pu-tzu through Ying-lao-shan (N.) to Wang-chia-pu-tzu (W.). As these dispositions would leave a gap between the two divisions, special care was to be taken to maintain connexion, and telegraphic communication was established from La-mu-fang to Hou-shih-la-kou through Chang-chia-pu-tzu. As a general reserve for the army, the 40th *Kobi* Regiment was directed to assemble at Yang-la-huo, in rear of the Japanese right, whence, as the attack progressed, it was to push forward and pursue as far as a line extending from Hou-chia-tun*, through Pai-lu-tun to Erh-tao-kou. General Nodzu intimated that his Head-Quarters would move at noon on the 30th from Wang-chia-pu-tzu (S.) to Hsiao-ku-shan.

At 2 a.m. on the 30th July, in accordance with the plan arranged, the 10th Division and 10th *Kobi* Brigade moved forward in three columns and, meeting with little opposition except from guns posted to the west of Hsi-mu-cheng, occupied a line running from Ta-fang-hsin through hill 685' to the hill one and a half miles north-west of Wang-chia-pu-tzu (N.); while the 5th Division, similarly organized, seized the ground which lies immediately south of Su-chia-pu-tzu and Ying-lao-shan (N.). But there was no attempt to push on any further.

For the 31st July, the advance of the 10th Division and 10th *Kobi* Brigade was ordered to take place at 2 a.m., the force being distributed in three columns as on the previous day:—

Japanese dispositions.

Right Column—

- 2 troops, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
- 2 batteries, 10th Artillery Regiment.
- 10th and 11th Regiments, 10th *Kobi* Brigade.
- 1 company, 10th Engineer Battalion.

Centre Column—

- 1 troop, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
- 1 battery, 10th Artillery Regiment.
- 10th Regiment, 10th Division.
- 1 company, 10th Engineer Battalion.

Left Column—

- 1 troop, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
- 1 battery, 10th Artillery Regiment.
- 40th Regiment, 10th Division.
- 1 company, 10th Engineer Battalion.

As a reserve for the division two squadrons of cavalry, two batteries, and the 20th Brigade were ordered to assemble at Wang-chia-pu-tzu (N.).

During the night, a battalion and a battery were transferred from the right to the centre column, and at dawn on the 31st the

* About 3 miles N.E. of Pai-lu-tun.

left and centre columns* attacked the Russians on the hill west of Ta-ping-ling, which was seized by the advanced troops about 9 a.m. The capture of this position did not, however, force the defenders to relinquish hill 787,† to which they clung with great determination supported by guns posted near Chang-san-huo and Hsiao-fang-hsin. But, as the rearmost troops of the column arrived, the Japanese pushed forward and succeeded in occupying the hill at 11.30 a.m. under a heavy fire of guns and rifles. Prior to this, the 39th Regiment, from the divisional reserve, had been sent by Lieutenant-General Kawamura to the extreme left of the 10th Division where assistance was required; but on the way it was met by so severe a fire from a battery posted on the saddle north of Hung-chia-pu-tzu, that it was forced to halt until supported by guns north of Wang-chia-pu-tzu (N.). With this assistance the infantry succeeded in coming into action from Ta-wan-kou, and the two batteries were then ordered up from the reserve.

On the left of the 10th Division the 5th Division was distributed as follows:—

Right Column—

- 2 troops, 5th Cavalry Regiment.
- 2 batteries, 5th Artillery Regiment.
- 42nd Regiment.
- 1 company, 5th Engineer Battalion.

Centre Column—

- 2 troops, 5th Cavalry Regiment.
- 2 battalions, 21st Regiment.

Left Column—

- 1 troop, 5th Cavalry Regiment.
- 1 battery, 5th Artillery Regiment.
- 41st Regiment.
- 1 Company, 5th Engineer Battalion.

Reserve, to assemble at Ying-lao-shan (S.)—

- 1½ squadrons, 5th Cavalry Regiment.
- 3 batteries, 5th Artillery Regiment.
- 11th Regiment.
- 1 battalion, 21st Regiment.
- 1 company, 5th Engineer Battalion.

Advancing in a northerly direction at 2 a.m., the centre column forced back the Russian outposts and, at 4.30 a.m., captured the hill north of Ying-lao-shan (N.). The right column then advanced towards hill 1130' north-east of Tung-yang-shu-kou with its artillery on the hill north of Su-chia-pu-tzu. The Russians were soon driven back by artillery fire, and two battalions of the left column then succeeded in occupying the lower slopes of hill 1420', though stubbornly opposed by one or two companies, and by

* The right column, after occupying the Russian advanced position, had been ordered to unite with the centre column; thus when the attack on the main position took place, there were only two columns, the left and centre.

† Called by the Japanese Mt. Hyotan.

artillery, about Fan-chia-huo-kou. Here it came in touch with a detachment from the 3rd Division, under Major-General Kodama, which had been despatched by General Oku to assist in the attack against the Russian right. This detachment* of the Second Army, on reaching Pai-tsao-yao, opened fire with its guns on some Russian artillery at Liang-chia-pu-tzu and on some infantry south of that village. At 10 a.m., the Russian infantry retired to the north-west and the artillery took up a new position west of Chuan-wan-tzu.

On hearing that the 5th Division was in possession of the hill 1420', General Nodzu, anticipating that this success would force the Russians to retire, sent orders at 9.15 a.m. to the commander of the 40th *Kobi* Regiment telling him to advance at once. He was informed that the enemy was holding a line from the hill north of Hung-yao-ling to the hill west of San-chiao-shan; and that the route he was to follow lay through Ta-tzu-ho and Ta-fang-hsin, whence, making for Lin-tung-huo, he was to menace the extreme Russian left. One company of the regiment which had been kept at Hsiao-ku-shan was ordered to proceed to hill 1105' where the Head-Quarters of the Fourth Army were now established.

At the same time, the commander of the right column of the 5th Division ordered his artillery to change position, and to come into action against the Russian battery on hill 1020' which had checked the advance of the 39th Japanese Regiment. So heavy was the fire now concentrated against this battery that it was forced to retire, leaving six of its guns. Meanwhile two batteries from the reserve of the 5th Division, assisted by a company of engineers, were trying to improvise a road up the steep and rocky ascent to the hill 1420'; but it was not till 1 p.m. that they succeeded in getting into a position whence they could open fire against some Russian guns which were in action near Miao-erh-kou. These they silenced in about twenty minutes; but in spite of these two misfortunes the Russians were by no means beaten. In front of the centre column of the 5th Division the Russian infantry maintained its ground about Miao-erh-kou; and although the battery on hill 1020' was out of action, the guns east of Hsiao-fang-hsin outranged those of the 10th Division, and successfully checked a fresh attempt to advance which was made by the 39th Regiment and by the two batteries which accompanied it. Moreover a strong Russian force was seen to be marching along the valley of the Pa-li Ho towards Chuan-wan-tzu while their guns near Fan-chia-huo-kou were increased to twenty-two.†

Further to the east the 10th Japanese Division, which had captured hill 787' at 11.30 a.m., had been unable to progress. The Russians were still on the hill east of San-chia-tzu and near Chang-san-huo, supported by the fire of forty-two guns.† This check caused

* Strength: three battalions of infantry, one troop of cavalry, two batteries, and one company of engineers.

† These figures are from Japanese sources, and from them it would appear that eight batteries, or the artillery of one division (sixty-four guns) were now in action. Probably the 2/31st Brigade had been reinforced by one brigade.

the Japanese considerable anxiety as to the safety of their left flank, and gave the Russians time to bring up fresh troops from the rear. With these they made several unavailing attempts to recapture hill 787', and gradually their infantry and cavalry fire grew heavier until, at 6 p.m., a force amounting to about one brigade of infantry was pushed into their fighting line, and an attack was delivered by two battalions* of the 124th (Voronej) Regiment, supported by a concentrated fire from the guns north of Chang-san-huo and east of Hsiao-fang-hsin. Four separate attempts were made to force the Japanese from their ground in the neighbourhood of San-chiao-shan, but without success. So determined was the attack that, in the left column of the 10th Division, the 11th Company of the 40th Regiment had all but thirty-five of its non-commissioned officers and men killed, while the only officer of the company who survived the action was among the wounded. This fierce struggle was maintained till 7 p.m., when the last of the Russian counter-attacks was repulsed, and the 10th Division bivouacked for the night.

Meanwhile the 5th Division had been less heavily engaged, and its left column, though assisted by the detachment from the Second Army, had done little more than maintain the positions which it had reached at midday.

In spite of great inferiority of numbers, the actual result of the fighting up to this point was, therefore, by no means unfavourable to the Russians. The exact number of Japanese troops remaining in reserve is not known, but the returns of the losses and of the ammunition expended show that the 11th, 21st, and 42nd Infantry Regiments, and the 10th Cavalry Regiment were only lightly engaged, while the 20th Infantry Regiment and the 5th Cavalry Regiment did not fire a shot. This caution on the part of General Nodzu, so different from the usual Japanese practice, may have been due to the fact that it was much easier for General Kuropatkin to reinforce his fighting line from Hai-cheng than for General Nodzu to obtain assistance from the Second Army or from any other source.

The Japanese difficulties were, however, solved by the retirement of the Russians, which commenced by the withdrawal of the troops from Pai-lu-tun about 3 p.m., followed in due course by the infantry and artillery from Chuan-wan-tzu and Fan-chia-huo-kou. The retirement was aided by the attack of the 124th Voronej Regiment, already described, and by the arrival of two battalions from the 2nd Siberian Army Corps sent up from about Hai-cheng. This timely reinforcement checked the Japanese advance and enabled the Russians to withdraw under cover of darkness.

About 4.30 p.m., General Nodzu sent forward a battalion and a half, from the general reserve, with orders to pursue towards Miao-erh-kou but, on arriving to the south of that village, obstinate resistance was encountered, and the 5th Division bivouacked on the ground which had been taken during the day.

* The Russian account states that this attack was delivered by one battalion only, under Colonel Lipovetz-Popovich, and that 75 per cent. of the officers were either killed or wounded.

On the opposite flank of the Fourth Army, the despatch of the 40th *Kobi* Regiment towards Lin-tung-huo also proved to be somewhat premature. Nevertheless, by 6 p.m., its two battalions had secured the heights north-west of that place, where they remained during the night, and blocked the main road from Hsi-mu-cheng.

At 4.10 a.m., on the 1st August, General Nodzu sent orders to the commander of the 10th Division pointing out the urgent necessity of forcing the Russians from their position in front of him, and adding that the 5th Division had been directed to assist by sending a portion of its troops towards San-chiao-shan.

At 7.30 a.m., Lieutenant-General Kawamura replied to the effect that to continue the attack was, for the time being, impossible, but that his division would hold its ground to the last man. This attitude did not satisfy the commander of the Fourth Army, who insisted that the attack must be renewed and the enemy repulsed by daybreak on the 2nd August. The operation was not, however, destined to be carried out, for the Russians, fearing a resumption of the attack upon their right, had fallen back towards Hai-cheng.

About 8 a.m., the commander of the 5th Division had received a message from Lieutenant-General Kawamura in which the situation of the 10th Division was described.

The Russians retire. Lieutenant-General Ueda at once ordered the bulk of his right column to co-operate and sent it towards the village of San-chiao-shan, but before that place was reached the detachment found that the Russians had withdrawn. This fact had been discovered some time earlier by the right column of the 10th Division, which had started in pursuit about 6 a.m., followed at 8.30 a.m. by the left column. These troops pushed forward and occupied a line from Shih-chia-wa-tzu to Pai-lu-tun, while the 40th *Kobi* Regiment, which had marched at 5.30 a.m., came up on their right and occupied Hou-chia-tun.* It was followed by the remainder of the Fourth Army, which moved forward and occupied a line running from north-east to south-west through Pai-lu-tun.

In this action, as in the engagements which preceded it, the Fourth Army had received assistance from troops detached either by the First or Second Armies, and although, on the 31st July, it failed to force the Russians from their ground, success had none the less been gained. Its efforts had sufficed to make the enemy relinquish his last position on the road leading to Hai-cheng, whither he had retired with a loss of six guns and many killed and wounded. The junction with General Oku's force was thus practically accomplished, for only a few miles of road, clear of the enemy, now separated the Fourth and Second Armies.

* About 3 miles N.E. of Pai-lu-tun.

CHAPTER XI.

THE ADVANCE OF THE FIRST JAPANESE ARMY, WITH THE ACTIONS
AT CHIAO-TOU, MO-TIEN LING, AND YU-SHU LING—
YANG-TZU LING.

IN the preceding chapters the advance of the Second and Fourth Japanese Armies, up to the time of their arrival in the neighbourhood of Hai-cheng City, has been described. It is now necessary to turn to the eastern portion of the theatre of operations, and to follow the movements of the First Army in the same direction. For several days after the successful passage of the Ya-lu, General Kuroki remained halted in and around An-tung. His victory of the 1st May had fulfilled the first requirement of the plan of campaign, and a foothold upon the southern border of Manchuria had been secured. The next phase of that plan was the general advance on Liao-yang of three Japanese armies, but as two of these were not yet in the field the First Army was compelled to remain inactive. In the interval, much had to be accomplished. The routes by which the First Army would march to the point of concentration led through a country difficult at any time for wheeled traffic, and during the rainy season almost impassable. Although the distance to be traversed was not great, it was necessary to hire local transport, and as the number of carts procurable at An-tung fell far short of requirements, troops were detached in the directions of Hsiu-yen and Kuan-tien-cheng, where it was thought that more might be obtained. By this means, sufficient were collected to enable a short advance northward to be made, and by the 10th May, the First Army had taken up positions covering Feng-huang-cheng.* This place, which has a population of some 20,000, is the only town of importance on the Imperial road between Korea and Mukden, and was selected as a centre where supplies for one month for the First Army were to be accumulated. North of the town the 2nd Division took position while east and west of it, respectively, were the 12th and Guard, Divisions. In advance of each division, strong parties of infantry were thrown forward to a distance of several miles, while ten miles further to the front a screen of cavalry was established. Supplies

The Japanese
at Feng-huang-
cheng.

* The actual occupation of Feng-huang-cheng had taken place on the 6th May, when the Japanese cavalry scouts had met and repulsed those of the Russian rearguard which had fallen back northward. On the following day Kuan-tien-cheng, on the Sai-ma-chi road, was taken possession of by troops sent up from Siojo on the Ya-lu, thus serving the double purpose of protecting the Japanese right and threatening the Russian left.

were brought from An-tung, at first by cart and afterwards by a line of tramway; and by the middle of June, a reserve sufficient for one month had been collected.

Meanwhile the Russian force under General Zasulich had fallen back to Lien-shan-kuan, covered by a rearguard which had remained at Pien-men till the 3rd May, while some seven miles east of Feng-huang-cheng a company of the 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment watched the valley of the Ai Ho. Still further east, Colonel Letchitski had maintained his position at Hung-shih-la until the 3rd May, when, hearing for the first time of the Russian reverse, he had withdrawn his detachment to Chu-chi-lin-tzu.*

During these few days great anxiety as to the safety of the "Eastern Force" was felt at the Russian Army Head-Quarters, where news of the reverse on the Ya-lu had been received on the evening of the 1st May. This uneasiness was increased by a report which had been received about the end of April from Lieutenant-Colonel Madritov, who, with a squadron of the Ussuri Cossack Regiment and some companies of mounted scouts, was watching the upper Ya-lu. In this report he stated that a Japanese force was moving in the direction of Chyangsyong, but, as no details were given, he created an impression at Head-Quarters that a strong body of troops was moving by Sai-ma-chi on Mukden. To guard against this danger, and to secure General Zasulich's retreat, such small reinforcements as were at once available were hurried eastward. The first step was to prepare a defensive position about Lien-shan-kuan, which would cover the Mo-tien Ling and protect the principal passes over the mountains. For this purpose a detachment was to concentrate at Lien-shan-kuan by the 3rd May; it was to act under the orders of Major-General Romanov, and was composed of:—

One battalion of the 124th Regiment (2nd Brigade, 31st Infantry Division) from Liao-yang.

One battalion of the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

Three companies of the 139th Regiment (2nd Brigade, 35th Infantry Division) from the Mo-tien Ling.

The 4th Battery of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division.†

Half the 4th Battery of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division.‡

The next step was to provide a strong flankguard which would be able to clear up the situation to the east, and at the same time protect the threatened flank of General Zasulich's

* See Part I., p. 60. During the battle of the Ya-lu a staff officer who was carrying orders to Colonel Letchitski, directing him to retire, was wounded and drowned in the Ai Ho.

† It will be observed that this detachment was composed of units, or portions of units, from four different divisions.

‡ These two batteries, escorted by the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment, were already on their way from Liao-yang to Feng-huang-cheng, but were overtaken by an order to halt on reaching Lien-shan-kuan. The guns of the 4th/6th Battery afterwards joined General Rennenkampf, though the date on which they did so is not known.

retiring force. To perform this double task, Major-General Rennenkampf, commander of the Trans-Baikal Cossack Division, with the 2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade and 4th Trans-Baikal Horse Artillery Battery, was despatched from Liao-yang to Sai-ma-chi, where he was to be joined by detachments under Colonels Kartsev and Volkov, which had taken part in the battle of the 1st May.*

A third step was still necessary, namely, to watch the coast line west of the Ya-lu River; and for this purpose General Mishchenko was ordered to move to Sha-li-chai with the 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade, which belonged properly to the Trans-Baikal Cossack Division, and to guard the coast as far as Pi-tzu-wo where he would come in touch with the cavalry under General Zikov.† The remainder of the troops which he had commanded on the Ya-lu were placed under Colonel Kartsev, and took position at Ai-yang-cheng, where they remained until the arrival of General Rennenkampf on the 7th May.

Lastly, three squadrons of the 2nd Chita Cossack Regiment, which had left Liao-yang on the 29th April, were ordered to hasten their march to Feng-huang-cheng, where they joined General Zasulich on the 2nd May and remained to guard his front. By these means the line of retreat of the "Eastern Force" was secured and its flanks were safeguarded.

In accordance with his orders, General Rennenkampf left Liao-yang with the 2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade on the 4th May; he took no carts with him, supplies were requisitioned from the country through which the column passed, and the ordinary military precautions were neglected. In this way the forty-five miles to Lien-shan-kuan were covered in two marches, and there General Rennenkampf had an interview with General Zasulich, whose troops were then retiring towards the Fen-shui range.

The precise nature of this interview has never become known but it is evident that the danger from the east was still held to be serious, for on the following day, the 6th, the Cossack Brigade made a most trying march of thirty miles along the main ridge of the

* Three squadrons of the Cossack Brigade were dropped on the road between Liao-yang and Sai-ma-chi to act as mail carriers; it is not known from which regiments they were taken. The strength of General Rennenkampf's command when concentrated was approximately 2,500 sabres, 2,000 rifles, and 14 guns, composed of:—

2nd Brigade Trans-Baikal Cossack Division, Major-General Liubavin—

2nd Nerchinsk Regiment } 9 squadrons.
2nd Argun Regiment }

4th Trans-Baikal Cossack Artillery Battery, 6 guns.

Detachment under Colonel Kartsev—

1st Argun Regiment, 5 squadrons.

Ussuri Cossack Regiment, 3 squadrons.

Detachment under Colonel Volkov—

23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 3 battalions.

4th/6th Battery, 8 guns.

† See Chapter VII, p. 11.

mountains. On the 7th, a junction was effected with Colonel Volkov's detachment at Sai-ma-chi and a defensive position was selected, which was to be held by the infantry and artillery while the cavalry was free to explore the country to the front and flanks. On the 8th, General Rennenkampf was joined by Colonel Kartsev, who had left three squadrons of the 1st Argun Regiment at Ai-yang-cheng. This officer reported that Feng-huang-cheng had been occupied by a large Japanese force, covered by strong parties of infantry and cavalry, and that the advanced troops of another force had reached Kuan-tien-cheng on the 5th May.

To clear up the situation, General Rennenkampf, whose troops had rested on the 8th, moved out on the 9th with seven squadrons of cavalry, one battalion of infantry, one battery of horse artillery, and two field guns, leaving Colonel Volkov with the remainder of his column at Sai-ma-chi. At Ai-yang-cheng he was joined by the three squadrons which had been left behind by Colonel Kartsev, and at noon on the 10th, after a very arduous march, he reached Kuan-tien-cheng, where he learnt that a body of four hundred Japanese infantry had left the town, but in what direction was not known. On this day the general himself was accompanied by three squadrons of cavalry; three more squadrons reconnoitred beyond Kuan-tien-cheng, and the remainder of the column was left near the Chan Ling, south-east of Erh-tao-kou, to secure the retreat of the advanced parties.

Nothing was heard from the reconnoitring squadrons, but at 1 p.m. General Rennenkampf received a report from Colonel Volkov, saying that strong detachments of hostile infantry were advancing on Sai-ma-chi. He at once despatched General Liubavin with orders to pick up the battalion of rifles, two squadrons, and six guns at the Chan Ling, and to return with them to Sai-ma-chi. At 2 p.m., while still halted at Kuan-tien-cheng, a report came in that a strong hostile force was coming up from the south-west. A little later some Japanese infantry was seen, and a brisk exchange of fire, lasting about forty minutes took place. Meantime, the three reconnoitring squadrons, which had apparently failed to discover the approaching enemy, were falling back; and, at 3.30 p.m., General Rennenkampf withdrew to the Chan Ling, where he rejoined the two squadrons and two guns which were still guarding his retreat. The retirement was resumed next day, and Sai-ma-chi was reached on the 12th, when it was discovered that the report of an advance in strength against that place had emanated from Chinese spies, and was greatly exaggerated.*

Little information had been gained by this reconnaissance, beyond the fact that Kuan-tien-cheng was in the hands of the enemy; and it is worthy of note, as illustrating Russian methods

* Though the Russians were unable to ascertain any definite information, we now know that the 12th Japanese Division advanced to Kuan-chia-pu-tzu on the 10th May; and that on the 12th the divisional cavalry was pushed out along the roads to Sai-ma-chi, Ai-yang-cheng, and Lien-shan-kuan, thus giving rise to this report.

at this stage of the war, that, though Ai-yang-cheng was still held, no troops were left to watch the movements of the Japanese.

We must now leave General Rennenkampf for a while to follow the movements of Colonel Madritov, who took advantage of the advance of the First Japanese Army to Feng-huang-cheng to make a raid across the Ya-lu into Korea. The moment was well chosen for his enterprise, for, on the 10th May, when he appeared in the vicinity of Anju, the old line of communication of the First Army was being handed over to the troops forming the army of occupation of Korea, and General Kuroki was in doubt as to the strength of the force holding the threatened city. Its actual garrison consisted of seventy reserve soldiers under a captain, and some thirty non-combatants, who were armed with rifles of men killed at the battle of the Ya-lu. From 7 a.m. on the 10th, this small force held the town and kept the Cossacks at bay until, at 3 p.m., seventy men under an officer who happened to be in the vicinity and had heard the sound of firing, came up from the south and succeeded in joining the defenders. Shortly afterwards, half the now augmented garrison sallied forth from the south-east gate and drove Colonel Madritov's troops back to some high ground, whence they retreated after dark.*

With the exception of these two reconnaissances the Russian troops accomplished nothing during the early part of May, and very little was known of the real strength or dispositions of the Japanese when, on the 17th, Lieutenant-General Count Keller† arrived from Europe and took over the command of the "Eastern Force" from General Zasulich, who then returned to his own 2nd Siberian Army Corps at Hai-cheng.

Returning now to General Rennenkampf, frequent reconnaissances were made from Sai-ma-chi; but on the 21st May the complete exhaustion of supplies in that neighbourhood and a report, received from Army Headquarters, that the Japanese were moving westward in support of a landing which had been made near Ta-ku-shan, led him to withdraw his infantry (less one company), half a squadron of cavalry, and his horse artillery, about twenty miles to the north-west. Of the remainder of his force part was retained at Sai-ma-chi, while the rest held Ai-yang-cheng

* The Japanese give the composition of Lieutenant-Colonel Madritov's force as one company of mounted scouts of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment, one company of mounted scouts of the 15th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, three squadrons of Cossacks, or in all about 500 men. Colonel Madritov, who originally had with him one squadron of the Ussuri Cossack Regiment, was probably joined by two more squadrons of that regiment before undertaking the raid, for it is known that only three squadrons fell back to Kuan-tien-cheng when the Japanese advanced across the Ya-lu. In this affair the Japanese lost 3 men killed and 7 wounded, and the Russians are understood to have had 2 officers and 14 others killed and 35 wounded. The Japanese captured 1 N.C.O., and 1 private soldier.

† Before receiving this appointment Count Keller had no experience of high command. He had spent some years as Director of the Corps of Pages in St. Petersburg, and latterly had been Governor of Ekatinoslay.

with a detachment thrown forward towards Kuan-tien-cheng. On the 23rd, a reconnaissance was made down the valley of the Ai Ho with nine squadrons, which came into contact with Japanese infantry near Ta-pu and were driven back without acquiring any information of value. General Rennenkampf next moved to Ai-yang-cheng, and on the 28th one of his patrols encountered half a squadron of Japanese cavalry supported by three infantry battalions and a mountain battery. Inferring that these troops were the advanced guard of a Japanese division, he ordered a retirement to Sai-ma-chi, which was reached at 6 p.m. There he intended to remain during the 29th, but on that date Chinese spies brought news that the Japanese advanced guard was only some two miles distant.* Thereupon the troops, without waiting to verify the information, marched hastily to Cheng-chang to block the road to Mukden; and a report that three thousand Japanese infantry, with a battery of artillery, had occupied Sai-ma-chi was

Count Keller
ordered to
Sai-ma-chi.

Count Keller, who from the first had strongly advocated offensive action, was permitted to proceed thither with half a squadron, eight and a half battalions, and two batteries. To replace these troops of the "Eastern Force," the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division was ordered to march at once from Liao-yang to Lien-shan-kuan. By the 2nd June, however, an officer's reconnoitring party had ascertained that Sai-ma-chi was not occupied by the enemy, and that beyond a patrol† no Japanese had visited that place. On the following day Count Keller, to his great disappointment, was recalled to Lien-shan-kuan, while a portion of General Rennenkampf's cavalry re-occupied Sai-ma-chi.

On his return from this abortive expedition, Count Keller distributed his force as follows:—‡

East of Lien-shan-kuan barring the road from Sai-ma-chi—

Redistribution
of the
"Eastern
Force."

The 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division and three batteries, with seven companies about Erh-tao-fang-shan.

Near Erh-chia-pu-tzu—

Head-Quarters of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, with the 24th Regiment and one battery.

Near Ma-chia-pu-tzu—

The 22nd Regiment of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, with two guns.

* The spies had probably encountered the patrol mentioned on p. 96.

† The action of this Japanese patrol had a curiously far-reaching result, for it was magnified into a threat against the Russian line of communication, with the result that the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division was left with the "Eastern Force," and, as has been seen, the force under General Stakelberg, which was to advance for the relief of Port Arthur, was unnecessarily weakened.

‡ The guns lost at the Ya-lu (22) were not replaced until the 15th July, but the 4th Battery of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division had joined the "Eastern Force." It will also be noted that the seven companies of the 31st and 35th Infantry Divisions were no longer with Count Keller (see p. 91).

At Ta-wan—

Five battalions of the 2nd Brigade 2nd Siberian Infantry Division.

At Lang-tzu-shan—

Three battalions of the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Siberian Infantry Division.

During the period in which the Russian cavalry was displaying this fruitless activity, supply difficulties and the necessity of conforming to the movements of the Second and

Difficulties of Japanese supply and transport.

Fourth Armies, which were not yet ready to move northward, had kept the Japanese First Army halted in the neighbourhood of Feng-huang-cheng.

The whole of the month of May was spent in bringing supplies of food from Japan, and in collecting sufficient transport to make a further forward movement. It soon became evident that at least three roads must be used, one by each division. The right division would march by Ai-yang-cheng and Sai-ma-chi, the centre by the main road to Hsueh-li-tien and Lien-shan-kuan, the left by Ta-yen-kou, Erh-chia-pu-tzu, and Chin-chia-pu-tzu. To facilitate this movement General Kuroki decided to

Occupation of Ai-yang-cheng.

establish a supply depot* at Ai-yang-cheng, which was occupied by General Sasaki, with the 12th Brigade from the 12th Division, on the 28th May.

On the 29th, a patrol from this brigade was sent out northward, a movement which, as we have seen, was the cause of General Rennenkampf's somewhat hasty retirement from Sai-ma-chi. Though no other definite operations were undertaken during this month, the cavalry, closely supported by infantry, was kept well out on the front and flanks and completely frustrated the Russian efforts to obtain information. When, however, it became clear to the Japanese Imperial Head-Quarters, at the beginning of June, that an effort was to be made to relieve Port Arthur, orders were at once issued for active operations to be begun. But the difficulty of supply was still the ruling factor, and the First Army was not yet in a position to move. In these circumstances, the most that General Kuroki could do was to throw forward detachments which should threaten the troops to which he was directly opposed, and at the same time should raise doubts in General Kuropatkin's mind as to his point of greatest danger.

Despatch of General Asada's brigade to Hsiu-yen.

With this object the advanced troops of the 2nd Division attacked the Russian outposts on the 6th and 7th, and on the latter date Sai-ma-chi was occupied by a detachment from Ai-yang-cheng commanded by Colonel Yoshida.† On the 6th June, also, General Asada's detachment left Feng-huang-cheng to co-operate with the 10th Division in the attack on Hsiu-yen.

* Supplies were brought by boat up the River Ya-lu as far as Shui-tien, whence they were forwarded to Ai-yang-cheng in Chinese carts.

† Presumably the Japanese found it impossible to supply a force so far forward as Sai-ma-chi, for it was evacuated on the 9th, and re-occupied by the Russians on the 16th June.

Count Keller appears to have failed completely to grasp the meaning of these movements, and, being badly served by the cavalry, he concluded that General Kuroki was now attempting to turn his right flank from the direction of Huang-hua-tien; an opinion which was strengthened by the knowledge that, in 1895, the Japanese had marched directly from Feng-huang-cheng to Hai-cheng. To guard against this new danger he moved the 11th and 12th East Siberian Rifle Regiments to Ta-wan, and concentrated the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division at Lang-tzu-shan; pushing out advanced parties towards Hsi-mu-cheng and, apparently, towards Hsiu-yen.* Thus for more than a month, while unable to make any forward movement, General Kuroki had succeeded in concealing from his adversary not only his intentions but also his numbers and dispositions, and had thereby done much to facilitate the advance of the Second Army.

At last, on the 10th June, Count Keller received fairly correct information from Army Head-Quarters. On that date he was informed that the 12th Japanese Division was at Sai-ma-chi, and that the 2nd and Guard Divisions were at Feng-huang-cheng. At the same time he was informed of the Russian movement towards Port Arthur.

Count Keller's
second expedi-
tion towards
Sai-ma-chi.

On receipt of this information he came to the conclusion that the First Japanese Army would probably attempt to move westward. To prevent it from doing so he decided to undertake another offensive movement, and, on the following day, the 11th, he started to make a reconnaissance towards Sai-ma-chi, taking with him the 9th and 10th East Siberian Rifle Regiments and half a battery. The march had hardly begun, when he heard that the Japanese had evacuated Sai-ma-chi on the 9th, and again he retraced his steps without bringing on a battle. It may have been well that he did so, for on the 13th he received orders from General Kuropatkin, who was apparently anxious as to the result of General Stakelberg's expedition, to send six battalions and a battery to Hai-cheng.†

On the evening of the 15th June, when the result of the battle of Te-li-ssu was known at Liao-yang, Count Keller was ordered to send the 11th and 12th East Siberian Rifle Regiments (*i.e.*, the 2nd Brigade, 3rd E.S.R. Division) to An-shan-chan,‡ and "with the rest of his force to make a demonstrative advance on Feng-huang-cheng." The rest of his force now consisted of the 9th and 10th Regiments of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, the 22nd and 24th Regiments of

Count Keller
ordered to
advance on
Feng-huang-
cheng.

* Vide Chapter X, p. 76.

† In compliance with this order the 7th and half of the 8th Siberian Infantry Regiments, belonging to the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Siberian Infantry Division and one battery, were despatched. The remaining two battalions of this brigade and one battery were left to watch the roads from Huang-hua-tien.

‡ These two regiments were sent back to Count Keller immediately.
(4091)

the 6th East Siberian Division, two battalions of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division, and some field batteries. Deducting the troops required to guard the various passes,* Count Keller could only muster seven and three-quarter battalions of infantry. These he divided into two columns, under Major-Generals Romanov and Kashtalinski, and directed them to move out on the 16th by Erh-chia-pu-tzu and Erh-tao-fang-shan respectively. Count Keller with his staff accompanied General Romanov's command. The same evening the two columns concentrated at Hen-chia-pu-tzu, whence they advanced on the 17th to within ten miles of Feng-huang-cheng without encountering any serious opposition. The troops had covered forty miles of difficult country in a day and a half, only to find themselves wet through and without food, exposed to the attack of a whole Japanese army of whose dispositions they were ignorant. Again nothing had been achieved, and the only course open to Count Keller, who had always considered the undertaking extremely hazardous, was to retire. Tu-men-tzu was reached before nightfall and on the 18th both columns were back at Lien-shan-kuan. While on the return march Count Keller received news of General Stakelberg's defeat at Te-li-ssu, accompanied by orders from General Kuropatkin that he was to act on the defensive and to cover the left of the main Russian forces.

Count Keller had hardly returned when General Rennenkampf again assumed the offensive, but his movements seem to have been perfectly well known to the Japanese, for on the 19th June information was received at Feng-huang-cheng that a hostile force, numbering some five thousand men, was marching from Sai-ma-chi towards Ai-yang-cheng. A battalion of infantry was at once despatched to reinforce the troops of the 12th Division, and, by the 22nd June, Major-General Sasaki had under his command his own brigade, three squadrons of the 2nd and 12th Cavalry Regiments, three mountain batteries, and a battalion of the 23rd Brigade. A strong position had been prepared, which was to be held by two battalions and three batteries with the remainder in reserve, while the line of outposts was posted two miles to the north-west astride the Sai-ma-chi road. At 10 a.m. on the 22nd, the Japanese battalion on outpost duty was attacked by a Russian force of infantry and cavalry, with a battery of horse artillery, and withdrew slowly to the main position, which was reached with little loss some four hours later. The Russian guns then opened fire on the prepared position, but the range was accurately known to the Japanese artillerymen, who quickly silenced them and were able to stifle all attempts to reopen later on. The Russian infantry had meantime pushed forward to within a thousand yards of the Japanese position, but, on coming under fire from the trenches, was brought to a halt and was

* Two battalions of the 8th Siberian Infantry Regiment at the Middle Fen-shui Ling. Two battalions of the 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment at the San-tao Ling. One battalion at the Mo-tien Ling. One battalion at the East Fen-shui Ling.

unable to make any further progress. About 5 p.m., the Russian guns, followed by the infantry, were withdrawn, and a somewhat purposeless operation, which may have been merely another reconnaissance, came to an end. Although the opportunity to inflict losses on a retiring enemy appears to have been favourable, no pursuit was undertaken, presumably because the Japanese preferred to leave the Russians in uncertainty as to the strength of the forces to which they had been opposed.*

Two days before the occurrence of this affair a reserve of food and forage sufficient to supply a division for ten days, had been accumulated at Ai-yang-cheng, where, as at Feng-huang-cheng, all preparations for a general advance on the 24th were now complete. On that date the First Army broke up its camps and handed over the town of Feng-huang-cheng to *Kobi* troops. Since, however, General Kuroki must have heard something of the sortie of the Russian fleet from Port Arthur on the 23rd June which had affected the Japanese plans so greatly, it seems probable that his forward movement was undertaken with the object of pushing his supply depots further to the front, rather than with any immediate strategical or tactical object.

As already stated, the advance was necessarily made by three separate roads, and even so it was only through the excellent work of the pioneers that the transport was enabled to move at all. With the exception of the main route from Seoul to Mukden the so-called roads were, indeed, little more than tracks following the bottoms of the valleys, along which the troops were compelled to move in single file. The hills on either side rose to heights of from 150 to 600 feet, and it would seem that an enterprising enemy might have delayed the advance, even if unable to check it entirely. But the Russians made no efforts to turn to account the natural advantages which the country gave them, and retired before the advancing Japanese columns without offering any serious opposition. On the 26th June, the date of the advance of the 10th Division against the Fen-shui Ling, the Guard Division† marched to Wang-tai-tzu, the 2nd Division to Kan-chia-tun, while the 23rd Brigade of the 12th Division occupied Tsui-chia-fang, with the 12th Brigade of the same division a short distance north of Ai-yang-cheng.

So far the staff arrangements for the march had met with marked success, largely due to the perfect communication which was kept up between the columns by the cavalry. The army Head-Quarters and the Guard Division had never been separated by a distance of less than twenty-five miles by road; and from the Guard Division to General Asada's detachment, was about fifty miles. Yet, in spite of the bad quality of the cavalry horses, all the Japanese commanders were kept fully informed of the movements

* The Japanese estimate the Russian losses in this affair as 42 killed (22 were found on the ground) in addition to the wounded. Their own losses were 11 killed and wounded, among the former being the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 14th Regiment.

† Less the Asada detachment,

of the various columns, a fact which provides eloquent testimony of the training of the men and the skill of the officers.* At this point, also, the four field batteries of the Guard Artillery Regiment, which had hitherto been obliged to accompany the 2nd Division, were able to rejoin their own corps, having marched thirty-eight miles over mountain roads in three days.

On the 30th† the Japanese met with further success, for on that date the Mo-tien Ling, and the passes to the east and west of it were found to have been abandoned by the enemy, and were occupied by the advanced troops without firing a shot. For this the blame must not be laid upon Count Keller, for on the 26th his command had been still further weakened by the withdrawal of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Regiment to Hai-cheng. To find himself deprived of troops at the very moment when his opponent assumed the offensive might well dishearten any commander, but an even more insidious danger was the lack of decision which characterized all the Russian plans, and made itself felt in every quarter of the theatre of war. An instance of the consequences which resulted from this indecision is furnished by the movements of the 12th East Siberian Rifle Regiment. This regiment had been ordered to An-shan-chan on the 15th June, but on reaching that place had been at once sent back to Count Keller. On the 26th it received orders to move to Ta-wan; but while on the march it received another order to retrace its steps and, at 1 a.m., on the 27th, reached the camp at Chin-erh-tun which it had left the previous morning. There it was met by an order from General Kuropatkin directing it to march at once to Hai-cheng. Leaving camp again at 4 a.m. on the 27th, it reached Hai-cheng on the 28th, only to find that it was to move next day to Liao-yang, this time by rail. Arriving there on the 30th, orders were again received to rejoin Count Keller. Similarly the 9th East Siberian Rifle Regiment while on the way to Hai-cheng received orders to march to An-shan-chan; thence it was railed to Liao-yang and eventually returned to Count Keller with the 12th East Siberian Regiment.†

But a more formidable enemy than the Russians was the rain, which fell in torrents from the 27th June to the 5th July.

The Japanese advance checked by rain. Rivers overflowed their banks, roads became morasses, and the Chinese carters, whose services had been secured with so much pains, fled in every direction to their homes. For a time the transport of supplies practically ceased, the troops were placed on half rations, and so serious was the situation on the right that, to avoid starvation, the 12th Division, after consuming all its emergency rations, was ordered to retire twelve miles to Sai-ma-chi, leaving a line of outposts further north. Had

* Whether this was the best use to make of the cavalry is another question.

† One account states that these passes were occupied on the 27th.

‡ The 11th East Siberian Rifle Regiment also returned about this date, while the remaining two battalions of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division seem to have been withdrawn to Hai-cheng.

the rain continued for forty-eight hours longer the whole army must have retired to Feng-huang-cheng. During this trying period the apprehensions of the Japanese commanders were greatly increased by lack of information. The force opposed to the First Army was estimated at two whole divisions, whereas, as we have seen, Count Keller's command was at one time reduced to the 10th, 22nd, 24th, and two battalions of the 8th Regiments of infantry. From the 5th to the 15th July, no efforts were spared in the endeavour to recall the scattered transport, and, as the road through Ai-yang-cheng had become impassable, a new line of supply had to be established for the 12th Division.

On the 4th July, during the enforced halt, the advanced troops of the 2nd Japanese Division, consisting of three companies of the 30th Regiment, which held the Mo-tien Ling, were attacked. While it was still dark a battalion of the 10th East Siberian Rifle Regiment appeared from the direction of Ta-wan and engaged the Japanese troops in a hand-to-hand struggle. Darkness favoured the Russians in their advance and the outpost line was pierced, but the arrival of two other companies of the 30th Regiment, which were thrown against their left, compelled them to retire without ascertaining the strength of the force opposed to them. This attack was supported by a battalion of the 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, but the movements of the two bodies were not well timed, for the latter battalion did not arrive until the 10th East Siberian Regiment was in retreat. On the same morning similar unsuccessful attempts were made to penetrate the Japanese outposts on the Hsin-kai Ling and the Li-ho Ling* (see map II/7).

For nearly a fortnight† there was no further action on either side, but rumours reached the Russian Head-Quarters of a general westward movement of Japanese troops. In all probability these reports had their foundation in General Tojo's reconnaissance towards Kai-ping, and in the action of the detachment under General Asada both of which have been described in the preceding chapter. It will be remembered that as soon as Kai-ping was

* Information from Berlin, received by General Kuroki a few days later, stated that these attacks had been delivered by 13 companies under Colonel Raschinski, the object being to clear up the situation on the Mo-tien Ling.

† During this period the Xth Russian Army Corps began to arrive from Europe. The Head-Quarters reached Liao-yang on the 5th July and remained there, but the 9th Infantry Division was at once sent off to the east. The 1st Brigade reinforced Count Keller and the 2nd Brigade joined General Rennenkampf; at the same time the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment was transferred from General Rennenkampf to Count Keller. Of the remaining infantry belonging to this corps [*i.e.*, the 31st Division] the 1st Brigade remained at Liao-yang but was directly under the commander-in-chief, and the 2nd Brigade was already at Hai-cheng. Thus Lieutenant-General Sluchevski, commander of the corps, remained without any troops until the 20th July. General Sluchevski was an engineer officer. He joined the army in 1861 and spent the whole of his service with his own corps, until, in 1901 he was appointed to command the Xth Corps without having previously commanded a division.

occupied by the Second Army, the 10th Division was reinforced and was directed on Hsi-mu-cheng. Some rumour of this change of plan must have reached General Kuropatkin, for, about the same date, it began to be believed at Liao-yang that General Kuroki was meditating a movement by his right against the Russian left. These contradictory reports gave rise to much anxiety, and, in hopes of gaining some definite information, Count Keller was again ordered to assume the offensive.

On the morning of the 17th July, in compliance with this order, he delivered a second attack against the whole front of the

The second
attack on the
Mo-tien Ling.

2nd Japanese Division, instead of against the troops holding the Mo-tien Ling only. Three battalions of infantry with half a squadron of cavalry, under Colonel Zibulski, moved north of the Ta-wan—Hsia-ma-tang road against the Japanese right. Fourteen and a half battalions of infantry with twelve mountain guns, under Major-General Kashtalinski, were directed against the Mo-tien Ling and the Hsiao-kao Ling; and a weak flank guard of one battalion was sent to the junction of the roads coming from the Li-ho Ling and the Hsin-kai Ling. Opposed to these forces the greater portion of the 2nd Japanese Division was concentrated at Lien-shan-kuan, covered by outposts holding the mountain passes to the west. On the right were the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 16th Regiment* with three companies on the roads leading to Ta-wan, Hsiao-ku-chia-tzu, and Chiao-tou, supported by the remaining five companies at Hsia-ma-tang; in the centre, holding the Mo-tien Ling itself, were the three battalions of the 30th Regiment with a field battery, and on the left, at the Hsin-kai Ling, were some companies of the 4th Regiment. These troops covered a front of about ten miles, and held the crest line of the main ridge of the mountains, except on the extreme right where the position was thrown out towards the north.

The attack began with a feint made by the Russian flank guard against the Hsin-kai Ling. At 12.30 a.m., a company of the 4th Japanese Regiment on duty at the pass was fired upon by the enemy. The Japanese advanced to meet the attack and succeeded in driving the Russians back to Ma-kou-men-tzu. Supports were brought up by both sides, until five companies of the 4th Regiment succeeded in repulsing the enemy, now estimated at three battalions, and in establishing themselves on the high ground east of that village.†

The commander of the 2nd Division had not been deceived by this demonstration and, when the main attack was delivered against the Mo-tien Ling at 3 a.m., the 30th Japanese Regiment was already occupying the positions which had been selected for

* The 3rd battalion of this regiment was detached on special duty and took no part in the fight.

† These five companies were assisted by the appearance of a battalion of guards and a battery of artillery, which came up from the direction of the Li-ho Ling and threatened the Russian right, although they took no active part in the fighting. The estimate of the Russian strength at this point seems to be excessive.

defence, with picquets at the Old and New Temples and outposts as far forward as Li-chia-pu-tzu. The 1st Battalion was posted along the Mo-tien ridge on the south of the main road. The 2nd Battalion held the right section of the defence on the north of the same road, while the 3rd Battalion was in reserve on the eastern side of the pass awaiting orders. In line with the infantry on the ridge north of the road was a battery of field artillery, for which gun pits had been prepared some days previously. At first the Russians met with little opposition, for the picquets had been ordered to fall back, if they were attacked, upon their supports which were entrenched on the main position. Nevertheless, their advance was slow, and at 4 a.m. they had only reached the wooded ridge west of the pass. At 5 a.m., the Russian right had arrived within three or four hundred yards of the position, while the left, which stretched northward along the New Temple ridge, was still at least fifteen hundred yards distant from it. Here the right came under fire from the 30th Regiment, but as the attack was still pressed vigorously, two companies were sent up from the Japanese reserve to the highest point of the ridge which had hitherto been left unoccupied. Another company was hurried forward to reinforce the centre, thus reducing the reserve to a single company. From 5.40 a.m., the fire grew heavier on the Japanese left, and it seemed to the defenders that the enemy were receiving reinforcements, while the appearance of two companies on the heights north of the Hsiao-kao Ling about 6 a.m. showed that so far only the right and centre of the attack had been engaged. The Japanese guns were turned against this fresh enemy, and the Russian attack was brought to a standstill. At 8 a.m., a slight fog, which had somewhat obscured the view hitherto, began to lift and revealed two dense columns of Russians coming up to reinforce the right wing and the left centre respectively. The latter column advanced shoulder to shoulder up the valley between Rocky Hill and the New Temple, offering an ideal artillery target, of which the Japanese gunners were not slow to take advantage. By this time the strength of the Japanese holding the pass had been increased to three regiments, and that of the Russians to four regiments. With these forces the fight continued for another hour, during which neither of the combatants gained any advantage, until, shortly after 9 a.m., the Russians began to withdraw the troops on the left, while those on the right maintained their ground to cover the retreat. Perceiving this movement the Japanese opened fire, rapid and magazine, from guns and rifles, and assuming the offensive took possession of the New Temple and part of the wooded spur to the south. The Russians fell back slowly towards Ta-wan, followed by the 30th Japanese Regiment, which was strengthened at 11 a.m. by the arrival of the 3rd Battalion of the 29th Regiment and the 2nd Cavalry Regiment. The mounted troops left their horses at the Old Temple, and advanced in extended order against some companies which were holding the hill immediately west of Li-chia-pu-tzu. As the main body of the Russians retreated through Chin-chia-pu-tzu to Ta-wan, they came under the fire of the five

companies of the 4th Japanese Regiment, whose movements during the morning have already been described. Nevertheless, the retirement was conducted with almost contemptuous deliberation, and was apparently covered by the fire of the artillery which had taken no part in the attack, for about 2 p.m. a battery near Chin-chia-pu-tzu opened upon the 1st Battalion of the 16th Regiment on the Hsiao-kao Ling with considerable accuracy. The Japanese retired quickly, and had the gunners then turned their attention to the 30th Regiment, which was offering a tempting target on the ridge west of the wood, they might have inflicted severe loss. A part of the Russian rearguard also occupied the high ground just north of Chin-chia-pu-tzu, and exchanged shots with the pursuers until about 4.20 p.m. when the engagement ceased.


Passing now to the extreme right of the Japanese line, the officer commanding the 16th Regiment at Hsia-ma-tang was informed by telephone of the Russian movement against the Hsin-kai Ling, and at once warned the companies on outpost duty that a general attack was possible. Several hours passed and, at 8 a.m., the 6th Company, which was on the Hsiao-ku-chia-tzu road, was attacked by eight companies* of Russian infantry who had made a long night march from the valley of the Lan Ho. For an hour this single Japanese company held its own against greatly superior numbers until, at 9 a.m., two more companies of the same battalion arrived from Hsia-ma-tang. The position was still critical, for the regimental commander had been deprived of his 1st Battalion which he had been ordered to send to the Hsiao-kao Ling, and he had no further reserves in hand. Fortunately for the Japanese, this battalion was replaced by the 2nd Battalion of the 29th Regiment, which arrived at 1.30 p.m. from the general reserve of the division. The forces were now approximately equal, and after some very sharp fighting the Russians were finally repulsed at 4.30 p.m.

Still further north, the company on outpost duty on the Chiao-tou road was attacked at 11.50 a.m. by eight Russian companies and a squadron of cavalry,* which came up from the direction of Hsiao-ku-chia-tzu, and was driven back upon its prepared line of resistance. There it was joined by a company of engineers sent up from the divisional reserve at Lien-shan-kuan. The attack was not pushed with much determination in this quarter and, at 12.40 p.m., the Russians began to withdraw.

Thus all the four attacking columns had been beaten with a loss in killed and wounded of one thousand officers and men. Including the 1st Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division (eight battalions), at least eighteen and a half Russian battalions had been employed in this reconnaissance. On the other hand, the Japanese had brought into action nearly all the infantry of the 2nd Division, the divisional cavalry, one battery of artillery, and a company of engineers; their casualties amounted to four officers and sixty-eight men killed, and fifteen officers and two hundred

* These are estimates of the Russian strength taken from Japanese sources; they agree very closely with the actual strength given on p. 102.

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and seventy men wounded, or little more than one-third of the losses they had inflicted on their assailants.

Whether the results achieved and the information gained were commensurate with the sacrifices made, can only be known to those in the councils of the Russian commander-in-chief, but General Nishi had been compelled to use a part, at least, of all the units under his command, and this should certainly have revealed the position of the 2nd Japanese Division, and done something to dispel the uncertainty which existed at Liao-yang.

On the date upon which the Russian attack against the Mo-tien Ling took place, the 12th Japanese Division was still only a few

The 12th Japanese Division.	miles west of Sai-ma-chi. This division suffered even more than the others from bad roads, and, until the 15th July, in spite of liberal pecuniary inducements,* could not procure sufficient local transport
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to enable it to resume the march, which had been interrupted by the heavy rain. At length by dint of great exertions, these difficulties were overcome; 12,000 military coolies were employed to accompany the advance on this one short piece of road, and on the 18th July the leading brigade, the 23rd, reached the neighbourhood of Chiao-tou.† This village, which was still in the hands of the Russians under Major-General Gershelmann, was of considerable importance, for it lay on the main route to Liao-yang by way of An-ping and close to a good road which, after crossing the Tai-tzu River, leads through Pen-hsi-hu to the Mukden highway. Moreover, until it had been captured, the Second and Guard Divisions could not safely cross the Lan Ho, for their right flank open to attack.

The strategical value of this point had been recognized by General Rennenkampf, who at the end of June had entrusted its defence to Major-General Shatilov with a mixed force, which consisted of the 23rd East Siberian Rifles, the 1st Argun Cossack Regiment and some old mountain guns, while the remainder of the Cossack Brigade retired by Tao-ting-shan to Hsiao-hsi-erh.‡ When the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment was replaced by the 2nd Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division, General Rennenkampf attempted to make his way from Hsiao-hsi-erh by Fan-chia-pu-tzu to Chiao-tou. On the 13th July, when north of Fan-chia-pu-tzu he came unexpectedly upon two companies of Japanese infantry, and a smart action ensued during which the Russians lost about 100 men and General Rennenkampf was wounded. The command of the cavalry then devolved upon Major-General Liubavin, who retired to Hsiao-hsi-erh. About the same date the 2nd Daghestan Cavalry Regiment, 11th (Pskov) Regiment, and half a battery of artillery belonging to the 3rd Infantry Division, of the XVIIIth

* 12 to 16 *sen* (3*d.* to 4*d.*) was paid for every *ri* (2½ miles) over which 2 *to* (about 60 lbs.) of rice were carried. A carter could thus earn 30 *yen* (£3) a day. Free rations were also issued for men and animals.

† This action is called Sihoyen in most of the foreign accounts which have been published.

‡ This force was at first under Colonel Grekov and was usually known as "Grekov's Detachment."

Army Corps, were sent from Mukden* to reinforce the garrison of Pen-hsi-hu, which already consisted of one battalion of the 1st Siberian Infantry Regiment and two Frontier Guard guns.

To return to the 12th Japanese Division, a reconnaissance revealed the fact that the Russians were present in force, and

The Russian position at Chiao-tou. that they were in position west of the village at a point where the valley, through which the road to Liao-yang runs, narrows until it becomes a defile about one-and-a-half miles in breadth, blocked by

a long, low spur, thrust out eastward from the mountains on the southern side. Across the southern front and round the end of the spur, through a gap between it and the mountains on the north of the valley, runs the Hsi River. Shortly before it enters the gap this stream is joined by another coming from the direction of Sai-ma-chi. Both streams are generally fordable, and their shelving banks afford no cover. The spur at its northern extremity stands about sixty feet above the Hsi Ho, but where it issues from the main range on the south of the valley it rises to a height of about three hundred feet above the plain.

The Russian left and centre held the spur, along the crest of which were deep and narrow shelter trenches with good communication to the rear; while the right, which for the most part was not entrenched, was placed on the slopes of the high ground bordering the south side of the valley. Pits had been prepared for twice as many guns as actually took part in the action, but the ground for nearly a mile in front of them was dead. Moreover, the millet crop on the plain east of the spur had attained a height sufficient to cover to some extent the approach of an enemy. The line of retreat ran westward through a well-marked defile for about three miles, and the whole position was commanded, at a distance of something under a mile, from a hill to the east. The southern and western faces of this height were very precipitous, but from the other directions the ascent presented no serious difficulties, yet the tactical advantage which might have been derived from it does not seem to have been realized by the attack.

While Major-General Kigoshi, commanding the 23rd Brigade, was examining the Russian position, the commander of a battalion

Action of the Japanese advanced guard. of the 46th Regiment, which formed the advanced guard, observing that the enemy was showing signs of falling back, pushed forward to keep touch with him. His action proved to be some-

what hasty, and the Japanese soon became seriously involved† and were forced to retire to a sunken ditch near Chiao-tou, where, the advanced guard, supported by a battalion of the 24th Regiment, continued to fight till 9 p.m. During the night the remainder of the 12th Division took up position and prepared to carry out their commander's plan for again attacking the Russians, whose force consisted of seven battalions of the 2nd Brigade of the 9th Infantry

* These troops, and the garrison of Pen-hsi-hu were under the command of Colonel Grulev.

† The battalion of the 46th Regiment which was engaged on the 18th July lost 247 killed and wounded.

Division, the 1st Argun Cossack Regiment, thirty-two field and seven mountain guns, under General Gershelmann. The 23rd Brigade, less one battalion of the 24th Regiment, was ordered to advance against the Russian left and centre, while the 14th Regiment of the 12th Brigade, in conjunction with a detachment sent by the 2nd Division, was to operate against the right. Of the remainder of the infantry of the 12th Division, two companies of the 24th Regiment were to form the reserve, while two other companies of the same corps and the 47th Regiment of the 12th Brigade were placed on the road to Pen-hsi-hu, in positions where they could oppose a possible hostile movement of Colonel Grulev's troops which were known to be in that direction.

About 5 a.m. on the 19th, the six mountain batteries of the 12th Division opened fire from two positions, which had been occupied and entrenched before daybreak. The Russian guns replied, and for an hour a heavy duel was maintained in which the well-concealed positions of the Japanese guns gave them the advantage. While the artillery of both sides was thus engaged, the 14th Regiment, which had started on the night of the 18th-19th to carry out its mission of enveloping the Russian right, was slowly making its way in a south-westerly direction. Its route lay through a pathless mountain district difficult to cross on foot, and a scorching sun added to the fatigue of the march. Opposite the front of the Russian position the men of the 23rd Brigade worked their way forward in extended order, advancing rapidly in groups of ten or less, and by the afternoon a considerable number had collected under cover of the village of Chiao-tou, where the development of the flank attack was awaited. By half-past two several of the Russian guns had been withdrawn from the main position on the spur, and as the fire grew momentarily slacker the infantry of the 23rd Brigade, which had maintained an intermittent fire throughout the morning, deployed from the village along a sunken lane. At 3 p.m.,* half of the Japanese batteries moved forward in support of the attack to a position seventeen hundred yards from the Russian trenches, on which a heavy fire was soon directed. At this time the 14th Regiment, after a tedious march of nearly eighteen miles, during which it had lost its way, had come up opposite the Russian right, where it was joined by a small column† from the 2nd Division. The Russian retreat was now threatened, but for some time these troops were held in check by five companies of the 6th (Orel) Regiment and the mountain guns which were protecting the Russian right flank. The time thus gained enabled the Russian commander to withdraw his troops from the main position, and by half-past four many of the defenders had left the trenches. Gradually the stream of fugitives increased, and at 5.10 p.m., the whole Japanese line advanced, and occupied the spur.

Meanwhile the commander of the 14th Regiment, observing

* One account states that about 3 p.m. there was a race, which resulted in favour of the Japanese, to secure the high ground east of the position.

† Six companies of the 16th Regiment from the 2nd Division took part in the action.

that the Russians as they retired were reassembling at a point about three thousand yards behind the line of trenches, decided not to follow up by a direct advance but, without attracting notice, to take position on their flank. Here he retained his troops until the holders of the trenches on the spur were making towards the rear when suddenly he threw himself against them from the south and south-west. This attack came as a surprise, and the Russians being taken at a disadvantage where the ground afforded little cover, suffered heavy loss. Nevertheless, part of their force resisted stubbornly, covering the retirement of the remainder, who fell back in some disorder towards Yu-shu-ling.

The two days' action at Chiao-tou cost the Japanese a loss of 516 of all ranks,* while the Russian losses were nine officers and 350 men killed and wounded. The withdrawal of the guns early in the afternoon of the 19th leads to the conclusion that General Gershelmann intended merely to delay the Japanese advance. If this be so the position which he occupied was not well chosen for that purpose, for, as already mentioned, troops falling back upon Yu-shu-ling would be forced to make their way over open ground exposed to fire for a distance of about three miles. Under such conditions infantry would suffer most, but in spite of this fact, no use appears to have been made of the Cossack regiment, while the field guns, which far outranged the mountain batteries of the Japanese, did little to retard pursuit.

While the main action was in progress the detached force on the Pen-hsi-hu—Mukden road encountered a battalion of infantry and some cavalry. After a skirmish lasting about four hours the Russians retired to the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, with a loss of one killed and thirteen wounded. The Japanese had seventeen men wounded.

By this success the First Army at last succeeded in straightening out its line, and all three divisions were now in favourable positions for the direct advance upon Liao-yang.

During the ten days following the action at Chiao-tou, the main positions of the Japanese troops remained unchanged, but on the 20th July, General Kuropatkin was further strengthened by the arrival at Liao-yang of the leading troops of the 3rd Infantry Division, belonging to the XVIIth Army Corps commanded by Lieutenant-General Bilderling. On the following day the Russian commander-in-chief returned to Liao-yang from Mukden, and at once announced that the Xth Corps, under his personal direction, was to move out against General Kuroki's army.† The 22nd July was employed in handing over outposts and garrison duties to the XVIIth Corps, and on the 23rd General Sluchevski started for An-ping, where he was to be joined by the 1st Brigade of the 9th Division and by the 121st Infantry

* Killed 1 officer and 68 men, wounded 19 officers and 428 men.

† The exact object of this movement is not clear. General Kuropatkin had formed no definite plan for a vigorous offensive, but apparently his intention was to attack the right of the First Army should a favourable opportunity arise.

Regiment. The troops which had taken part in the battle of Chiao-tou had already retired to Ku-hsia-tzu where they had been joined by the Terek-Kuban Cavalry Regiment, and thus the only remaining units of the Xth Corps which were available to accompany General Sluchevski were the 122nd Regiment of the 31st Division, and one regiment of Orenburg Cossacks.

From Liao-yang to Ku-hsia-tzu is a march of about twenty-five miles, and the whole of the Xth Corps, with the exception of the 2nd Brigade of the 31st Infantry Division and three regiments of cavalry, were concentrated on the 24th on the Lan Ho, with outposts on the Shih Shan Ridge overlooking Yu-shu-ling. Guarding the road from Mukden, and threatening the right flank of the Japanese 12th Division, was General Liubavin's cavalry, which had joined Colonel Grulev's detachment in Pen-hsi-lu. Six regiments of cavalry and very nearly two whole divisions of infantry under General Kuropatkin in person, were now massed against the Japanese right, but it was decided that no attack could be delivered, as the information about the enemy was not sufficiently definite. In this way four valuable days were wasted, and it was not until the 29th July that any further move was made. On that date the 122nd Regiment was pushed out to Fu-chia Shan, which was held by a Japanese outpost too weak to offer any resistance, and on the same evening General Sluchevski* issued the following orders for the 30th and 31st (see map II/9):—

Offensive
movement of
Xth Russian
Corps against
12th Japanese
Division.

General
Sluchevski's
orders.

General Sluchevski* issued the following orders for the 30th and 31st (see map II/9):—

La-kou-ling, 29th July, 1904.†

The enemy's advanced guard, strength about one infantry brigade with 18 guns and 6 squadrons, has occupied Chiao-tou. His main body is reported to be concentrated east of Chiao-tou. In the event of the enemy attacking, the army corps will come into action upon the heights to the east of the village of Men-chia-pu.

Advanced Guard.—Lt.-Gen. Mau.

1st Brigade, 31st Infantry Division	...	...	7½ battalions.
31st Artillery Brigade	...	...	40 guns.
1st Argun Cossack Regiment	...	...	1 squadron.
6th Engineer Battalion	...	...	1 company.

1. The advanced guard will engage the enemy on the line now occupied by its outposts; that position must therefore be held in sufficient force, and will be fortified without delay.

Main Body.—Maj.-Gen. Gershelmann

1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division	...	...	7 battalions.
9th Artillery Brigade	...	...	40 guns.
1st East Siberian Mountain Battery	...	...	5 guns.
1st Argun Cossack Battery	...	...	1 squadron.
6th Engineer Battalion	...	...	1 company.

2. The main body will take up a position as follows:—

a. 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division (33rd Elets and 2 Battalions 34th Syev Regiments) east of La-kou-ling.

* General Kuropatkin had returned to Liao-yang on receiving news of General Zarubaiev's retreat from Ta-shih-chiao.

One account states that General Kuropatkin's final orders to General Sluchevski were, that if the Japanese attempted to advance by Pen-hsi-hu he was to attack with the utmost vigour; if they advanced on Liao-yang he was to oppose them to the last.

† von Tettau, *Eighteen Months with the Russians in Manchuria*, vol. i, p. 732.

- b. The artillery, escorted by one battalion of the Syev Regiment, near Tun-chia-pu.

Right Flank Detachment.—Maj.-Gen. Martson.

2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division	...	...	8 battalions.
9th Artillery Brigade	...	...	8 guns.
1st East Siberian Mountain Battery	...	...	2 guns.
Terek-Kuban Cavalry Regiment	...	...	2 squadrons.
1st Argun Cossack Regiment	...	...	$\frac{1}{2}$ squadron.
6th Engineer Battalion	...	...	1 company.

Left Flank Detachment.—Maj.-Gen. Grekov.

34th Syev Regiment	...	...	1 battalion.
1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment	...	...	5 squadrons.
1st Argun Cossack Regiment	...	...	1 squadron.

3. The Right Flank Detachment will cover work being carried out for the improvement of the road Li-pi-yu—Nan-shan, and will secure the right flank of the army corps with which it will maintain close touch on its left. It will also maintain touch with Count Keller's force on its right.

4. The Left Flank Detachment will cover the left flank of the army corps near the village of Liu-hsia-la-tzu,* and will maintain touch with the army corps on its right and with General Liubavin's detachment on its left.

- (5) The Terek-Kuban Cavalry Regiment (4 squadrons) will be in reserve to the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The scout detachment with this regiment will maintain touch with the left flank detachment. Captain Kasanovich's scouts will be placed at the disposal of the O.C. 121st (Pensa)† Infantry Regiment for the purpose of reconnoitring on the right flank and of maintaining touch with the right flank detachment.
- (6) Reports will be sent to the village La-kou-ling.
- (7) The principal dressing station will be established between the pass west of La-kou-ling and the village Ku-chia-tzu.
- (8) Second line transport will be sent back to the village Tun-chia-pu. Each division will detail one company and one section of Cossacks as escort.
- (9) The Artillery Park Brigade‡ will take up a position in front of the village of Ku-hsia-tzu.
- (10) Next for command: Lieutenant-General Mau; Major-General Gershelmann.

The instructions of the Russian commander laid great stress upon the importance of a methodical advance and of fortifying each successive position as it was captured. In this spirit the Xth Corps entered upon its task. The occupation of Fu-chia Shan on the Russian left was followed, on the 30th, by

* North of the Yu-shu Ling map.

† The 121st Pensa Regiment occupied the right section (south of the Yu-shu Ling) of the position allotted to the 1st Brigade, 31st Infantry Division, to which the regiment belongs.

‡ i.e., Ammunition Column.

the occupation of the Western Pien Ling on the right by the 35th Regiment, but no attempt was made to follow up these two successful moves, and in spite of the orders the pass was not entrenched.

So far all had gone well with the Russians, but the concentration of so many troops could hardly be kept secret, and the five days' delay had given General Kuroki ample time to make his arrangements. The possible danger to his right flank, separated as it was from his centre and left by fourteen miles of broken mountainous country, had long been foreseen. Now that it had actually arisen the Japanese commander met it, not by reinforcing the 12th Division, as a less determined man might have done, but by a general attack along his whole twenty miles of front. In preparation for the struggle, General Asada's detachment had been recalled from the neighbourhood of Hsiu-yen, and five battalions of *Kobi* troops had been called up from the line of communication to strengthen the 12th Division.*

The ground over which the battle was about to take place was divided into two distinct sections by an intricate mass of pathless hills, and was traversed throughout its length by the Lan Ho, as it flowed northward to join the Tai-tzu. In the southern section General Kuroki, with the Guard and 2nd Divisions, was opposed to Count Keller with the 3rd and 6th East Siberian Rifle Divisions; in the northern section General Inouye, with the 12th Japanese Division, faced General Sluchevski with the Xth Corps, and General Liubavin with a mixed force of all arms. Taking the former section first,† the position held by Count Keller formed a rough semicircle, of which the centre was the Yang-tzu Ling. Over this pass ran the direct road from

The Russian position at the Yang-tzu Ling.

the Mo-tien Ling, through An-ping, to Liao-yang. About a mile west of the crest line, this road was joined by another, which left the valley of the Lan Ho at the village of Chu-chia-pu-tzu and followed the bed of a steep and narrow gully. These were the two roads which the left of the First Army was compelled to use in the next step of the advance on Liao-yang, and hence the importance of the position. Down from the Yang-tzu Ling runs a small stream which joins the Lan Ho at Ta-wan; as it reaches the low ground the valley narrows gradually until, at the point where it enters the valley of the main river, the heights enclosing it and upon which the Russian troops were placed, are but three hundred yards apart. Just at this point the Russian position presented a sharp salient, beneath which there was an area of dead ground distinctly favourable to the attack. Nevertheless, the heights themselves were so rugged and broken that they could only be scaled with the greatest difficulty; and at one point, upon which a Russian

* For the *Kobi* troops which were present at the battle of Yu-shu Ling, see Appendix J.

† See map II/8. Only 28 field and 4 mountain guns (Russian) took part in this action.

battery was placed, the southern spur dropped in a sheer precipice eighty feet into the bed of the river. But before the shelter of the dead ground could be reached the Japanese troops must cross the valley of the Lan Ho, from five hundred to one thousand yards in width, and during the passage they would be exposed to the full effects of the Russian infantry and artillery fire. The river itself was not a formidable obstacle, since at that season it was not more than two feet deep; but the various valleys running down to it from the Mo-tien Ling were thoroughly commanded by the Russian guns, which were placed in skilfully selected positions about four or five hundred feet above the stream.

South of the main position, and on the far side of the valley up which runs the road from Chu-chia-pu-tzu to An-ping, was another mountain spur which was held as an advanced post by the 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment. At the head of the same valley, a mile further to the west, stood the 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment guarding the approaches from the south and watching for a possible turning movement. The villages in the valley of the Lan Ho were also occupied, but, by a strange oversight, they were not prepared for defence, and the crops were left standing. The position was, therefore, in some respects a strong one, but was suited only to a passive defence for, although means for internal communication had been carefully prepared, it did not lend itself readily to counter-attack.

Twelve miles north of the Mo-tien Ling, General Inouye was facing the Russian Xth Corps.* The position he had taken up was peculiar and merits particular attention. On the 19th July he had gained possession of the ridge at Chiao-tou after a stiff fight. Five miles further west was a second ridge stretching right across the valley of the Hsi Ho from Fu-chia Shan in the north to the Pien Ling in the south. Between these two ridges is a broad and open valley. Into this open stretch of country General Inouye advanced deliberately on the night of the 20th July, and proceeded to construct a deep and solid line of entrenchments in the cultivated plain. At first sight it would appear that there were but two courses open, either to remain on the Chiao-tou position or to advance to the second, or Shih Shan, ridge. But General Inouye thought otherwise, and probably with good reason; for formidable as the Shih Shan is against an attack from the east, it is commanded by heights further west, and could not have been held easily against an attack. Moreover, by entrenching himself in the open he lessened the distance he would have to advance to the assault when the time came, and provided himself with a convenient rallying place should his attack fail.†

Two points remain to be noted. First, that the wings of the Russian army were separated by the valley of the Lan Ho, and were considerably further apart than were those of the Japanese. Secondly, that while General Kuroki held undivided control,

* See map II/9.

† Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any reliable map of the country between Hsia-ma-tang and the Pien Ling.

Count Keller, General Sluchevski, and General Liubavin all acted independently. Thus the Japanese commander, though inferior in strength to his opponents, was in a much better position to manœuvre; and it will be seen that while the attack was a perfectly combined operation, the defence lacked both cohesion and control.

General Kuroki's plan may be summed up as follows:—

General
Kuroki's plan
of attack.

- (1) To turn the enemy's right flank with the Guard Division.
- (2) To hold the troops on the heights about Ta-wan to their positions by demonstrating with the 2nd Division.
- (3) To concentrate detachments from the 2nd and 12th Divisions against the enemy on the Pien Ling.
- (4) To drive in the left of the Xth Corps at the Yu-shu Ling with the remainder of the 12th Division.

To carry out the first of these operations the Guard Division was divided into three columns as follows:—

Left column, under Major-General Asada, to move via Ma-chia-pu-tzu—

3 battalions of infantry less 1 company (2nd Guard Regiment.)

2½ troops of cavalry.

1 battery of field artillery.

½ company of engineers.

Centre column, under Colonel Yamada, to move via the Pa-pan Ling—

3 battalions of infantry (1st Guard Regiment).

3 troops of cavalry.

1 battery of mountain artillery (borrowed from the 12th Division).

¾ company of engineers.

Right Column, under Major-General Watanabe—

5 battalions of infantry.

1½ troops of cavalry.

5 batteries of field artillery.

2 companies of engineers.

Of the right column, three battalions of the 4th Guard Regiment with three field batteries were to march via the Hsin-kai Ling to Ma-kou-men-tzu, while two battalions of the 3rd Guard Regiment and two field batteries were to move via the Li-ho Ling into the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley, by a road which had been made practicable for field guns during the previous afternoon. Divisional Head-Quarters, with the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Guard Regiment in reserve, was to follow the centre column.

The Guard Division left its bivouacs at 9 p.m. on the night of the 30th July. The left column marched all night and well into the following day. By noon it reached a point about two and a half miles north-west of Han-chia-pu-tzu where it found itself confronted by four battalions of the 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment, posted in an extremely strong position. The Japanese were greatly

fatigued by their long march, and beyond a little skirmishing, in which one man was killed, these battalions did nothing for the rest of the day. The field battery which was attached to this column could not accompany it over the very rough ground, and was ordered to return to the mouth of the Pa-pan Ling, where it came into action later.

Meanwhile the centre column advanced into the valley of the Lan Ho under cover of darkness, and when day broke on the morning of the 31st, it found its way barred by two or three companies of Russian infantry which were holding the villages of Ku-chia-pu-tzu and Han-chia-pu-tzu, as well as the hills above them. Aided by their mountain battery the Japanese cleared the villages, and by midday they reached a point a mile and a half north-west of Han-chia-pu-tzu, and less than a mile east of General Asada's detachment. Here they remained throughout the day, under the fire of two Russian batteries, which, however, did not inflict much damage, as the casualties in Colonel Yamada's column amounted only to about sixty.

Although the turning movement of the 1st and 2nd Guard Regiments had failed to produce any great result, it had the effect of simplifying the task of the right column; for the Russians were prevented from reinforcing the troops near Shui-ta-yang-tzu and Chu-chia-pu-tzu. At 7.50 a.m., the two batteries with the 3rd Guard Regiment advanced into the valley of the Lan Ho and engaged the Russian guns south of the Yang-tzu Ling. The Japanese artillery was inferior to that of their enemy both in range and in rapidity of fire, and by 8.20 a.m. the gunners were compelled to leave their guns in position while they themselves took cover, whence they emerged at frequent intervals throughout the day to take part in the action. At 9 a.m., the infantry attack began with the advance of one company of the 2nd Battalion 3rd Guard Regiment, covered by the fire of the remainder of the battalion, against the south side of Shui-ta-yang-tzu. The valley was here about 600 yards wide and covered with crops. The river was crossed successfully and, at 9.30 a.m., the village was entered from the south, but the Russians held on to the northern edge for some time longer. As soon as a lodgment had been effected the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Guard Regiment crossed the valley near Ku-chia-pu-tzu. It then worked its way northward along the face of the hill held by the 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment, until it reached the village of Shui-ta-yang-tzu, where it was joined by the company from the 2nd Battalion which had crossed previously. By 10.30 a.m., the firing line was occupying a spur with its left just below the crest of the main position, where it was sheltered from the Russian artillery, and was supported by the fire of the three remaining companies of the 2nd Battalion, which were still on the east side of the valley.* The men were exhausted by their

* These three companies did not move from their original position until midnight, when they crossed the river and found that the Russians had retired.

exertions, for the heat was very great, and both rest and food were required before the advance could be resumed. During this halt the 3rd Battalion was joined by the mountain battery and by two companies of infantry from the centre column. The mountain guns opened a flanking fire at once on the Russian batteries south of the Yang-tzu Ling, and claim to have put three guns out of action. About the same time, 11.50 a.m., four guns of the battery which had been sent back from the left column came into action just north of the village of Ku-chia-pu-tzu, and shelled the ridge which runs north-east towards Chu-chia-pu-tzu. Aided by these reinforcements, the infantry attack was resumed at midday, and the defenders were driven back to the last spur south of the Chu-chia-pu-tzu—An-ping road. The combatants were now holding two spurs connected at their western extremities by the main range of hills, and separated elsewhere only by a deep gully, which varied from two hundred to four hundred yards in width. If the Japanese attempted to cross the main ridge on their left they came at once under fire from the Russian guns; if they attempted to traverse the gully they were met by enfilade fire from the vicinity of Chu-chia-pu-tzu and from the crest line. The shooting of the 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment was very good, and although the Japanese were able to hold their own without difficulty they were quite unable to make any further advance.

During all these hours the commander of the Guard Division had been without news of General Asada's column, and it was not until 3 p.m. that he heard that the turning movement against the Russian right had failed. Without further delay he decided to make a frontal attack with the remaining regiment (the 4th), of his division, supported by the three batteries of artillery which had not yet been in action. His first step was to send three companies from his divisional reserve to strengthen the two battalions on the spur above Shui-ta-yang-tzu, and then, at 4 p.m., two battalions of the 4th Guard Regiment advanced directly against Yang-mulin-tzu. The village was only lightly held, and the Japanese after passing through it succeeded in capturing a knoll some 800 yards further to the south-west about 6 p.m. The defenders, who belonged to the 23rd and 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, then fell back to the main prepared position where they remained until nightfall. This attack by the 4th Guard Regiment owed such success as it achieved largely to the action of the 2nd Division on its right. Until news was received that General Asada's attack had failed, the action of the 2nd Division was confined to an artillery bombardment, directed principally against the Russian batteries north of the Yang-tzu Ling. When, however, it became evident that the Guard Division could make no further progress, the 2nd Division was ordered to move against the heights north of Ta-wan. It will be remembered that four battalions from this Division had already been sent to help the 12th Division against the Xth Russian Corps. Eight battalions were, therefore, all that remained, and of these six were at once sent forward. Two battalions of the 29th Regiment moved south of the Mo-tien Ling—

Yang-tzu Ling road; four more battalions advanced just south of Tien-shui-tien.

Here, as in other parts of the field, the Russian troops made but a feeble attempt to hold their advanced positions, and retired slowly to the main ridge, and the battery which had been posted all day on the spur south-west of Ta-wan moved off shortly after 5 p.m. In other respects this attack also failed to make any real impression, and the troops bivouacked with the full intention of renewing the attack next day. But although the Russians had held their own successfully throughout a long day, they had suffered a heavy loss through the death of their gallant commander, Count Keller, who was killed about 2 p.m. He was succeeded in the command by Major-General Kashtalinski, who decided to abandon the field, a course which hardly seems to have been necessitated by the tactical situation at the close of the fighting on the 31st. Up to the present there has been no Russian account of this action, but as far as can be gathered the defenders had employed only the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division. Another whole division, the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, had been held in reserve, while the Japanese had but two battalions which had not yet been committed to the attack. It is, however, possible that General Kashtalinski may have been influenced by information of the Russian retirement from Hsi-mu-cheng in front of the Fourth Japanese Army, and by the result of the fighting at the Yu-shu Ling, where the Xth Corps had been very roughly handled.

It will be remembered that the 35th Regiment, belonging to 2nd Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division, occupied the Pien Ling (W) on the 30th July. Later, it was reinforced by the remainder of the brigade, a battery of field artillery, two mountain guns, two and a half squadrons of cavalry, and one company of engineers; the whole under the command of Major-General Martson. At the Pien Ling, this force, which was known as the right flank detachment, was in a position to block two roads which cross the mountains lying between the Hsi Ho and the Lan Ho, and to guard the right flank of the main body on the Shih Shan and Fu-chia Shan heights. Moreover, had the Russian advance been continued it might have been able to interpose between the right and centre of General Kuroki's army. The brigade was, therefore, in a good position strategically; but it was somewhat isolated and had not taken the precaution to entrench itself. For this neglect it was to pay dearly. The existence, but not the strength, of the detachment was known to the Japanese, and General Kuroki decided to concentrate against it four battalions from his 2nd Division, and such troops as could be spared from the 12th Division.

In accordance with this plan, five battalions of infantry, a mountain battery,* and a squadron of cavalry, under Major-General Sasaki, left their bivouac near Chiao-tou at 3.30 a.m.

* One account says that this was a Guard *Kobi* battery, which had joined the 12th Division in place of the mountain battery sent to the central column of the Guard Division.

on the 31st July. At 6.30 a.m., this column came into contact with three companies of the 35th Regiment posted just north of the Eastern Pien Ling. As soon as the Japanese battery opened fire the Russians retired to the Western Pien Ling, which was held by two battalions of the 35th Regiment and eleven companies of the 36th Regiment. At 7.30 a.m., the Japanese commander, who was still ignorant of the numbers opposed to him, sent forward one battalion to the attack. For some reason General Martson's guns were still in the neighbourhood of Li-pi-yu, and were consequently unable to reply; with the result that when the Japanese battery again came into action, about 8 a.m., it was free to devote its attention to the infantry. Being without artillery, General Martson replied by bringing up his reserve (4 companies of the 35th Regiment and 5 companies of the 6th Regiment) and attempting to envelop the Japanese left. In this he was unsuccessful. The Japanese held their own on the threatened flank and, supported by their artillery, they pressed the attack vigorously against the Russian left. By 11 a.m. the Russian troops holding the hills north of the pass had been defeated, and finding his retreat endangered, not only by General Sasaki but also by General Okasaki coming up from the south, General Martson gave orders for a retreat.

As the retiring Russians passed down the narrow defile to Li-pi-yu they were caught in flank by the troops which had been detached from the 2nd Division. Leaving their camp at Hsia-ma-tang at 1.30 a.m., these four battalions had marched all night through very difficult country. By 8 a.m., General Okasaki was sufficiently close to the field of action to form some idea of what was going on, and instead of joining General Sasaki he preferred to move westward to a position whence he could command the Russian line of retreat. In this he was perfectly successful, and a heavy fire was poured into the retreating column at close range. In places the path was so narrow that the Russians could not move more than four abreast, and so steep were the hill-sides that they were quite unable to deploy for attack, or to make any effective reply to the Japanese fire. In this short space the losses suffered amounted to five or six hundred killed and wounded, and the remainder of the column was only saved by the arrival of four squadrons of the Terek-Kuban Cavalry Regiment which appeared on the heights above Li-pi-yu. These fresh troops checked the Japanese advance with rifle and machine gun fire until 2 p.m., when General Martson's troops had succeeded in reaching the Lan Ho, where orders were received from General Sluchevski to "occupy the heights right and left of Li-pi-yu at any cost." General Martson felt compelled to reply that his troops were quite worn out, and were unable to protect the flank of the main body. They were therefore replaced by two battalions of the 33rd Infantry Regiment and were withdrawn to La-kou-ling, where they remained in reserve.

While General Okasaki had thus been completing the work of defeating the Russian right flank detachment, General Sasaki had turned northward against the 121st (Pensa) Regiment, which was holding the southern flank of the Russian position about Yu-shu Ling. But the ground was too intricate even for infantry and this movement had practically no effect upon the fight between the main bodies of the Xth Corps and the 12th Japanese Division, which must now be described.

The disposition of General Sluchevski's Corps has already been given in his orders for the 30th and 31st July.* The Japanese

The Japanese force detailed for the capture of the Pien Ling, consisted of General Kigoshi's brigade, one battalion of General Sasaki's brigade, four mountain batteries, one field battery,† three squadrons of cavalry, and five battalions of *Kobi* troops. Of the above, the cavalry supported by the *Kobi* troops, was

employed on the right flank, watching the detachment under General Liubavin known to be about Pen-hsi-hu. The duty of attacking the position was entrusted to General Kigoshi, and the only general reserve retained was the single battalion of General Sasaki's brigade.

At 4 a.m. on the 31st July, General Kigoshi's brigade advanced to the attack. The 24th Regiment moved south of the Hsi Ho, against the Russian right on the Shih Shan ridge; while the commander of the 46th Regiment sent one battalion against Fu-chia Shan, one against the height marked 500', and kept one battalion in reserve. The 24th Regiment occupied Lien Shan without opposition, but between that point and the Russian position at Shih Shan was an open valley, over which it was not thought advisable to advance until General Sasaki, after defeating the brigade at the Pien Ling, should be able to turn the right of the main position. For reasons which have already been given, this assistance was not forthcoming, and the 24th Regiment took no further part in the action.

North of the river, the battalion which was advancing directly against Fu-chia Shan reached the foot of the hill under cover of darkness. There the men were able to lie down, in a convenient area of dead ground, while waiting for the development of the attack upon their right. As day broke the camp of the 122nd (Tambov) Regiment, which lay below hill 500', was alarmed by the sound of firing to the east. Such men as could be collected at once hurried up to the high ground, some making for hill 500' and others for Fu-chia Shan. The latter party was successful, but the former party found itself forestalled by the Japanese, who had surprised

* The orders to the advanced guard were not carried out in their entirety, as only 2 batteries (16 guns) were brought up to Shih Shan. The remainder of the artillery (64 field and 5 mountain guns) remained near Tun-chia-pu. One account places 3 batteries on Shih Shan.

† It may have been this field battery which was lent to the 12th Division in exchange for the mountain battery sent to the Guard Division. See footnote p. 116.

a picquet a few hundred yards from the main position. A sharp fight ensued, but the Russians were slowly driven back into their camp, which then offered a splendid target to the Japanese riflemen. Notwithstanding the disadvantage at which they had been taken, there was no panic among the Russian soldiers, and most of those who had not joined in the attempt to seize the hills, as well as three companies of the 121st Regiment sent across the river, were soon in position on the next ridge to the west, whence they covered the retreat of the Tambov Regiment. Some of the Japanese now began to make their way along the neck which connects the hill they had taken with Fu-chia Shan, and at the same time the battalion which had been waiting at the foot of the hill began to scale the height. The position was strong, and the attacking infantry made little progress, but as the light improved the Japanese gunners near Chin-chia-pu-tzu were able to realize what was going on, and at once opened fire upon the hill. The Russian guns replied from Shih Shan, but their fire was not very effective, as difficulty was experienced in locating the position of the Japanese artillery. Nevertheless, it was not until 8.30 a.m. that the defenders were forced to retire to hill 300', and even then the Japanese found that the crest of Fu-chia Shan was swept so effectively from Shih Shan by rifle and artillery fire that they were compelled to remain under cover on the eastern slopes. The artillery advanced to a second position, but no further infantry attack was attempted either against hill 300' or against the Shih Shan Ridge.

At 10 a.m., General Sluchevski reinforced his left with two battalions from the reserve, one belonging to the 33rd and one to the 34th Infantry Regiment. About the same time General Inouye sent up his reserve battalion to strengthen his front line, but from noon until 3 p.m. there was a pause in the fighting, due entirely to the great heat. When the battle was resumed Colonel Klembovski, who was in command of the Russian troops on hill 300', asked for further reinforcements, and another battalion of the 34th Regiment was sent to his assistance; but as no further attack was made by either side the struggle resolved itself into a simple fire fight, and when night fell the troops were occupying the positions they had held since 9 a.m. Gradually the firing ceased, and the Japanese bivouacked, like their comrades of the 2nd and Guard Divisions, with every intention of renewing the battle on the morrow. With this object gun-pits were constructed on Fu-chia Shan, but the labour proved unnecessary, as General Sluchevski felt that he was not sufficiently strong to continue the fight, and retired to a second position which had been prepared near Tun-chia-pu. In adopting this course, he was influenced partly by the disaster at Pien Ling, partly by a false report* received from his cavalry that Japanese

The
Russian
retreat.

* This report is remarkable since the left flank of the Xth Corps should have been rendered perfectly secure by the presence of General Liubavin's detachment. Beyond making two very feeble threats against the Japanese right, this detachment took no part in the fight and did not influence the result in any way.

infantry and artillery were turning his left, and partly by the retirement of the "Eastern Force" from the Yang-tzu Ling on his right. The retreat was carried out in good order, covered by a rear guard of ten battalions and two batteries under General Riabinkin stationed on the heights about Li-pi-yu.

This rear-guard was attacked by General Okasaki on the morning of the 1st August, but, after performing its task successfully, it also withdrew in good order across the Lan Ho.

Thus, although the Russians suffered no serious reverse, except at the Pien Ling, the battle had resulted in a victory for the Japanese at all points. The First Army succeeded in advancing twelve miles on the road towards Liao-yang, and gained possession of the valley of the Lan Ho. Moreover, owing to the slaughter at the Pien Ling, the losses sustained by the attack were very much less than those inflicted upon the defence.* In the Xth Corps alone 2,000 of all ranks were killed, wounded, or missing, while the casualties of the 12th Japanese Division amounted only to 12 officers and 424 non-commissioned officers and men. On the left wing the Japanese losses were under 550, and those of the Russian "Eastern Force" were less than 400. These successes, however, were not followed up, and by the 2nd August the Xth Corps was concentrated on the line An-ping Ling—Kung-chang Ling, where it came in touch with the "Eastern Force" on the heights north-east of Lang-tzu-shan. For the next three weeks the Japanese and Russian forces remained facing one another, separated by only six miles of mountainous country. During this period the "Eastern Force" was renamed the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, and, together with the Xth and XVIIth Corps, was placed under the command of General Baron Bilderling, who was entrusted with the defence upon the "Eastern Front."

* See Appendix I.

CHAPTER XII.

SUMMARY OF EVENTS 1ST MAY—22ND AUGUST, 1904.

As the result of the operations which had taken place during the months of May, June, and July, the Russian Forces had been pushed back to within sixteen miles of Liao-yang, and at the beginning of August they were occupying an extended position east, south, and south-west of that town. They were divided into two main groups, the Eastern and the Southern, under Generals Bilderling and Zarubaiev, who also commanded the XVIIth (European), and the 4th Siberian Army Corps respectively. The 2nd Brigade of the 31st Infantry Division now joined the Xth Corps and formed the extreme left of the Eastern Group on the north bank of the Tai-tzu Ho; while the extreme right of the group was drawn back west of Lang-tzu-shan to Hsiao-hsi-kou on the Hsi-ta Ho. The greater part of the Southern Group was in a strongly fortified position at An-shan-chan with its left at Ku-san-tzu. The gap of twelve and a half miles between these two bodies of troops was watched by General Mischenko's cavalry brigade which had its Head-Quarters at the Miao Ling until the 19th August, when it was withdrawn to Liao-yang to rest the men and horses after their exertions in the field, and was replaced by two mixed detachments under Major-General Tolmachev and Colonel Count Troubetskoi.*

At the same date the Japanese forces also formed two main groups, which were separated by over thirty miles of very mountainous country. On the right, General Kuroki with the First Army had established himself on the Lan Ho with his left about Ta-wan and his right division within twenty-five miles of Liao-yang. Thirty-five miles south-west of that town the Second and Fourth Armies were holding a line from Niu-chuang village to Fei-shun with a small detachment pushed out north-east to Tieh-shan-tun. The 1st Japanese Cavalry Brigade was watching the left of the Second Army, while the communications of the First Army were protected by the Guard *Kobi* Brigade under Major-General Umesawa

* The composition of these detachments was :—

General Tolmachev's—

2 battalions, 19th E.S.R. Regiment.

5 squadrons, Orenburg Cossack Regiment.

Count Troubetskoi's—

4 squadrons, 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment

1 battalion, 19th E.S.R. Regiment.

1 battalion, 20th E.S.R. Regiment.

$\frac{1}{2}$ 1st Battery, 5th E.S.R. Artillery Brigade (4 guns).

at Chiao-tou. Two other *Kobi* battalions were at Cheng-chang, and a small detachment was holding Hsiao-hsi-erh. These reserve troops were rendered especially important by the presence of General Liubavin's Cossacks who were now at San-chia-tzu with an outpost pushed forward to Pei-ling-pu-tzu, and of the garrison of Pen-hsi-hu under Colonel Grulev. Still further east on the crest of the Ta Ling was the detachment under Colonel Madritov,* with an observation post at Ching-ho-cheng, watching the road from Cheng-chang to Mukden.

For the next three weeks these positions remained practically unchanged, but during this time the work on the lines of communication was very heavy. Advanced depots for the First Army were established at Chiao-tou, Lien-shan-kuan, and Tung-fang-liu-ho, and by the 15th August reserve supplies sufficient for seven days, in addition to the eight days' rations on divisional charge, had been accumulated. Meanwhile the base of the Second Army was shifted to Ying-kou as soon as the Liao River could be cleared of mines, but the line of communication of the Fourth Army still ran from Ta-ku-shan through Hsiu-yen. The final advance on Liaoyang was to have begun on the 18th August, but the Japanese plans were again interfered with by very heavy rain which fell from the 14th to the 17th. The rivers came down in flood, and all the bridges were destroyed; during the 17th and 18th the Russian troops on the "Eastern Front" were completely cut off from Liaoyang, but the inconvenience caused to the Japanese was considerably less than had been the case in June, and it is more than probable that the real cause of inaction was a natural desire to await the result of the attacks on Port Arthur, which were made during the concluding days of July and continued throughout the following month.

During this period the 11th *Kobi* Brigade arrived from Japan, and the Russian Army was increased by the arrival of the 5th Siberian Army Corps which began to detrain at Mukden on the 10th August; but except for two small reconnaissances, one on either flank, no active operations were undertaken. On the 6th August, a Russian force bombarded and burned the village of Ken-chuang-tzu, driving back some troops of the Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade and capturing some pack animals. The Russians followed the Japanese to about three miles south-east of Ken-chuang-tzu and then withdrew. On the same day General Liubavin, who had left San-chia-tzu on the 5th with the 2nd Nerchinsk and 2nd Argun Cossack Regiments and a battery of artillery, was repulsed in front of Cheng-chang by some Japanese infantry estimated at two battalions. A few days later Colonel Madritov's post at Ching-ho-cheng was fired upon by Japanese, and although these events were of no real importance they served to maintain the anxiety as to the possibility of a Japanese advance upon Mukden.

This, therefore, was the position of affairs immediately before the resumption of the active operations which ended in the battle

* This detachment had been strengthened by the addition of one battalion of the 2nd (Chita) Infantry Regiment.

of Liao-yang. But, although the situation was at last comparatively clear, it is important to note two mistakes which were made in the Russian estimate of the strength of the Japanese armies. The 9th Division which was in front of Port Arthur was believed to be with the First Army, and the 8th Division which was still in Japan was believed to be with the Fourth Army.

Here the troops under Generals Kuropatkin and Oyama may be left for the present, but before reviewing the operations which took place between the battles of the Ya-lu and Liao-yang it will be well to state briefly the events which had occurred elsewhere.

On the 24th May, the 11th Japanese Division began to disembark in Yen-tai Bay, whence it marched to join the 1st Division in front of Port Arthur and formed the nucleus of the Third Army.

On the 27th May, Admiral Togo established the blockade of the south end of the Liao-tung Peninsula.

On the 30th May, Dalny was occupied by the Japanese.

On the 11th June, Ying-kou was blockaded by the Japanese.

On the 14th June, the *Novik* and ten destroyers drove off the Japanese Third Destroyer Flotilla. On the same date the *Novik* and two gunboats bombarded the left flank of the Japanese Third Army near Dalny for about forty minutes.

On the 15th June the Vladivostok squadron encountered the Japanese transports *Izumi Maru*, *Hitachi Maru* and *Sado Maru*. The two first named were sunk, and the third was disabled. On board the *Hitachi Maru* were 1,100 men of the Guard *Kobi* Brigade.

On the 18th June, a Russian flotilla from Port Arthur again bombarded the left flank of the Japanese Third Army.

On the 23rd June, the Russian fleet steamed out of Port Arthur, but returned without bringing on a battle. (See footnote p. 52).

On the 26th June, the Japanese Third Army made the first advance from the line they held since the occupation of Dalny, and captured Ken Shan.

On the 30th June, a Russian torpedo boat flotilla from Vladivostok appeared off Gensan, sank a steamer and fired on some Japanese troops.

On the 1st July, the Japanese Second Squadron sighted the Vladivostok squadron in the Tsushima Straits and pursued. The Russians extinguished their lights and escaped.

On the 3rd July, the Russians from Port Arthur began a series of land attacks on the Japanese positions, which continued until the 5th.

On the 6th July, Marshal Oyama left Tokio for the front and went to Kai-ping, where he remained until the 22nd August when his Head-Quarters were moved to Hai-cheng.

On the 15th July, the Japanese 9th Division began to disembark at Dalny. By the 23rd July both the 9th Division and the 1st *Kobi* Brigade had landed. The 9th Division took position in front of Port Arthur between the 1st and the 11th Divisions.

Between the 26th and 31st July, the Japanese drove the Russians out of the positions they had occupied since the 5th July, thus completing the close investment of Port Arthur.

On the 7th and 8th August, the Japanese captured the Russian advanced posts on Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan, thus opening the way for a general attack on the north-east front of the fortress.

On the 10th August, the Russian fleet made a sortie from Port Arthur, and was attacked by Admiral Togo about 1 p.m. From 4 p.m. to 8 p.m. the engagement was at its height.

On the 11th August the *Retvisan*, *Sevastopol*, *Peresveit*, *Poltava*, and *Pallada* returned to Port Arthur, the first four badly damaged. The *Tsarevich* and three destroyers went to Kiao-chao.

On the 14th August, the Vladivostok squadron left the harbour and steamed southward towards Port Arthur, but was encountered by Admiral Kamimura, and driven back with the loss of the *Kurik*.

On the 14th and 15th August, the Japanese renewed their attacks on Port Arthur, and succeeded in establishing themselves on the height between Hsiao-tung-kou and Nien-pan-kou.

On the 16th August, the Japanese demanded the surrender of Port Arthur.

On the 19th to the 24th August, the Japanese made their first general assault on Port Arthur, which resulted in the capture of East and West Pan-lung Shan, two minor works in the main line of defence. Elsewhere the attack failed.

The attempt to carry the main line of the Port Arthur defences now ceased for a time, and Liao-yang again became the chief centre of interest.

APPENDIX D.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE SECOND JAPANESE ARMY ON THE 26TH MAY, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : General Baron Oku.

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Ochiai.

Commander of Artillery : Major-General Saisho.

Commander of Engineers : Colonel Abe.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
1st Division.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General H.I.H. Prince Fushimi.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Matsumura.				
1st Regiment	3	—	—	—
15th Regiment	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Nakamura.				
2nd Regiment... ..	3	—	—	—
3rd Regiment... ..	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
1st Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
1st Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
1st Battalion	—	—	—	3

ORDER OF BATTLE—*Continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
3RD DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Y. Oshima.				
5th Brigade, Major-General K. Yamaguchi.				
6th Regiment	3	—	—	—
33rd Regiment	3	—	—	—
17th Brigade, Major-General J. Kodama.				
18th Regiment	3	—	—	—
34th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
3rd Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
3rd Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
3rd Battalion	—	—	—	3
4TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Ogawa.				
7th Brigade, Major-General Nishijima.				
8th Regiment	3	—	—	—
37th Regiment	3	—	—	—
19th Brigade, Major-General Ando.				
9th Regiment	3	—	—	—
38th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
4th Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
4th Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—

ORDER OF BATTLE—Continued.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
ENGINEERS.				
4th Battalion	—	—	—	3
CORPS ARTILLERY.				
1st Artillery Brigade, Major-General Uchiyama.				
13th Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
14th Regiment (")	—	—	36	—
15th Regiment (")	—	—	36	—
Total ...	36	9	216	9
To the above total must be added—				
5th Engineer Battalion (of the 5th Division)	—	—	—	3
Total ...	36	9	216	12
From the above total must be deducted—*				
3RD DIVISION.				
34th Regiment	3	—	—	—
3rd Cavalry Regiment	—	2	—	—
3rd Artillery Regiment	—	—	18	—
4TH DIVISION.				
37th Regiment (3rd Battalion)	1	—	—	—
38th Regiment (2nd Battalion)	1	—	—	—
4th Cavalry Regiment	—	2	—	—
Total ...	31	5	198	12

Total combatant strength all ranks about 38,500, of which about 29,500 would be infantry. The Japanese state that the number of bayonets present on their side at this battle was between 30,000 and 31,000.

* The units of the Second Army not present at the battle were attached to the 5th Division, which, with the 1st Cavalry Brigade, was covering the Second Army from the north. The 3rd Battalion, 37th Regiment, was not, however, with the covering force, but is believed to have been in Korea.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE RUSSIAN FORCE AT NAN SHAN ON THE 26TH MAY, 1904.

General Officer Commanding: Major-General Fock (commanding 4th East Siberian Rifle Division).

	Battalions,	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.	Machine Gun Companies.
4TH EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.					1 (8 guns.)
Commander: Major-General Fock.					
1st Brigade, Major-General André de Bui Gingliatt.					
13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—	—
14th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Nadyein.					
15th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—	—
16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.					
4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Batteries (Q.F. field guns) ...	—	—	32	—	—
OTHER TROOPS.					
5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment*	3	—	—	—	1 (8 guns.)
7th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, two batteries (Q.F. field guns)	—	—	16	—	—
ARTILLERY.					
Fortress and old field guns ...	—	—	66	—	—
Total	18	—	114	—	16

The total strength of the Russian force at the battle of Nan Shan is not known, but it was probably somewhat less than 16,000 to 18,000 all ranks, which is the Japanese estimate. Of these only some 3,000 appear to have been engaged.

* The 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, which belonged to the 2nd East Siberian Rifle Division in the Ussuri District, was at Chin-chou at the outbreak of war, and was attached to the Russian Force in the Kuan-tung Peninsula.

† During the war each Russian division included in its organization one machine gun company of 8 guns; it is not known whether two complete companies were present at this engagement, i.e., those of the 2nd and 4th East Siberian Divisions, but 10 guns were captured by the Japanese.

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF NAN SHAN.

Japanese.

Body of Troops.	Killed.			Wounded.			Total.		
	Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.
1st Division	14	202	—	41	1,102	14	55	1,304	14
3rd "	6	161	6	32	1,222	0	38	1,383	6
4th "	8	298	1	38	1,303	0	46	1,601	1
1st Artillery Brigade ...	0	15	11	5	43	5	5	58	16
5th Engineer Battalion...	1	5	0	0	8	0	1	13	0
Total	29	681	18	116	3,678	19	145	4,359	37

Grand total, all ranks, 4,504 killed and wounded.

A later and correct, but less detailed, return gives the losses as follows:—

Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.
31	652	124	3,803	—	3	155	4,458

The later return includes losses at Chin-chou on the night of the 25th—26th May.

The naval losses amounted to 10 of all ranks, and included the commander of the gunboat *Chokai*, who was killed.

Russian.

The losses of the Russians are not known, but the Japanese buried 700 of their dead, and took 23 prisoners. At the time of the retirement from the position, the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment had lost in killed, wounded, and missing 56 per cent. of its officers and 38 per cent. of its rank and file. The Fortress Artillery had 1 officer wounded and 22 men killed and 55 wounded out of a total of 350.

The Russians lost the following war material:—rifles, 365; guns (heavy, 30, light, 52, machine guns, 10); 4 ammunition wagons for guns; and 4 small arm ammunition wagons; rifle ammunition, 416,650 rounds; shells, 8,906; 1 dynamo, and 52 mines and 4 search-light machines. About 300 railway wagons were found at Ta-lien-wan and Dalny.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED AT THE BATTLE OF NAN SHAN.

Japanese.

—			Common Shell (High explosive).	Shrapnel Shell.	Small Arm Ammunition.
1st Division	...	...	450	6,015	667,010
3rd Division	...	...	462	3,249	425,148
4th Division	...	...	806	5,000	1,110,886
1st Artillery Brigade	...	...	2,029	16,036	—
5th Engineer Battalion	...	...	—	—	62
Total			3,747	30,300	2,203,106

Average number of rounds expended :—

Per Rifle.

76

Per Gun.

174.50

In this battle the difficulty of ammunition supply was great, since, on the date on which it took place, only one infantry and one artillery ammunition column had been disembarked. The infantry, therefore, engaged with what the men carried in their pouches and the ammunition in the battalion reserve, or 180 rounds in all, while the artillery had limber ammunition and first and second line wagons or 198 rounds per gun.

Russians.

The ammunition expended by the Russians is not known in full detail. The 5th East Siberian Regiment, however, expended 738,000 rounds, while the Fortress Artillery expended 7,297 rounds, or about 133 rounds per gun.

APPENDIX E.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE SECOND JAPANESE ARMY ON THE 15TH JUNE, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : General Baron Oku,
 Chief of the Staff : Major-General Ochiai.
 Commander of Artillery : Major-General Saisho,
 Commander of Engineers : Colonel Abe.

—					Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
3RD DIVISION.								
Commander : Lieutenant - General Baron Y. Oshima.								
5th Brigade, Major-General K. Yamaguchi.								
6th Regiment					3	—	—	—
33rd Regiment					3	—	—	—
17th Brigade, Major-General J. Kodama.								
18th Regiment					3	—	—	—
34th Regiment					3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.								
3rd Regiment					—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.								
3rd Regiment (field guns)....					—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.								
3rd Battalion					—	—	—	3

ORDER OF BATTLE—*Continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
4TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Ogawa.				
7th Brigade, Major-General Nishijima.				
8th Regiment	3	—	—	—
37th Regiment	3	—	—	—
19th Brigade, Major-General Ando.				
9th Regiment	3	—	—	—
38th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
4th Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
4th Regiment (field guns)....	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
4th Battalion	—	—	—	3
5TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Ueda.				
9th Brigade, Major-General Yamada.				
11th Regiment	3	—	—	—
41st Regiment	3	—	—	—
21st Brigade, Major-General K. Tsukamoto.				
21st Regiment	3	—	—	—
42nd Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
5th Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
5th Regiment (mountain guns)	—	—	36	—

ORDER OF BATTLE—Continued.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
ENGINEERS.				
5th Battalion	—	—	—	3
6TH DIVISION.				
1st Battalion 23rd Regiment	1	—	—	—
CORPS CAVALRY.				
1st Cavalry Brigade, Major-General Akiyama.				
14th Regiment	—	4	—	—
15th Regiment	—	4	—	—
One battery of machine guns	—	—	6	—
CORPS ARTILLERY.				
1st Artillery Brigade, Major-General Uchiyama.				
13th Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
14th Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
15th Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
Total	37	17	216	9

Total combatant strength, all ranks, about 37,500, of which about 30,000 would be infantry; only about half of the 4th Division took part in the battle.

The 14th Artillery Regiment and one battalion from the 4th Artillery Regiment, 56 guns in all, were with the remainder of the 4th Division. It is believed that the 3rd Battalion 37th Infantry Regiment was not present at the battle of Te-li-ssu, being at that time in Korea. The strength given above is that of war establishments, and no deduction has been made for sick or casualties prior to the battle. The 6th Mountain Battery of the 5th Artillery Regiment was attached to the 1st Cavalry Brigade.

In all Russian accounts of the battle of Te-li-ssu, the Japanese are mentioned as having used machine guns. So far as is known the Japanese infantry of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Armies had no machine guns until after the battle of the Sha Ho, but each cavalry brigade had six.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE RUSSIAN FORCE AT TE-LI-SSU ON THE 15TH JUNE, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : Lieutenant-General Baron Stakelberg
(commanding 1st Siberian Army Corps).

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Ivanov.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
1ST SIBERIAN ARMY CORPS.				
1ST EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Gerngross.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Rutkovski.				
1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—
2nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Maksimovich.				
3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—
4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
1st East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, Major-General Luchkarski.				
1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Batteries (Q.F. field guns).	—	—	32	—
9TH EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Kondratovich.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Krauze.				
33rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment....	2	—	—	—
34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment....	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Zikov.				
35th East Siberian Rifle Regiment....	3	—	—	—
36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment....	3	—	—	—

ORDER OF BATTLE—*Continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
ARTILLERY.				
9th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, Major-General Mrosovski.				
1st, 3rd and 4th Batteries (Q. F. field guns) ...	—	—	24	—
CORPS CAVALRY.				
SIBERIAN COSSACK DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Simonov.				
1st Brigade, Colonel Erkovski.				
4th Siberian Cossack Regiment	—	3	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Chirikov.				
5th Siberian Cossack Regiment	—	2	—	—
8th Siberian Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
USSURI CAVALRY BRIGADE : Major - General Samsanov.				
Primorsk Dragoons Regiment	—	6	—	—
Frontier Guard (42nd and 48th Squadrons and two companies).	2 coys.	2	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery.	—	—	6	—
3rd Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery.	—	—	6	—
CORPS ENGINEERS.				
1st East Siberian Sapper Battalion	—	—	—	3
<i>Other Troops.</i>				
3RD SIBERIAN INFANTRY DIVISION.				
9th Tobolsk Regiment	4	—	—	—

ORDER OF BATTLE—*Continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
35TH INFANTRY DIVISION (OF THE XVIIITH ARMY CORPS.)				
2nd Brigade, Major-General Glasko.				
139th Infantry Regiment	4	—	—	—
140th Infantry Regiment	4	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
2nd Division, 35th Artillery Brigade, Colonel Olchovski.				
Two batteries (Q.F. field guns)	—	—	16	—
Frontier Guard Artillery (old pattern mountain guns).	—	—	6	—
Total	35½	19	90	3

The total strength of the above force is not known. It is believed that the infantry battalion did not exceed, on an average, 700 bayonets, which would represent a force of about 25,000 bayonets.

Note.—The 2nd Battery of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade was not present at this battle; only two battalions of the 33rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment were present; only a part of one regiment of the 1st Brigade Siberian Cossack Regiment was present; the other regiment of this brigade is the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment. The other regiments of the Ussuri Cossack Brigade are the 1st Nerchinsk Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment and the Ussuri Cossack Regiment. The former was near Vladivostok, and the latter was with Colonel Madritov.

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF TE-LI-SSU.

Japanese.

Body of troops.	Arms.	Killed.			Wounded.			Total.		
		Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.
3rd Division	Infantry	2	77	—	11	307	3	13	384	3
	Cavalry ...	—	2	1	—	8	—	—	10	1
	Artillery	—	4	20	2	30	35	2	34	55
	Engineers	—	2	—	—	8	—	—	10	—
4th Division	Infantry	1	73	—	14	266	—	15	339	—
	Cavalry ...	—	—	4	—	—	2	—	—	6
	Artillery	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
	Engineers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5th Division	Infantry	4	36	—	10	219	—	14	255	—
	Cavalry ...	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
	Artillery	—	15	—	—	1	—	—	16	—
	Engineers	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	—
1st Cavalry Brigade	Cavalry ...	—	—	—	—	2	4	—	2	4
1st Artillery Brigade	Artillery	—	—	1	6	59	24	6	59	25
	Total ...	7	210	26	43	903	68	50	1,113	94

A later and more correct, but less detailed, return gives the losses as follows :—

Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.
8	198	45	938	—	1	53	1,137

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF TE-LI-SSU—*Continued.**Russians.*

Body of Troops.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.
Staff ...	—	—	2	—	—	—	2	—
1st East Siberian Rifle Div.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1st Regiment ...	5	27	13	206	—	16	18	249
2nd " ...	6	116	11	298	7	310	24	724
3rd " ...	3	123	19	282	3	335	25	740
4th " ...	1	22	6	162	2	39	9	223
Artillery ...	1	15	9	85	—	—	10	100
9th East Siberian Rifle Div.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
33rd Regiment ...	—	23	6	435	—	15	6	473
34th " ...	1	15	2	115	—	4	3	134
35th " ...	—	64	7	226	—	31	7	321
36th " ...	—	34	6	254	—	14	6	302
Artillery ...	1	—	2	30	—	—	3	30
2nd Brig. 35th Infy. Div.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
139th Regiment ...	—	12	7	137	—	7	7	156
140th " ...	—	2	2	49	—	3	2	54
Artillery ...	—	3	4	37	—	—	4	40
3rd Siberian Infantry Div.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
9th Tobolsk Regiment	1	9	1	56	1	1	3	66
CAVALRY.								
4th Sib. Cossack Reg.	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
5th Sib. Cossack Reg.	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	1
Primorsk Dragn. Reg.	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	2
Frontier Guard ...	—	5	—	15	1	—	1	20
Total ...	19	470	98	2,396	14	775	131	3,641

The above table, from Russian sources, accounts for a loss of 131 officers and 3,641 non-commissioned officers and men, and includes 23 officers and 311 non-commissioned officers and men who were killed and wounded on the 14th June. As the Japanese state in their official reports upon the action that the number of Russians buried by them on the field amounted to 2,000 of whom 1,620 fell in front of the 3rd Division, it would appear that the losses given above are far from complete. Moreover, the detachments of the 4th Japanese Division, which surprised a portion of the Russian cavalry near Chiao-chia-tun, inflicted upon it heavy losses, and these are not shown above.

The Japanese took 16 Q.F.* guns in this battle, and in addition, captured 46 ammunition wagons and a large quantity of war material.

* This number is taken from the Japanese official reports, but only 13 Q.F. guns and 4 mountain guns are accounted for in the narrative.

EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION.

Japanese.

The average number of rounds expended per gun amounted to 75, and per rifle to 46. The 5th Brigade, 3rd Division, expended an average of 112·4 rounds per rifle, and the 17th Brigade of the same division expended an average of 521·8 rounds. The latter brigade, however, was engaged in the fighting which took place on the 14th June, the day prior to the battle.

Russians.

No official information regarding the expenditure of ammunition on the Russian side is available. From other sources it appears that three batteries of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade expended the following amounts :—

	Total
2nd Battery, on 14th June, 321 rounds ; on 15th June, 70 rounds	= 391
3rd Battery, on 14th and 15th June	= 883
4th Battery, on 14th June, 440 rounds ; on 15th June, 390 rounds	= 830

APPENDIX F.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE SECOND JAPANESE ARMY AT TA-SHIH-CHIAO ON THE 24TH JULY, 1904

General Officer Commanding : General Baron Oku.

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Ochiai.

Commander of Artillery : Major-General Saisho.

Commander of Engineers : Colonel Abe.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
3RD DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant - General Baron Y. Oshima.				
5th Brigade, Major-General K. Yamaguchi.				
6th Regiment	3	—	—	—
33rd „	3	—	—	—
17th Brigade, Major-General J. Kodama.				
18th Regiment	3	—	—	—
34th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
3rd Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
3rd Regiment (field guns)....	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
3rd Battalion	—	—	—	3
4TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Ogawa.				
7th Brigade, Major-General Nishijima.				
8th Regiment	3	—	—	—
37th Regiment	3	—	—	—
19th Brigade, Major-General Ando.				
9th Regiment	3	—	—	—
38th Regiment	3	—	—	—

ORDER OF BATTLE.—*Continued.*

					Battalions.	Squadrons	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
CAVALRY.								
4th Regiment					—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.								
4th Regiment (field guns)....					—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.								
4th Battalion					—	—	—	3
5TH DIVISION.								
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Ueda.								
9th Brigade, Major-General Yamada.								
11th Regiment					3	—	—	—
41st Regiment					3	—	—	—
21st Brigade, Major-General T. Tsukamoto.								
21st Regiment					3	—	—	—
42nd Regiment					3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.								
5th Regiment					—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.								
5th Regiment (mountain guns)					—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.								
5th Battalion					—	—	—	3
6TH DIVISION.								
Commander : Lieutenant-General Okubo.								
11th Brigade, Major-General S. Iida.								
13th Regiment					3	—	—	—
45th Regiment					3	—	—	—
24th Brigade, Major-General Koidzume.								
23rd Regiment					3	—	—	—
48th Regiment					3	—	—	—

ORDER OF BATTLE—*Continued*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
CAVALRY.				
6th Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
6th Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
6th Battalion	—	—	—	3
CORPS CAVALRY.				
1st Cavalry Brigade, Major-General Akiyama.				
14th Regiment	—	4	—	—
15th Regiment	—	4	—	—
One battery of machine guns	—	—	6	—
CORPS ARTILLERY.				
1st Artillery Brigade, Major-General Uchiyama.				
13th Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
14th Regiment (" ")	—	—	36	—
15th Regiment (" ")	—	—	36	—
Total	48	20	252	12

Total established combatant strength of all ranks was about 60,000, of which about 46,000 were infantry.

It is believed that no *Kobi* brigades were present at the battle of Ta-shih-chiao. It is not known if the 3rd Battalion, 37th Infantry Regiment, had rejoined from Korea before the battle took place. The strength given above is that of war establishments, and no deduction has been made for sick, or for casualties prior to the battle.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE RUSSIAN FORCE AT TA-SHIH-CHIAO, ON THE 24TH JULY, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : Lieutenant-General Zarubaiev.

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Babel.

Commander of Artillery : Major-General Osinov.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
1ST SIBERIAN ARMY CORPS.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Stakelberg.				
Chief of the Staff : Major-General Ivanov.				
1ST EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Gerngross.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Rutkovski.				
1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—
2nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major General Maksimovich.				
3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—
4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
1st East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, Major-General Luchkarski.				
1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Batteries (Q.F. field guns).	—	—	32	—

ORDER OF BATTLE—*Continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
9TH EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Kondratovich.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Krauze.				
33rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—
34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Zikov.				
35th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—
36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
9th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, Major-General Mrosovski.				
1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Batteries (Q.F. field guns)	—	—	32	—
CAVALRY.				
SIBERIAN COSSACK DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Kossakovski.				
1st Brigade.				
4th Siberian Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
2nd Brigade.				
5th Siberian Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
8th Siberian Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
Ussuri Cavalry Brigade.				
Primorsk Dragoons	—	6	—	—
Frontier Guards	—	2	—	—
4 Detachments Mounted Scouts	—	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
2nd Trans-Baikal Horse Artillery Battery	—	—	6	—
3rd Trans-Baikal Horse Artillery Battery	—	—	6	—
ENGINEERS.				
1st East Siberian Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	3

ORDER OF BATTLE—Continued.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
IVTH SIBERIAN ARMY CORPS.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Zarubaiev.*				
Chief of the Staff : Major-General Babel.				
2ND SIBERIAN INFANTRY DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Levestam.				
2nd Brigade, Major-General Oganovski.				
7th Siberian (Krasnoyarsk) Infantry	4	—	—	—
8th Siberian (Tomsk) Infantry	4	—	—	—
3RD SIBERIAN INFANTRY DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Kossovich.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Shileiko.				
9th Siberian (Tobolsk) Infantry	4	—	—	—
10th Siberian (Omsk) Infantry	4	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Baron Rebinder.				
11th Siberian (Semipalatinsk) Infantry	4	—	—	—
12th Siberian (Barnaul) Infantry	4	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
1st Siberian Artillery Brigade				
2nd, 3rd and 4th Batteries	—	—	24	—
CAVALRY.				
Commander : Major-General Mishchenko.				
Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade.				
1st Chita Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
1st Verkhne Udinsk Regiment	—	4	—	—
2nd Brigade, Orenburg Cossack Division : Major-General Tolmachev.				
11th Orenburg Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
12th Orenburg Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
From 1st Brigade Siberian Cossack Division.				
7th Siberian Cossack Regiment ...	—	6	—	—

* Also commanding the army in this battle.

ORDER OF BATTLE—*Continued.*

—			Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
ARTILLERY.						
11th Horse Artillery Battery			—	—	6	—
20th Horse Artillery Battery			—	—	6	—
ENGINEERS.						
4th Battalion East Siberian Engineers (including 5th Telegraph Company).			—	—	—	3
Total			48	54*	112	6

* To these should be added 4 detachments of mounted scouts = 4 officers and 152 men, if at full strength.

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF TA-SHIH-CHIAO.

Japanese.

Body of Troops.	Arms.	Killed.			Wounded.			Total.		
		Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Horses.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.
3rd Division	Infantry	4	67	3	14	275	5	18	342	8
	Cavalry ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Artillery	—	1	1	2	11	8	2	12	9
	Engineer	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	—
	Others	—	—	—	—	3	1	—	3	1
Total ...		4	69	4	16	290	14	20	359	18
4th Division	Infantry	—	5	—	1	57	6	1	62	6
	Cavalry ...	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	Artillery	—	10	11	13	79	72	13	89	83
	Engineer	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Others ...	—	1	—	1	7	—	1	8	—
Total ...		—	17	11	15	143	78	15	160	89
5th Division	Infantry	4	57	—	9	322	2	13	379	2
	Cavalry ...	—	1	3	—	2	3	—	3	6
	Artillery	—	3	12	2	59	49	2	62	61
	Engineer	—	1	—	1	4	—	1	5	—
	Others ...	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	2	1
Total ...		4	62	15	12	389	55	16	451	70
6th Division	Infantry	—	4	—	1	42	2	1	46	2
	Cavalry ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Artillery	2	5	6	1	14	3	3	19	9
	Engineer	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
	Others ...	—	—	2	—	3	—	—	3	2
Total ...		2	9	8	2	60	5	4	69	13
1st Artillery Brigade	Artillery	—	12	14	11	72	69	11	84	83
Total ...	—	10	169	52	56	954	221	66	1,123	273

A later and correct, but less detailed, return gives the losses as follows :—

Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.
12	136	47	848	—	1	59	985

Russians.

The losses of the Russians are not known, but have been estimated from independent sources at 2,000 killed, wounded and missing. One authority puts the losses at 20 officers and 600 men killed and wounded. In the two batteries most heavily engaged, the losses are said to have been :—

		Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
		Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.
2nd Battery	...	—	2	2	25	—	—	2	27
3rd Battery	...	—	—	—	11	—	—	—	11

EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION AT THE BATTLE OF
TA-SHIH-CHIAO.

Japanese.

The average number of rounds expended was as follows :—

Per rifle.	Per gun.
8·8	80·5

The highest average expenditure of ammunition occurred in the 3rd Division, and the average number of rounds per rifle expended in its two brigades was as follows :—

5th Brigade.	17th Brigade.
107·12	16·76

Russian.

The Russian batteries are stated to have expended on an average 200 rounds per gun, the 2nd Battery of the 9th Brigade (8 guns) firing over 4,000 rounds, and the 3rd Battery 3,141 rounds. A Cossack horse artillery battery fired an average of 104 rounds per gun.

APPENDIX G.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE TA-KU-SHAN ARMY ON THE 27TH JUNE, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : Lieutenant-General Baron Kawamura.

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Uchiyama.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
10TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant - General Baron Kawamura.				
8th Brigade : Major-General H. Tojo.				
10th Regiment	3	—	—	—
40th Regiment	3	—	—	—
20th Brigade : Major-General M. Marui.				
20th Regiment	3	—	—	—
39th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
10th Cavalry Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
10th Artillery Regiment (mountain guns) ...	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
10th Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	3

ORDER OF BATTLE—*Continued.*

					Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
ATTACHED.								
1st Guard Brigade : Major-General N. Asada.								
1st Guard Regiment ...	...	...	...	...	3	—	—	—
2nd Guard Regiment	...	...	...	...	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.								
Guard Cavalry Regiment ...	...	...	...	...	—	2	—	—
ARTILLERY.								
Guard Artillery Regiment (field guns) ...	...	...	...	...	—	—	12	—
ENGINEERS.								
Guard Engineer Battalion	...	...	...	...	—	—	—	1
Total	...	...	...	...	18	5	48	4

The Russian force present at the Fen-shui Ling on the 27th June is not known in sufficient detail to admit of the preparation of an Order of Battle. *See p. 151.*

LOSSES AT THE CAPTURE OF THE FEN-SHUI LING, 26TH AND
27TH JUNE, 1904.

Japanese.

Body of Troops.	Killed.		Wounded.	
	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.
GUARD DIVISION.				
1st Guard Regiment	1	6	2	49
2nd Guard Regiment	1	2	—	31
Guard Cavalry Regiment	—	—	—	—
Guard Artillery	1	4	2	15
3rd Company Guard Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	8
Guard Bearer Company	—	—	—	3
13TH DIVISION.				
10th Regiment	—	6	—	30
40th Regiment	—	1	—	17
20th Regiment	—	—	1	4
39th Regiment	—	1	—	8
10th Cavalry Regiment	—	—	—	1
10th Artillery Regiment	—	—	—	8
10th Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	2
Total	3	20	5	176

A later and more correct, but less detailed, return gives the losses as follows:—

Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.
3	19	3	168	—	—	6	187

Russians.

The official Russian report gives their losses as only one man killed and 20 wounded. Unofficial information raises them to from 300 to 500 killed and wounded. The Japanese, in their official report of this action, state that many Russians were killed, those on the main road alone numbering over 90, while six officers and 82 men were taken prisoners.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED AT THE CAPTURE OF THE
FEN-SHUI LING.

Japanese.

The expenditure of the 10th Division is not known, but that of the Mixed Brigade, Guard Division, on the 27th June, was as follows:—

Body of Troops.	Gun Ammunition.		Small Arm Ammunition.
	High Explosive.	Shrapnel.	
1st Guard Regiment	—	—	49,251
2nd Guard Regiment	—	—	9,677
Guard Artillery Regiment (12 guns)	317	971	—
10th Artillery Regiment	182	376	—
Total	499	1,347	58,928

Russians.

No information is available regarding the expenditure of ammunition by the Russians in this action beyond the fact that one quick-firing battery expended the whole of its ammunition between daylight and 7.40 a.m., or in less than four hours.

APPENDIX H.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE FOURTH JAPANESE ARMY ON THE 31ST JULY, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : General Count Nodzu.

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Uehara.

Commanding Artillery : Major-General Kasunose.

Commander of Engineers : Major-General Furokawa.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
10TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant - General Baron Kawanura.				
8th Brigade : Major-General H. Tojo.				
10th Regiment	3	—	—	—
40th Regiment	3	—	—	—
20th Brigade : Major-General M. Marui.				
20th Regiment	3	—	—	—
39th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
10th Cavalry Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
10th Artillery Regiment (mountain guns) ...	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
10th Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	—
10th <i>Kobi</i> Brigade :—				
10th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	2	—	—	3
20th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	2	—	—	—
40th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	2	—	—	—

ORDER OF BATTLE—*Continued.*

						Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
ATTACHED.									
5TH DIVISION.									
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Ueda.									
9th Brigade : Major-General Yamada.									
11th Regiment	...	...	...	...	...	3	—	—	—
41st Regiment	...	...	...	...	...	3	—	—	—
21st Brigade : Major-General Tsukamoto.									
21st Regiment...	...	...	...	...	...	3	—	—	—
42nd Regiment	...	...	...	...	...	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.									
5th Cavalry Regiment	...	...	...	...	...	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.									
5th Artillery Regiment (mountain guns)	...	...	...	...	...	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.									
5th Engineer Battalion	...	...	...	...	...	—	—	—	3
3RD DIVISION.									
Major-General Kodama's detachment	...	...	...	...	...	3	1 troop	12	1
Total						33	6 & 1 troop	84	7

The only Russian troops who are definitely known to have been present at this battle were the 2nd Brigade of the 31st Infantry Division. It is certain that this force was extricated from a difficult position by reinforcements sent up from the rear, but neither the strength nor composition of these fresh troops is known at present.

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF HSI-MU-CHENG, 21ST JULY, 1904.

Japanese.

Body of Troops.	Killed.		Wounded.	
	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.
5TH DIVISION.				
11th Regiment	—	3	1	14
41st Regiment	—	9	2	73
21st Regiment	1	2	—	8
42nd Regiment	—	2	1	0
5th Cavalry Regiment	—	—	—	—
5th Artillery Regiment	—	2	—	23
5th Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	2
Total, 5th Division	1	18	4	120
10TH DIVISION.				
10th Regiment	2	45	6	144
40th Regiment	2	89	8	194
20th Regiment	—	—	—	—
39th Regiment	2	14	1	63
10th Cavalry Regiment	—	—	—	—
10th Artillery Regiment	—	5	4	25
10th Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	—
Ammunition Column	—	—	—	5
Total, 10th Division	6	153	19	431
10TH <i>Kobi</i> BRIGADE.				
10th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	2	11	—	72
20th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	—	5	3	12
40th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	—	—	—	—
Total, 10th <i>Kobi</i> Brigade	2	16	3	84
Total	9	187	26	635

In the 5th Division 2 horses were killed and 9 wounded, and in the 10th Division 10 horses were killed and 13 wounded.

A later and more correct, but less detailed, return gives the losses as follows :—

Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Officers.	Other Ranks.
9	186	24	617	—	—	33	803

Russians.

The losses of the 2nd Brigade of the 31st Infantry Division are officially stated to have been 27 officers and 730 men, of whom 5 officers and 120 men were overcome by the great heat. The Japanese official report states that about 700 Russian dead were found.

The Russians lost six field guns, some ammunition, and supplies.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED AT THE BATTLE OF HSI-MU-CHENG.

Japanese.

Body of Troops.	Gun Ammunition.		Small Arm Ammunition.
	High Explosive.	Shrapnel.	
5TH DIVISION.			
11th Regiment	—	—	14,905
41st Regiment	—	—	64,385
21st Regiment	—	—	13,750
42nd Regiment	—	—	9,338
5th Artillery Regiment	402	2,727	—
10TH DIVISION.			
10th Regiment	—	—	111,482
40th Regiment	—	—	77,166
39th Regiment	—	—	41,056
10th Cavalry Regiment	—	—	240
10th Artillery Regiment	439	3,131	—
10TH <i>Kobi</i> BRIGADE.			
10th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	—	—	41,642
20th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	—	—	23,903
Total	841	5,858	397,867

One gun was damaged in each of the artillery regiments.

Russians.

No information is available regarding the expenditure of ammunition by the Russians in this action.

APPENDIX I.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE FIRST JAPANESE ARMY ON THE 31ST JULY, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : General Baron Kuroki.

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Fuji.

Commander of Artillery : Colonel Matsumoto.

Commander of Engineers : Major-General T. Kodama.

—				Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
GUARD DIVISION.							
Commander: Lieutenant - General Baron Hashegawa.							
1st Guard Brigade, Major-General N. Asada.							
1st Guard Regiment ...	...	...	...	3	—	—	—
2nd Guard Regiment...	...	...	...	3	—	—	—
2nd Guard Brigade.							
3rd Guard Regiment...	...	...	...	3	—	—	—
4th Guard Regiment...	...	...	...	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.							
Guard Cavalry Regiment...	...	...	...	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.							
Guard Artillery Regiment (field guns) ...	...	...	...	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.							
Guard Engineer Battalion	...	...	...	—	—	—	3

ORDER OF BATTLE—*Continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
2ND DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Nishi.				
3rd Brigade, Major-General M. Matsunaga.				
4th Regiment	3	—	—	—
29th Regiment	3	—	—	—
15th Brigade, Major-General S. Okasaki.				
16th Regiment	3	—	—	—
30th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
2nd Cavalry Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
2nd Artillery Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
2nd Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	3
12TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Inouye.				
12th Brigade, Major-General N. Sasaki.				
14th Regiment	3	—	—	—
47th Regiment	3	—	—	—
23rd Brigade, Major-General Kigoshi.				
23rd Regiment	3	—	—	—
46th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
12th Cavalry Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
12th Artillery Regiment (mountain guns)	—	—	36	—

ORDER OF BATTLE— *Continued.*

					Battalions,	Squadrons,	Guns,	Engineer Companies.
ENGINEERS.								
12th Engineer Battalion	...	...	...	—	—	—	—	3
<i>Kobi</i> TROOPS.								
Guard <i>Kobi</i> Brigade	...	...	...	4	—	—	—	—
39th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	...	...	...	1	—	—	—	—
CAVALRY.								
Guard <i>Kobi</i> Cavalry	...	...	...	—	1	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.								
<i>Kobi</i> Artillery of the Line	...	...	...	—	—	6	—	—
ENGINEER.								
Guard <i>Kobi</i> Engineers	...	...	...	—	—	—	—	1 Sec.
Total					41	10	114	9 Com. 1 Sec.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE RUSSIAN FORCES ON THE 31ST JULY, 1904.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
EASTERN FORCE.				
General Officer Commanding: Lieutenant-General Count Keller.				
Chief of the Staff: Colonel Oranovski.				
3RD EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander: Major-General Kashtalinski.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Mardanov.				
9th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
10th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Stolitsa.				
11th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
12th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
3rd East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.				
1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Batteries ...	—	—	32*	—
6TH EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander: Major-General Romanov.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Yatsinin.				
21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Krichinski.				
23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—

* It has been ascertained that although 68 guns were present at Yang-tzu Ling, only 28 field and 4 mountain guns actually took part in the action.
(4091)

ORDER OF BATTLE—*Continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
ARTILLERY.				
6th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Batteries ...	—	—	32*	—
CAVALRY.				
2nd Chita Cossack Regiment ...	—	3	—	—
Frontier Guard ...	—	—	4*	—
Artillery ...	—	—	mountain.	—
XTH ARMY CORPS.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Sluchevski.				
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Gershelmann.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Riabinkin				
33rd (Elets) Infantry Regiment ...	4	—	—	—
34th (Syev) Infantry Regiment ...	4	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Martson.				
35th (Bryansk) Infantry Regiment ...	4	—	—	—
36th (Orel) Infantry Regiment ...	4	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
9th Artillery Brigade (6 batteries)...	—	—	48	—
31ST INFANTRY DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Mau				
1st Brigade.				
121st (Penza) Infantry Regiment ...	4	—	—	—
122nd (Tambov) Infantry Regiment ...	4	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
31st Artillery Brigade (less 1 Battery) ...	—	—	40	—

* It has been ascertained that although 68 guns were present at Yang tzu Ling, only 28 field and 4 mountain guns actually took part in the action.

ORDER OF BATTLE—*Continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
CAVALRY.				
1st Argun Cossack Regiment ...	—	5	—	—
1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment ...	—	5	—	—
Terek-Kuban Cavalry Regiment ...	—	6	—	—
ENGINEERS.				
6th Engineer. Battalion... ..	—	—	—	3
Major-General Liubavin's Detachment.				
ARTILLERY.				
4th Trans-Baikal Cossack Artillery Battery.	—	—	6	—
4th Battery 6th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.	—	—	8	—
CAVALRY.				
2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade.				
2nd Nerchinsk Cossack Regiment ...	—	6	—	—
2nd Argun Cossack Regiment... ..	—	6	—	—
Ussuri Cossack Regiment	—	3	—	—
Garrison of Pen-hsi-hu.				
11th (Pskov) Regiment	4	—	—	—
1st Siberian Infantry Regiment ...	1	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
Frontier Guard Battery	—	—	2	—
CAVALRY.				
2nd Daghestan Cavalry Regiment ...	—	6	—	—
	50	40	158	3

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF YU-SHU LING—
YANG-TZU LING (31st JULY-1st AUGUST.)

Japanese.

	Killed.		Wounded.		Total.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
Guard Division	5	74	17	317	413
2nd Division	1	15	8	99	123
12th Division	2	61	10	351	424
Kobi troops	—	1	2	26	29
Total	8	151	37	793	989

Russians.

	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
Yang-tzu Ling	3	48	11	306	1	22	391
Yu-shu Ling	6	269	33	1,345	8	407	2,068

EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION AT THE BATTLE OF
YU-SHU LING—YANG-TZU LING.

Japanese.

	Yu-shu Ling.	Yang-tzu Ling.
Gun ammunition	4,053 rounds	2,263 rounds.
Rifle ammunition... ..	351,885 „	587,997 „

Russians.

The only information available is that one battery fired 1,292 rounds during the battle at the Yang-tzu Ling.

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